

Proxy Voting Report July 1, 2018 to June 30, 2019

Proposal Summary

| Number of Meetings: Number of Mgmt Proposals: Number of Shareholder Proposals: | 152 2,061 91 | | |
|--|--------------------|----------------------------|------|
| Mgmt Proposals Voted FOR | 1,759 | % of All Mgmt Proposals | 85.3 |
| Mgmt Proposals Voted Against/Withold | 300 | % of All Mgmt Proposals | 14.6 |
| Mgmt Proposals Voted Abstain | 2 | % of All Mgmt Proposals | 0.1 |
| Mgmt Proposals With No Votes Cast | 0 | % of All Mgmt Proposals | NA |
| ShrHldr Proposal Voted FOR | 67 | % of All ShrHldr Proposals | 73.6 |
| ShrHldr Proposals Voted Against/Withold | 13 | % of All ShrHldr Proposals | 14.3 |
| ShrHldr Proposals Voted Abstain | 8 | % of All ShrHldr Proposals | 8.8 |
| ShrHldr Proposals With No Votes Cast | 0 | % of All ShrHldr Proposals | NA |

Addenda Canadian Equity Pooled Fund

Agnico Eagle Mines Ltd. Voted — Country of Trade: Canada — Annual Meeting Agenda 4/26/2019

| Proposal | Proposal Text | Mgmt Rec | Vote Cast |
|----------|---|----------|-----------|
| 1 | Election of Directors | | |
| | 1.1 Elect Leanne M. Baker | For | For |
| | 1.2 Elect Sean Boyd | For | For |
| | 1.3 Elect Martine A. Celej | For | For |
| | 1.4 Elect Robert J. Gemmell | For | For |
| | 1.5 Elect Mel Leiderman | For | For |
| | 1.6 Elect Deborah A. McCombe | For | For |
| | 1.7 Elect James D. Nasso | For | For |
| | 1.8 Elect Sean Riley | For | For |
| | 1.9 Elect J. Merfyn Roberts | For | For |
| | 1.10 Elect Jamie C. Sokalsky | For | For |
| 2 | Appointment of Auditor and Authority to Set Fees | For | Withhold |
| | Vote Note: The non-audit-related fees are 30.5% of the total fees paid to the auditor. We believe that non-audit-related work could have been performed by a separate auditor so as to not compromise the independence of the auditor and the integrity of the Company's financial statements. | | |
| 3 | Amendment to Incentive Share Purchase Plan | For | For |
| 4 | Advisory Vote on Executive Compensation | For | Against |
| | Vote Note: It is not clear that executive compensation sufficiently ties pay with performance in a manner that aligns executives with the long-term interests of the company. For example: • The company has not provided many of the performance objectives for its short or long-term compensation plans. • The Company's short- and long-term incentive arrangements are based on similar metrics, which allows for a high level of pay-out (or lack thereof) for hitting similar targets. • Under the LTI plan, executives become eligible to receive awards if the Company's TSR ranks 14th or 15th relative to a peer group of 19 companies. • The company's short-term incentive program is formulaic overall but target performance is up to committee discretion for multiple metrics. | | |

| Proposal | Proposal Text | Mgmt Rec | Vote Cast |
|----------|--|----------|-----------|
| 1 | Election of Directors | | |
| | 1.1 Elect Christie J.B. Clark | For | For |
| | 1.2 Elect Gary A. Doer | For | Withhold |
| | Vote Note: This director nominee appears to have too many commitments to fulfill their duties as a director. He This director is on a total of 5 public company boards. | | |
| | 1.3 Elect Robert I. Fyfe | For | For |
| | 1.4 Elect Michael M. Green | For | For |
| | 1.5 Elect Jean Marc Huot | For | For |
| | 1.6 Elect Madeleine Paquin | For | For |
| | 1.7 Elect Calin Rovinescu | For | For |
| | 1.8 Elect Vagn Sørensen | For | For |
| | 1.9 Elect Kathleen P. Taylor | For | For |
| | 1.10 Elect Annette Verschuren | For | For |
| | 1.11 Elect Michael M. Wilson | For | For |
| 2 | Appointment of Auditor | For | For |
| 3 | Advisory Vote on Executive Compensation | For | Against |
| | Vote Note: It is not clear that executive compensation sufficiently ties pay with performance in a manner that aligns executives with the long-term interests of the company. For example: • The use of absolute metrics for the incentive programs may not be appropriate as it may reflect economic or industry factors beyond the control of executives. Performance conditions should include relative targets. | | |
| | The company provides immediate vesting of certain equity awards upon a change in control rather than requiring that an executive also lose their position. The company has not disclosed the performance objectives for its short-term or long-term compensation plan. | | |
| 4 | Article Amendments Regarding Variable Voting Share Structure to Comply with Transportation Act | For | For |
| 5 | Resident Status | Against | For |

Alimentation-Couche Tard, Inc. Voted — Country of Trade: Canada — Annual Meeting Agenda 9/20/2018

| Proposal | Proposal Text | Mgmt Rec | Vote Cast |
|----------|--|----------|-----------|
| 1 | Appointment of Auditor and Authority to Set Fees | For | For |
| 2 | Election of Directors | | |
| | 2.1 Elect Alain Bouchard | For | For |
| | 2.2 Elect Mélanie Kau | For | For |
| | 2.3 Elect Nathalie Bourque | For | For |
| | 2.4 Elect Eric Boyko | For | For |
| | 2.5 Elect Jacques D'Amours | For | For |
| | 2.6 Elect Jean Élie | For | For |
| | 2.7 Elect Richard Fortin | For | For |
| | 2.8 Elect Brian Hannasch | For | For |
| | 2.9 Elect Monique F. Leroux | For | For |
| | 2.10 Elect Réal Plourde | For | For |
| | 2.11 Elect Daniel Rabinowicz | For | For |
| 3 | Shareholder Proposal Regarding Advisory Vote on Compensation Report (Say on Pay) | Against | For |
| | Vote Note: Improved disclosure of the company's director diversity policies and practices could help with the evaluation of related risks and opportunities. | | |
| 4 | Shareholder Proposal Regarding Disclosure of Vote Results By Share Class | Against | For |
| | Vote Note: It would not be overly burdensome for the company to be fully transparent about shareholder votes. | | |

Shareholder Proposal Regarding Accountability Exercise on Environmental and Social Issues

5

Against

For

Vote Note: A comprehensive sustainability report would provide shareholders with valuable information regarding the risk and opportunities associated with the Company's operation. The terms of the proposal are reasonable. The Company is evaluating different options for reporting on corporate responsibility initiatives, and will communicate more when it has determined the best approach (2018 Management Proxy Circular, p.67). However, the Company currently does not provide any meaningful environmental and social data nor has it provided specific information concerning its planned disclosures.

Bank of Nova Scotia Voted — Country of Trade: Canada — Annual Meeting Agenda 4/9/2019

| Proposal | Proposal Text | Mgmt Rec | Vote Cast |
|----------|--|----------|-----------|
| 1 | Election of Directors | | |
| | 1.1 Elect Nora. A. Aufreiter | For | For |
| | 1.2 Elect Guillermo E. Babatz | For | For |
| | 1.3 Elect Scott B. Bonham | For | For |
| | 1.4 Elect Charles Dallara | For | For |
| | 1.5 Elect Tiff Macklem | For | For |
| | 1.6 Elect Michael D. Penner | For | For |
| | 1.7 Elect Brian J. Porter | For | For |
| | 1.8 Elect Una M. Power | For | For |
| | 1.9 Elect Aaron W. Regent | For | For |
| | 1.10 Elect Indira V. Samarasekera | For | For |
| | 1.11 Elect Susan L. Segal | For | For |
| | 1.12 Elect Barbara S. Thomas | For | For |
| | 1.13 Elect L. Scott Thomson | For | For |
| | 1.14 Elect Benita Warmbold | For | For |
| 2 | Appointment of Auditor | For | For |
| 3 | Advisory Vote on Executive Compensation | Against | For |
| | Vote Note: It is not clear that executive compensation sufficiently ties pay with performance in a manner that aligns executives with the long-term interests of the company. For example: • The company has not provided a clear description of threshold, target and maximum goals under the LTI plan. • The company uses a performance-based formula, however, final awards granted under the bonus plan may be adjusted relative by performance in certain metrics where the goals are less defined as being significantly more or less than peers. Payouts are also influenced by what appears to be a subjective assessment of risk. | | |
| 4 | Shareholder Proposal Regarding Human and Indigenous Peoples' Rights Vote Note: This proposal is requesting that the Bank of Nova Scotia revise its Human Rights policies to ensure that corporate level financing thoroughly considers the finance recipients' policies and practices for potential impacts on Human and Indigenous Peoples' Rights. We believe this is a reasonable request. The Company has declared it has a robust due diligence and loan screening process in place to ensure Human Rights are not violated. If the Company is following this process honestly, the Company should be making these considerations. | Against | For |
| 5 | Shareholder Proposal Regarding Equity Ratio Vote Note: One of the tools used to inform shareholders is the equity ratio, or the difference between the CEOs' total compensation and an employee's median compensation, known as the equity ratio. Disclosure of the equity ratio would allow shareholders to judge whether this compensation program is aligned with shareholders' interests. | Against | For |
| 6 | Shareholder Proposal Regarding Creation of Technology Committee Vote Note: While we agree with the spirit of the proposal, we find certain sections of the resolution to be overly prescriptive. | Against | Abstain |

BCE Inc. Voted — Country of Trade: Canada — Annual Meeting Agenda 5/2/2019

| Proposal 1 | Proposal Text Election of Directors | Mgmt Rec | Vote Cast |
|---------------|--|----------|-----------|
| | 1.1 Elect Barry K. Allen | For | For |
| | 1.2 Elect Sophie Brochu | For | For |
| | 1.3 Elect Robert E. Brown | For | For |
| | 1.4 Elect George A. Cope | For | For |
| | 1.5 Elect David F. Denison | For | For |
| | 1.6 Elect Robert P. Dexter | For | For |

| | 1.7 Elect Ian Greenberg Vote Note: This director is not independent and he is on the company's audit and compensation committees and these committees should be 100% independent. | For | Withhold |
|---|---|-----|----------|
| | 1.8 Elect Katherine Lee | For | For |
| | 1.9 Elect Monique F. Leroux | For | For |
| | 1.10 Elect Gordon M. Nixon | For | For |
| | 1.11 Elect Calin Rovinescu | For | For |
| | 1.12 Elect Karen Sheriff | For | For |
| | 1.13 Elect Robert C. Simmonds | For | For |
| | 1.14 Elect Paul R. Weiss | For | For |
| 2 | Appointment of Auditor | For | For |
| 3 | Advisory Vote on Executive Compensation | For | Against |

Vote Note: It is not clear that executive compensation sufficiently ties pay with performance in a manner that aligns executives with the long-term interests of the company. For example:

• The use of absolute metrics for incentive programs may not be appropriate as it may reflect

- The use of absolute metrics for incentive programs may not be appropriate as it may reflect economic or industry factors beyond the control of executives. Performance conditions should include relative targets.
- The company has not disclosed all of the performance objectives for its compensation plans.
- Only 25% of the company's long-term incentive plan is based on performance metrics achieved.

Brookfield Asset Management Inc. Voted - Country of Trade: Canada - Annual Meeting Agenda 6/14/2019

| Proposal | Proposal Text | Mgmt Rec | Vote Cast |
|----------|--|----------|-----------|
| 1 | Election of Directors | mge ree | vote case |
| | 1.1 Elect M. Elyse Allan | For | For |
| | 1.2 Elect Angela F. Braly | For | For |
| | 1.3 Elect V. Maureen Kempston Darkes | For | For |
| | 1.4 Elect Murilo Pinto de Oliveira Ferreira | For | For |
| | 1.5 Elect Frank J. McKenna | For | For |
| | 1.6 Elect Rafael Miranda Robredo | For | For |
| | 1.7 Elect Seek Ngee Huat | For | For |
| | 1.8 Elect Diana L. Taylor | For | For |
| 2 | Appointment of Auditor and Authority to Set Fees | For | For |
| 3 | Advisory Vote on Executive Compensation | For | Against |
| | Vote Note: It is not clear that executive compensation sufficiently ties pay with performance in a manner that aligns executives with the long-term interests of the company. For example: • The company's incentive program does not use any performance metrics. The compensation committee determines cash bonuses on a purely discretionary basis. | | |
| 4 | Approval of the 2019 Management Share Option Plan | For | For |
| 5 | Shareholder Proposal Regarding Linking Executive Pay to Sexual Misconduct | Against | Against |
| 6 | Shareholder Proposal Regarding Disclosure of Human Capital Management Metrics | Against | For |
| | Vote Note: The disclosure of meaningful ESG metrics helps investors evaluate how a company manages key risks and upholds its responsibilities under international norms and frameworks such as the OECD Guidelines for Multinational Enterprises. A few Company subsidiaries report health and safety metrics, however most do not, and the Company provides no global data; Disclosure of metrics such as total recordable work-related injuries and number of fatalities would help investors to evaluate the Company's progress against its stated commitment to "zero serious safety incidents;" and Data on the types of complaints received from employees and contract workers or the corrective measures taken to address workforce-related risks and concerns raised by the Company's workforce would help demonstrate the effectiveness of human capital management practices. | | |

Canadian National Railway Co. Voted — Country of Trade: Canada — Annual Meeting Agenda 4/30/2019

| Proposal | Proposal Text | Mgmt Rec | Vote Cast |
|----------|---|----------|-----------|
| 1 | Election of Directors | | |
| | 1.1 Elect Shauneen Bruder | For | For |
| | 1.2 Elect Donald J. Carty | For | For |
| | 1.3 Elect Gordon D. Giffin | For | For |
| | 1.4 Elect Julie Godin | For | For |
| | 1.5 Elect Edith E. Holiday | For | Withhold |
| | Vote Note: This director nominee appears to have too many commitments to fulfill their duties as a director. She sits on a total of five public company boards. | | |

| | 1.6 Elect V. Maureen Kempston Darkes | For | For |
|---|--|-----|----------|
| | 1.7 Elect Denis Losier | For | For |
| | 1.8 Elect Kevin G. Lynch | For | For |
| | 1.9 Elect James E. O'Connor | For | For |
| | 1.10 Elect Robert Pace | For | For |
| | 1.11 Elect Robert L. Phillips | For | For |
| | 1.12 Elect Jean-Jacques Ruest | For | For |
| | 1.13 Elect Laura Stein | For | For |
| 2 | Appointment of Auditor | For | Withhold |
| | Vote Note: It is not clear that executive compensation sufficiently ties pay with performance in a manner that aligns executives with the long-term interests of the company. For example: • Threshold performance for the growth in shareholder value metric is 25th percentile versus peers which may not be sufficiently challenging. • The use of absolute metrics for the short-term incentive program may not be appropriate as it may reflect economic or industry factors beyond the control of executives. Performance conditions should include relative targets. | | |
| 3 | Advisory Vote on Executive Compensation Vote Note: It is not clear that executive compensation sufficiently ties pay with performance in a manner that aligns executives with the long-term interests of the company. For example: • The company has not provided a clear description of threshold, target and maximum goals | For | Against |

under the LTI plan.

• The company uses a performance-based formula, however, final awards granted under the bonus plan may be adjusted relative by performance in certain metrics where the goals are less defined

plan may be adjusted relative by performance in certain metrics where the goals are less defined as being significantly more or less than peers. Payouts are also influenced by what appears to be a subjective assessment of risk.

Canadian Natural Resources Ltd. Voted — Country of Trade: Canada — Annual Meeting Agenda 5/9/2019

| | D 17 (| | V . C |
|----------|--|----------|----------|
| Proposal | Proposal Text | Mgmt Rec | Vote Ca |
| 1 | Election of Directors | | |
| | 1.1 Elect Catherine M. Best | For | For |
| | 1.2 Elect N. Murray Edwards | For | Withhold |
| | Vote Note: This director nominee appears to have too many commitments to fulfill his duties | | |
| | as a director. He is an executive of a publicly traded company and he sits on a total of three public company boards. | | |
| | 1.3 Elect Timothy W. Faithfull | For | For |
| | 1.4 Elect Christopher L. Fong | For | For |
| | 1.5 Elect Gordon D. Giffin | For | For |
| | 1.6 Elect Wilfred A. Gobert | For | For |
| | 1.7 Elect Steve W. Laut | For | For |
| | 1.8 Elect Tim S. McKay | For | For |
| | 1.9 Elect Frank J. McKenna | For | For |
| | 1.10 Elect David A. Tuer | For | For |
| | 1.11 Elect Annette Verschuren | For | For |
| 2 | Appointment of Auditor and Authority to Set Fees | For | For |
| 3 | Stock Option Plan Renewal | For | For |
| 4 | Advisory Vote on Executive Compensation | For | Against |
| | Vote Note: It is not clear that executive compensation sufficiently ties pay with performance | | |
| | in a manner that aligns executives with the long-term interests of the company. For example: | | |
| | Threshold performance for the growth in shareholder value metric is 20th percentile versus peers which may not be sufficiently challenging. | | |
| | The company has not disclosed the performance objectives for its short-term compensation plan. | | |

Canadian Pacific Railway Ltd. Voted - Country of Trade: Canada - Annual Meeting Agenda 5/7/2019

| Proposal | Proposal Text Appointment of Auditor Advisory Vote on Executive Compensation Vote Note: It is not clear that executive compensation sufficiently ties pay with performance in a manner that aligns executives with the long-term interests of the company. For example: • Threshold performance for the growth in shareholder value metric is 25th percentile versus peers which may not be sufficiently challenging. • The total compensation of the CEO is quite high relative to the other named executive officers which may indicate there are problems with succession planning or effective structuring of pay. | Mgmt Rec | Vote Cast |
|----------|--|----------|-----------|
| 1 | | For | For |
| 2 | | For | Against |
| 3 | Election of Directors 3.1 Elect John Baird | For | For |

| 3.2 | Elect Isabelle Courville | For | For |
|-----|----------------------------|-----|-----|
| 3.3 | Elect Keith E. Creel | For | For |
| 3.4 | Elect Gillian H. Denham | For | For |
| 3.5 | Elect Rebecca MacDonald | For | For |
| 3.6 | Elect Edward L. Monser | For | For |
| 3.7 | Elect Matthew H. Paull | For | For |
| 3.8 | Elect Jane L. Peverett | For | For |
| 3.9 | Elect Gordon T. Trafton II | For | For |

CGI Group Inc. Voted — Country of Trade: Canada — Annual Meeting Agenda 1/30/2019

| Proposal | Proposal Text | Mgmt Rec | Vote Cast |
|----------|---|----------|-----------|
| 1 | Election of Directors | | |
| | 1.1 Elect Alain Bouchard | For | For |
| | 1.2 Elect Paule Doré | For | For |
| | 1.3 Elect Richard B. Evans | For | For |
| | 1.4 Elect Julie Godin | For | For |
| | 1.5 Elect Serge Godin | For | For |
| | 1.6 Elect Timothy J. Hearn | For | For |
| | 1.7 Elect André Imbeau | For | For |
| | 1.8 Elect Gilles Labbé | For | For |
| | 1.9 Elect Michael B. Pedersen | For | For |
| | 1.10 Elect Alison Reed | For | For |
| | 1.11 Elect Michael E. Roach | For | For |
| | 1.12 Elect George D. Schindler | For | For |
| | 1.13 Elect Kathy N. Waller | For | For |
| | 1.14 Elect Joakim Westh | For | For |
| 2 | Appointment of Auditor and Authority to Set Fees | For | For |
| 3 | Company Name Change | For | For |
| 4 | Shareholder Proposal Regarding Advisory Vote on Compensation Report | Against | For |
| | (Say on Pay) | | |
| | Vote Note: Advisory votes on executive compensation allow shareholders to register their opinions regarding compensation practices and should not unduly increase the burden on the board, given that Canadian companies are already required to disclose information regarding the compensation of its top executives in their regulatory filings. | | |
| 5 | Shareholder Proposal Regarding Disclosure of Vote Results by Share Class Vote Note: It would not be overly burdensome for the company to be fully transparent about shareholder votes. | Against | For |

Constellation Software Inc. Voted — Country of Trade: Canada — Annual Meeting Agenda 5/2/2019

| Proposal | Proposal Text | Mgmt Rec | Vote Cast |
|----------|---|----------|-----------|
| 1 | Election of Directors | | |
| | 1.1 Elect Jeff Bender | For | For |
| | 1.2 Elect Lawrence Cunningham | For | For |
| | 1.3 Elect Meredith (Sam) Hayes | For | For |
| | 1.4 Elect Robert Kittel | For | For |
| | Vote Note: It is Addenda's practice to vote against the chair of a company's nominating committee if their board has 0 or 1 women and no board diversity policy. In this case, we have decided to vote for this member of the nominating committee because we understand that the company is working on a diversity policy. | | |
| | 1.5 Elect Mark Leonard | For | For |
| | 1.6 Elect Paul McFeeters | For | For |
| | Vote Note: We contacted the company and they informed us that there was a mistake in the circular — that this director attended 6/7 meetings. | | |
| | 1.7 Elect Mark Miller | For | For |
| | 1.8 Elect Lori O'Neill | For | For |
| | 1.9 Elect Stephen R. Scotchmer | For | For |
| | Vote Note: It is Addenda's practice to vote against the chair of a company's nominating committee if their board has 0 or 1 women and no board diversity policy. In this case, we have decided to vote for this member of the nominating committee because we understand that the company is working on a diversity policy. | | |

| | 1.10 Elect Robin Van Poelje | For | For |
|---|---|-----|----------|
| 2 | Appointment of Auditor and Authority to Set Fees | For | Withhold |
| | Vote Note: It is Addenda's practice to vote against the chair of a company's nominating committee if their board has 0 or 1 women and no board diversity policy. In this case, we have decided to vote for this member of the nominating committee because we understand that the company is working on a diversity policy. | | |
| 3 | Increasing the Maximum Number of Directors | For | For |
| 4 | Advisory Vote on Executive Compensation | For | Against |
| | Vote Note: It is not clear that executive compensation sufficiently ties nay with performance | | |

Vote Note: It is not clear that executive compensation sufficiently ties pay with performance in a manner that aligns executives with the long-term interests of the company. For example:

- The company's incentive plans do not appear to have a clawback provision that would enable the company to recoup bonus awards in the event of material fraud or misconduct by the recipient of a bonus award.
- The use of absolute metrics for incentive programs may not be appropriate as it may reflect economic or industry factors beyond the control of executives. Performance conditions should include relative targets.
- The company has not disclosed the performance objectives for its variable compensation plan.
- The company's variable incentive program uses less than three years of performance.
- The company does not have an anti-hedging policy to prohibit executives from engaging of hedging transactions with respect to the company's securities.
- Executives are eligible to receive unlimited long-term incentive payments.

This runs contrary to best practices and shareholder interests.

Descartes Systems Group Inc. Voted — Country of Trade: Canada — Annual Meeting Agenda 5/30/2019

| Proposal | Proposal Text | Mgmt Rec | Vote Cast |
|----------|--|----------|-----------|
| 1 | Election of Directors | | |
| | 1.1 Elect David I. Beatson | For | For |
| | 1.2 Elect Deborah Close | For | For |
| | 1.3 Elect Eric Demirian | For | For |
| | 1.4 Elect Dennis Maple | For | For |
| | 1.5 Elect Jane O'Hagan | For | For |
| | 1.6 Elect Edward J. Ryan | For | For |
| | 1.7 Elect John Walker | For | For |
| 2 | Appointment of Auditor | For | For |
| 3 | Advisory Vote on Executive Compensation | For | Against |
| | Vote Note: It is not clear that executive compensation sufficiently ties pay with performance in a manner that aligns executives with the long-term interests of the company. For example: • The use of a single metric for the long-term incentive programs may not be appropriate. Performance related compensation should be linked to a variety of specific objective measures of the company's operational and financial performance. • Threshold performance for the growth in shareholder value metric is 30th percentile versus peers which may not be sufficiently challenging. • The company has not disclosed all of the performance thresholds for its short-term compensation plan. • The use of only absolute metrics for the short-term incentive program may not be appropriate as it may reflect economic or industry factors beyond the control of executives. | | |

Dollarama Inc. Voted — Country of Trade: Canada — Annual Meeting Agenda 6/13/2019

Performance conditions should include relative targets.

| Proposal 1 | Proposal Text Election of Directors | Mgmt Rec | Vote Cast |
|---------------|---|----------|-----------|
| | 1.1 Elect Joshua Bekenstein Vote Note: This director nominee appears to have too many commitments to fulfill his duties as a director. He sits on a total of five public company boards. | For | Withhold |
| | 1.2 Elect Gregory David | For | For |
| | 1.3 Elect Elisa D. Garcia | For | For |
| | 1.4 Elect Stephen K. Gunn | For | For |
| | 1.5 Elect Kristin Mugford | For | For |
| | 1.6 Elect Nicholas Nomicos | For | For |
| | 1.7 Elect Neil Rossy | For | For |
| | 1.8 Elect Richard G. Roy | For | For |
| | 1.9 Elect Huw Thomas | For | For |
| 2 | Appointment of Auditor and Authority to Set Fees | For | For |

3 Advisory Vote on Executive Compensation For Against Vote Note: It is not clear that executive compensation sufficiently ties pay with performance in a manner that aligns executives with the long-term interests of the company. For example: • The company's long-term incentive program does not use any performance metrics. • Executives are eligible to receive unlimited short-term incentive payments. This runs contrary to best practices and shareholder interests. Against Shareholder Proposal Regarding Sustainability Report For Vote Note: A comprehensive sustainability report would provide shareholders with valuable information regarding the risk and opportunities associated with the Company's operation. 5 Shareholder Proposal Regarding Human Rights Due Diligence Process Report Against For Vote Note: The Company's suppliers are required to signal adherence to the Company's vendor code of conduct which prohibits the use of child or forced labour and requires, at minimum, compliance with local laws with respect to wages and working conditions; The Company does not currently monitor compliance with its code of conduct nor does it require vendors to establish any clear practice with regard to critical concerns like labour recruitment and the risk of forced labour, which are known risks in the Company's sourcing countries; The Company has not reported any specific policies or practices beyond its vendor code of conduct and self-reporting by vendors. Failure to put proactive policies and procedures in place exposes the Company to significant risks, including potential regulatory action, supply chain disruption, and media reports that negatively impact the Company's reputation. 6 Shareholder Proposal Regarding Living Wage Policy Against For Vote Note: Public disagreement between companies and their workers can negatively impact market share and revenue. Paying employees a living wage can help strengthen a company's reputation.

Element Fleet Management Corp. Voted — Country of Trade: Canada — Annual Meeting Agenda 5/8/2019

| Proposal | Proposal Text | Mgmt Rec | Vote Cast |
|----------|---|----------|-----------|
| 1 | Election of Directors | | |
| | 1.1 Elect David F. Denison | For | For |
| | 1.2 Elect Paul D. Damp | For | For |
| | 1.3 Elect Jay Forbes | For | For |
| | 1.4 Elect G. Keith Graham | For | For |
| | 1.5 Elect Joan Lamm-Tennant | For | For |
| | 1.6 Elect Rubin J. McDougal | For | For |
| | 1.7 Elect Andrew C. Clarke | For | For |
| | 1.8 Elect Alexander D. Greene | For | For |
| | 1.9 Elect Andrea S. Rosen | For | For |
| 2 | Appointment of Auditor and Authority to Set Fees | For | Withhold |
| | Vote Note: The non-audit-related fees are 34.7% of the total fees paid to the auditor. We believe that non-audit-related work could have been performed by a separate auditor so as to not compromise the independence of the auditor and the integrity of the Company's financial statements. | | |
| 3 | Advisory Vote on Executive Compensation | For | Against |
| | Vote Note: It is not clear that executive compensation sufficiently ties pay with performance in a manner that aligns executives with the long-term interests of the company. For example: • The company provides immediate vesting of certain equity awards upon a change in control rather than requiring that an executive also lose their position. • Threshold performance for the growth in shareholder value metric is 40th percentile versus peers which may not be sufficiently challenging. • The short-term and long-term incentive programs are based on similar financial metrics which allows for a high level of pay-out (or lack thereof) for hitting similar targets rather than considering a variety of financial and operational metrics. • Part of the company's long-term incentive program uses less than three years of performance. Performance conditions should be measured over at least three consecutive years. | | |

Emera Inc. Voted — Country of Trade: Canada — Annual Meeting Agenda 5/15/2019

| Proposal 1 | Proposal Text Election of Directors | Mgmt Rec | Vote Cast |
|---------------|-------------------------------------|----------|-----------|
| | 1.1 Elect Scott C. Balfour | For | For |
| | 1.2 Elect James V. Bertram | For | For |
| | 1.3 Elect Sylvia D. Chrominska | For | For |
| | 1.4 Elect Henry E. Demone | For | For |
| | 1.5 Elect Kent M. Harvey | For | For |
| | 1.6 Elect B. Lynn Loewen | For | For |
| | 1.7 Elect Donald A. Pether | For | For |
| | 1.8 Elect John B. Ramil | For | For |
| | 1.9 Elect Andrea S. Rosen | For | For |

| | 1.10 Elect Richard P. Sergel | For | For |
|---|--|---------|---------|
| | 1.11 Elect M. Jacqueline Sheppard | For | For |
| | 1.12 Elect Jochen E. Tilk | For | For |
| 2 | Appointment of Auditor | For | For |
| 3 | Authority to Set Auditor's Fees | For | For |
| 4 | Advisory Vote on Executive Compensation | For | Against |
| | Vote Note: It is not clear that executive compensation sufficiently ties pay with performance in a manner that aligns executives with the long-term interests of the company. For example: • Threshold performance for the growth in shareholder value metric is 25th percentile versus peers which may not be sufficiently challenging. • The short-term and long-term incentive programs are based on similar financial metrics which allows for a high level of pay-out (or lack thereof) for hitting similar targets rather than considering a variety of financial and operational metrics. | | |
| 5 | Resident Status | Against | For |

Enbridge Inc. Voted – Country of Trade: United States – Annual Meeting Agenda 5/8/2019

| Proposal | Proposal Text | Mgmt Rec | Vote Cas |
|----------|---|----------|----------|
| 1 | Elect Pamela L. Carter | For | For |
| 2 | Elect Marcel R. Coutu Vote Note: This director nominee appears to have too many commitments to fulfill his duties as a director. He sits on a total of five public company boards. | For | Abstain |
| 3 | Elect Susan M. Cunningham | For | For |
| ļ | Elect Gregory L. Ebel | For | For |
| 5 | Elect J. Herb England | For | For |
|) | Elect Charles W. Fischer | For | For |
| , | Elect V. Maureen Kempston Darkes | For | For |
| 3 | Elect Teresa S. Madden | For | For |
|) | Elect Al Monaco | For | For |
| 0 | Elect Michael E.J. Phelps | For | For |
| 1 | Elect Dan C. Tutcher | For | For |
| 2 | Elect Catherine L. Williams | For | For |
| 3 | Appointment of Auditor and Authority to Set Fees | For | For |
| 14 | 2019 Long Term Incentive Plan Vote Note: We oppose the use of stock options to compensate directors. | For | Against |
| 15 | Advisory Vote on Executive Compensation Vote Note: We are supporting this advisory vote on compensation even though this company's practices are not entirely consistent with our Proxy Voting guidelines. | For | For |

Encana Corporation Voted — Country of Trade: Canada — Annual Meeting Agenda 4/30/2019

| Proposal | Proposal Text | Mgmt Rec | Vote Cast |
|----------|--|----------|-----------|
| 1 | Election of Directors | | |
| | 1.1 Elect Peter A. Dea | For | For |
| | 1.2 Elect Fred J. Fowler | For | For |
| | 1.3 Elect Howard J. Mayson | For | For |
| | 1.4 Elect Lee A. McIntire | For | For |
| | 1.5 Elect Margaret McKenzie | For | For |
| | 1.6 Elect Steven W. Nance | For | For |
| | 1.7 Elect Suzanne P. Nimocks | For | For |
| | 1.8 Elect Thomas G. Ricks | For | For |
| | 1.9 Elect Brian G. Shaw | For | For |
| | 1.10 Elect Douglas J. Suttles | For | For |
| | 1.11 Elect Bruce G. Waterman | For | For |
| | 1.12 Elect Clayton H. Woitas | For | For |
| 2 | Appointment of Auditor and Authority to Set Fees | For | For |
| 3 | Amendment to Shareholder Rights Plan | For | For |
| 4 | Approval of the 2019 Omnibus Incentive Plan | For | Against |
| | Vote Note: We oppose the use of stock options to compensate directors. | | |

5 Advisory Vote on Executive Compensation

Vote Note: It is not clear that executive compensation sufficiently ties pay with performance in a manner that aligns executives with the long-term interests of the company. For example:

- The use of absolute metrics for the short-term incentive program may not be appropriate as it may reflect economic or industry factors beyond the control of executives. Performance conditions should include relative targets.
- The company has not disclosed the performance objectives for its long-term compensation plan.

Encana Corporation Voted — Country of Trade: Canada — Special Meeting Agenda 2/12/2019

| Proposal | Proposal Text | Mgmt Rec | Vote Cast |
|----------|---------------------------|----------|------------------|
| 1 | Stock Issuance for Merger | For | For |
| 2 | Right to Adjourn Meeting | For | For |

For

Against

Enerplus Corporation Voted — Country of Trade: Canada — Annual Meeting Agenda 5/9/2019

| Proposal | Proposal Text | Mgmt Rec | Vote Cast |
|----------|---|----------|-----------|
| 1 | Election of Directors | | |
| | 1.1 Elect Michael R. Culbert | For | For |
| | 1.2 Elect Ian C. Dundas | For | For |
| | 1.3 Elect Hilary A. Foulkes | For | For |
| | 1.4 Elect Robert B. Hodgins | For | For |
| | 1.5 Elect Susan M. MacKenzie | For | For |
| | 1.6 Elect Elliott Pew | For | For |
| | 1.7 Elect Jeffrey W. Sheets | For | For |
| | 1.8 Elect Sheldon B. Steeves | For | For |
| | 1.9 Elect Karen E. Clarke-Whistler | For | For |
| 2 | Appointment of Auditor | For | For |
| 3 | Advisory Vote on Executive Compensation | For | Against |

Vote Note: It is not clear that executive compensation sufficiently ties pay with performance in a manner that aligns executives with the long-term interests of the company. For example:

- The use of a single metric for long-term incentive program may not be appropriate. Performance related compensation should be linked to a variety of specific objective measures of the company's operational and financial performance.
- The short-term and long-term incentive programs are based on similar financial metrics which allows for a high level of pay-out (or lack thereof) for hitting similar targets rather than considering a variety of financial and operational metrics.
- \bullet Threshold performance for the growth in shareholder value metric is 25^{th} percentile versus peers which may not be sufficiently challenging.
- The company has not disclosed the performance objectives for its short-term compensation plan.

Franco-Nevada Corporation Voted — Country of Trade: Canada — Annual Meeting Agenda 5/8/2019

| Proposal | Proposal Text | Mgmt Rec | Vote Cast |
|----------|---|----------|-----------|
| 1 | Election of Directors | | |
| | 1.1 Elect Pierre Lassonde | For | For |
| | 1.2 Elect David Harquail | For | For |
| | 1.3 Elect Tom Albanese | For | For |
| | 1.4 Elect Derek W. Evans | For | For |
| | 1.5 Elect Catharine Farrow | For | For |
| | 1.6 Elect Louis P. Gignac | For | For |
| | 1.7 Elect Jennifer Maki | For | For |
| | 1.8 Elect Randall Oliphant | For | For |
| | 1.9 Elect David R. Peterson | For | For |
| 2 | Appointment of Auditor and Authority to Set Fees | For | For |
| 3 | Advisory Vote on Executive Compensation | For | Against |
| | Vote Note: It is not clear that executive compensation sufficiently ties pay with performance in a manner that aligns executives with the long-term interests of the company. For example: • The company provides immediate vesting of certain equity awards upon a change in control rather than requiring that an executive also lose their position. • The company's incentive programs do not use any performance metrics. The compensation committee determines cash bonuses on a largely discretionary basis. | | - |

Gildan Activewear Inc. Voted — Country of Trade: Canada — Annual Meeting Agenda 5/2/2019

| Proposal | Proposal Text | Mgmt Rec | Vote Cast |
|----------|---|----------|-----------|
| 1 | Election of Directors | | |
| | 1.1 Elect William D. Anderson | For | For |
| | 1.2 Elect Donald C. Berg | For | For |
| | 1.3 Elect Maryse Bertrand | For | For |
| | 1.4 Elect Marcello Caira | For | For |
| | 1.5 Elect Glenn J. Chamandy | For | For |
| | 1.6 Elect Shirley Cunningham | For | For |
| | 1.7 Elect Russell Goodman | For | For |
| | 1.8 Elect Charles M. Herington | For | For |
| | 1.9 Elect Craig A. Leavitt | For | For |
| | 1.10 Elect Anne Martin-Vachon | For | For |
| 2 | Advance Notice By-Law Provision | For | For |
| 3 | Advisory Vote on Executive Compensation | For | Against |
| | Vote Note: It is not clear that executive compensation sufficiently ties pay with performance in a manner that aligns executives with the long-term interests of the company. For example: • The short-term and long-term incentive programs are based on similar financial metrics which allows for a high level of pay-out (or lack thereof) for hitting similar targets rather than considering a variety of financial and operational metrics. • The use of only absolute metrics for incentive programs may not be appropriate as it may reflect economic or industry factors beyond the control of executives. Performance conditions should include relative targets. • The company has not disclosed the performance objectives for its long-term compensation plan. | | |
| 4 | Appointment of Auditor | For | For |

iA Financial Corp Voted — Country of Trade: Canada — Annual Meeting Agenda 5/9/2019

| Proposal | Proposal Text | Mgmt Rec | Vote Cast |
|----------|--|----------|-----------|
| 1 | Election of Directors | | |
| | 1.1 Elect Agathe Côté | For | For |
| | 1.2 Elect Benoit Daignault | For | For |
| | 1.3 Elect Nicolas Darveau-Garneau | For | For |
| | 1.4 Elect Emma Griffin | For | For |
| | 1.5 Elect Claude Lamoureux | For | For |
| | 1.6 Elect Jacques Martin | For | For |
| | 1.7 Elect Monique Mercier | For | For |
| | 1.8 Elect Danielle G. Morin | For | For |
| | 1.9 Elect Marc Poulin | For | For |
| | 1.10 Elect Denis Ricard | For | For |
| | 1.11 Elect Louis Têtu | For | For |
| 2 | Appointment of Auditor | For | For |
| 3 | Advisory Vote on Executive Compensation | For | Against |
| | Vote Note: It is not clear that executive compensation sufficiently ties pay with performance in a manner that aligns executives with the long-term interests of the company. For example: • The stock option component of the target long-term incentive awards are not based on performance metrics. • The use of only absolute metrics for the short-term incentive program may not be appropriate as it may reflect economic or industry factors beyond the control of executives. Performance conditions should include relative targets. | | |
| 4 | Shareholder Proposal Regarding Linking Compensation to ESG Criteria Vote Note: Linking sustainability metrics to executive compensation could reduce risks related to sustainability underperformance, incent employees to meet sustainability goals and achieve resultant benefits, and increase accountability. While the company already integrates some health, safety, security and environmental considerations into its bonus plan, this proposal is requesting a report on the importance accorded to that integration. This is relevant considering the recent controversies the company has been involved in. | Against | For |
| 5 | Shareholder Proposal Regarding Disclosure of Board Independence Qualifications | Against | Against |
| 6 | Shareholder Proposal Regarding Diversity Policy Vote Note: Normally we would support this proposal but the company has recently committed to adopting a board diversity policy. | Against | Against |

| Proposal 1 | Proposal Text Election of Directors | Mgmt Rec | Vote Cast |
|---------------|--|----------|-----------|
| | 1.1 Elect Heather Allen | For | For |
| | 1.2 Elect Louis J. Aronne | For | For |
| | 1.3 Elect Angela Holtham | For | For |
| | 1.4 Elect Mark Hornick | For | For |
| | 1.5 Elect Timothy H. Penner | For | For |
| | 1.6 Elect Catherine Potechin | For | For |
| | 1.7 Elect Steve Spooner | For | For |
| | 1.8 Elect Jason Tafler | For | For |
| | 1.9 Elect David M. Williams | For | For |
| 2 | Appointment of Auditor and Authority to Set Fees | For | For |

Keyera Corp. Voted — Country of Trade: Canada — Annual Meeting Agenda 5/14/2019

| Proposal | Proposal Text | Mgmt Rec | Vote Cast |
|----------|---|----------|-----------|
| 1 | Appointment of Auditor | For | For |
| 2 | Election of Directors | | |
| | 2.1 Elect James V. Bertram | For | For |
| | 2.2 Elect Douglas J. Haughey | For | For |
| | 2.3 Elect Gianna Manes | For | For |
| | 2.4 Elect Donald J. Nelson | For | For |
| | 2.5 Elect Michael J. Norris | For | For |
| | 2.6 Elect Thomas C. O'Connor | For | For |
| | 2.7 Elect Charlene Ripley | For | For |
| | 2.8 Elect David G. Smith | For | For |
| | 2.9 Elect Janet P. Woodruff | For | For |
| 3 | Advisory Vote on Executive Compensation | For | Against |

Vote Note: It is not clear that executive compensation sufficiently ties pay with performance in a manner that aligns executives with the long-term interests of the company. For example:

- The company provides immediate vesting of certain equity awards upon a change in control rather than requiring that an executive also lose their position.
- \bullet Threshold performance for the growth in shareholder value metric is 25^{th} percentile versus peers which may not be sufficiently challenging.
- The company's incentive plans do not appear to have a clawback provision for executives other than the CEO, that would enable the company to recoup bonus awards in the event of material fraud or misconduct by the recipient of a bonus award.
- The company's short-term incentive metrics may be used by the Compensation Committee to determine the bonus pool size, but the ultimate decision is at the Committees' discretion.

$\textbf{Loblaw Cos. Ltd.} \ \ \text{Voted} - \text{Country of Trade: Canada} - \text{Annual Meeting Agenda 5/2/2019}$

| Proposal | Proposal Text | Mgmt Rec | Vote Cast |
|----------|--|----------|-----------|
| 1 | Election of Directors | | |
| | 1.1 Elect Paul M. Beeston | For | For |
| | 1.2 Elect Paviter S. Binning | For | For |
| | 1.3 Elect Scott B. Bonham | For | For |
| | 1.4 Elect Warren Bryant | For | For |
| | 1.5 Elect Christie J.B. Clark | For | For |
| | 1.6 Elect William A. Downe | For | For |
| | 1.7 Elect Janice Fukakusa | For | For |
| | 1.8 Elect M. Marianne Harris | For | For |
| | 1.9 Elect Claudia Kotchka | For | For |
| | 1.10 Elect Beth Pritchard | For | For |
| | 1.11 Elect Sarah Raiss | For | For |
| | 1.12 Elect Galen G. Weston | For | For |
| 2 | Appointment of Auditor and Authority to Set Fees | For | For |

3 Advisory Vote on Executive Compensation

Vote Note: It is not clear that executive compensation sufficiently ties pay with performance in a manner that aligns executives with the long-term interests of the company. For example:

- The use of only absolute metrics for incentive programs may not be appropriate as it may reflect economic or industry factors beyond the control of executives. Performance conditions should include relative targets.
- The company has not disclosed the performance objectives for its long-term compensation plan.
- The company's long-term incentive program uses less than three years of performance. Performance conditions should be measured over at least three consecutive years.
- Executives were granted supplemental awards outside the normal incentive plan, which may undermine the regular plan or indicate it is poorly designed.

Shareholder Proposal Regarding Review of Relative Compensation Inequality
Vote Note: Employee pay is a material issue for this company. In May 2018, the company's board
recommended shareholders to vote against a living wage shareholder proposal at the AGM, because
they believed it would hinder the company's flexibility to maintain competitive position. The company
does not provide any disclosure assuring investors it has evaluated this risk. The benefits of paying
employees fair wages include staff retention, positive corporate reputation, improved productivity,
and staff morale. Although the wording of this proposal is not ideal, we believe the requested report
is reasonable and we want assurance that the Board is looking at this issue.

Against For

Against

For

Magna International Inc. Voted — Country of Trade: Canada — Annual Meeting Agenda 5/9/2019

| Proposal | Proposal Text | Mgmt Rec | Vote Cast |
|----------|---|----------|-----------|
| 1 | Election of Directors | | |
| | 1.1 Elect Scott B. Bonham | For | For |
| | 1.2 Elect Peter Guy Bowie | For | For |
| | 1.3 Elect Mary S. Chan | For | For |
| | 1.4 Elect Kurt J. Lauk | For | For |
| | 1.5 Elect Robert F. MacLellan | For | For |
| | 1.6 Elect Cynthia A. Niekamp | For | For |
| | 1.7 Elect William A. Ruh | For | For |
| | 1.8 Elect Indira V. Samarasekera | For | For |
| | 1.9 Elect Donald J. Walker | For | For |
| | 1.10 Elect Lisa S. Westlake | For | For |
| | 1.11 Elect William L. Young | For | For |
| 2 | Appointment of Auditor and Authority to Set Fees | For | For |
| 3 | Advisory Vote on Executive Compensation | For | Against |
| | Vote Note: «It is not clear that executive compensation sufficiently ties pay with performance in a manner that aligns executives with the long-term interests of the company. For example: • The use of absolute metrics for the short-term incentive program may not be appropriate as it may reflect economic or industry factors beyond the control of executives. Performance conditions should include relative targets. • The use of a single metric for the short-term incentive program may not be appropriate. Performance related compensation should be linked to a variety of specific objective measures of the company's operational and financial performance. • Threshold performance for the growth in shareholder value metric is 35th percentile versus peers which may not be sufficiently challenging. • Executives are eligible to receive unlimited short-term incentive payments. This runs contrary to best practices and shareholder interests. | | |
| 4 | Shareholder Proposal Regarding Disclosure of Human Capital Management Metrics Vote Note: In recent years, the Company has been expanding its manufacturing and sourcing activities in or near growth markets such as China, India, Thailand, and Mexico, where certain risks tend to be higher as a result of less stringent regulatory oversight; Higher risk factors as a result of a country's less stringent regulatory oversight, includes but is not limited to: (i) a weaker enforcement of fundamental rights and principles at work, including freedom of association; (ii) the weak management of health and safety issues; (iii) excessive and sometimes illegal working hours; (iv) forced labour; and (v) a disproportionate reliance on temporary and migrant workers; While the Company has taken the encouraging step of including a sustainability report in the annual information form it published in 2018, the report provides insufficient metrics to help investors ascertain the Company's approach to human capital management and human rights due diligence, and remedy in its | Against | Against |

Manulife Financial Corp. Voted — Country of Trade: Canada — Annual Meeting Agenda 5/2/2019

| Proposal 1 | Proposal Text Election of Directors | Mgmt Rec | Vote Cast |
|---------------|--|------------|------------|
| | 1.1 Elect Ronalee H. Ambrose1.2 Elect Joseph P. Caron | For For | For For |

global manufacturing operations and supply chain.

| | 1.3 Elect John M. Cassaday | For | For |
|---|---|-----|---------|
| | 1.4 Elect Susan F. Dabarno | For | For |
| | 1.5 Elect Sheila S. Fraser | For | For |
| | 1.6 Elect Roy Gori | For | For |
| | 1.7 Elect Tsun-yan Hsieh | For | For |
| | 1.8 Elect P. Thomas Jenkins | For | For |
| | 1.9 Elect Donald R. Lindsay | For | For |
| | 1.10 Elect John R.V. Palmer | For | For |
| | 1.11 Elect C. James Prieur | For | For |
| | 1.12 Elect Andrea S. Rosen | For | For |
| | 1.13 Elect Lesley D. Webster | For | For |
| 2 | Appointment of Auditor | For | For |
| 3 | Advisory Vote on Executive Compensation | For | Against |

Vote Note: It is not clear that executive compensation sufficiently ties pay with performance in a manner that aligns executives with the long-term interests of the company. For example:

- Threshold performance for the growth in shareholder value metric is 30% below median versus peers which may not be sufficiently challenging.
- The company has not disclosed all of the performance objectives for its long-term compensation plan.
- The use of only absolute metrics for the short-term incentive program may not be appropriate as it may reflect economic or industry factors beyond the control of executives. Performance conditions should include relative targets.

Maple Leaf Foods Inc. Voted — Country of Trade: Canada — Annual Meeting Agenda 5/2/2019

| Proposal | Proposal Text Election of Directors | Mgmt Rec | Vote Cast |
|----------|---|----------|-----------|
| • | 1.1 Elect William E. Aziz | For | For |
| | 1.2 Elect W. Geoffrey Beattie | For | For |
| | 1.3 Elect Ronald G. Close | For | For |
| | 1.4 Elect Jean M. Fraser | For | For |
| | 1.5 Elect John A. Lederer | For | For |
| | 1.6 Elect Katherine N. Lemon | For | For |
| | 1.7 Elect Jonathon W.F. McCain | For | For |
| | 1.8 Elect Michael H. McCain | For | For |
| | 1.9 Elect Carol M. Stephenson | For | For |
| 2 | Appointment of Auditor and Authority to Set Fees | For | Withhold |
| | Vote Note: The non-audit-related fees are 32.8% of the total fees paid to the auditor. We believe that non-audit-related work could have been performed by a separate auditor so as to not compromise | | |
| | the independence of the auditor and the integrity of the Company's financial statements. | | |
| 3 | Advisory Vote on Executive Compensation | For | Against |
| | Vote Note: It is not clear that executive compensation sufficiently ties pay with performance | | |
| | in a manner that aligns executives with the long-term interests of the company. For example: • The use of a single metric for the incentive programs may not be appropriate. Performance | | |
| | related compensation should be linked to a variety of specific objective measures of the company's | | |
| | operational and financial performance. | | |
| | • The use of absolute metrics for incentive programs may not be appropriate as it may reflect economic or industry factors beyond the control of executives. Performance conditions should include | | |
| | relative targets. | | |
| 4 | Share Option Plan Renewal | For | For |

Maxar Technologies Ltd. Voted — Country of Trade: Canada — Annual Meeting Agenda 11/16/2018

| Proposal | Proposal Text | Mgmt Rec | Vote Cast |
|----------|---|----------|-----------|
| 1 | Change of Continuance from Canada to Delaware | For | For |

Methanex Corp. Voted — Country of Trade: Canada — Annual Meeting Agenda 4/25/2019

| Proposal | Proposal Text | Mgmt Rec | Vote Cast |
|----------|--|----------|-----------|
| 1 | Elect Management Nominee Bruce Aitken | For | For |
| 2 | Elect Management Nominee Doug Arnell | For | For |
| 3 | Elect Management Nominee Howard Robert Balloch $-$ WITHDRAWN | | Withhold |

| 4 | Elect Management Nominee James V. Bertram | For | For |
|----|---|-----|----------|
| 5 | Elect Management Nominee Phillip Cook | For | For |
| 6 | Elect Management Nominee John Floren | For | For |
| 7 | Elect Management Nominee Maureen E. Howe | For | For |
| 8 | Elect Management Nominee Robert J. Kostelnik | For | For |
| 9 | Elect Management Nominee Janice Rennie | For | For |
| 10 | Elect Management Nominee Margaret Walker | For | For |
| 11 | Elect Management Nominee Benita Warmbold | For | For |
| 12 | Elect Dissident Nominee Lawrence Cunningham — WITHDRAWN | | Withhold |
| 13 | Elect Management Nominee Paul Dobson | For | For |
| 14 | Elect Dissident Nominee Patrice Merrin — WITHDRAWN | | Withhold |
| 15 | Elect Dissident Nominee Kevin Rodgers — WITHDRAWN | | Withhold |
| 16 | Appointment of Auditor and Authority to Set Fees | For | For |
| 17 | Advisory Vote on Executive Compensation | For | Against |

Vote Note: It is not clear that executive compensation sufficiently ties pay with performance in a manner that aligns executives with the long-term interests of the company. For example:

- The use of a single metric for the long-term incentive program may not be appropriate. Performance related compensation should be linked to a variety of specific objective measures of the company's operational and financial performance.
- The use of absolute metrics for incentive programs may not be appropriate as it may reflect economic or industry factors beyond the control of executives. Performance conditions should include relative targets.
- The company provides immediate vesting of certain equity awards upon a change in control rather than requiring that an executive also lose their position.
- The company has failed to disclose performance targets for its short-term incentive plan.

NFI Group Inc. Voted — Country of Trade: Canada — Annual Meeting Agenda 5/9/2019

| D1 | December 1 Total | Marriet Dans | V-+- C+ |
|----------|---|--------------|-----------|
| Proposal | Proposal Text | Mgmt Rec | Vote Cast |
| 1 | Appointment of Auditor and Authority to Set Fees | For | For |
| 2 | Election of Directors | | |
| | 2.1 Elect Phyllis E. Cochran | For | For |
| | 2.2 Elect Larry Edwards | For | For |
| | 2.3 Elect Adam L. Gray | For | Withhold |
| | Vote Note: This director attended less than 75% of the board meetings held by the board during the most recently completed fiscal year. We view this as a failure to fulfill a fundamental responsibility to represent shareholders at such meetings. | | |
| | 2.4 Elect Krystyna T. Hoeg | For | For |
| | 2.5 Elect John Marinucci | For | For |
| | 2.6 Elect Paulo Cezar da Silva Nunes | For | For |
| | 2.7 Elect Paul Soubry | For | For |
| | 2.8 Elect Brian Tobin | For | For |
| 2 | Appointment of Auditor | For | For |
| 3 | Advisory Vote on Executive Compensation | For | Against |
| | Vote Note: It is not clear that executive compensation sufficiently ties pay with performance in a manner that aligns executives with the long-term interests of the company. For example: • The use of absolute metrics for the short-term and long-term incentive programs may not be appropriate as it may reflect economic or industry factors beyond the control of executives. Performance conditions should include relative targets. • The use of a single metric for the long-term incentive program may not be appropriate. Performance related compensation should be linked to a variety of specific objective measures of the company's operational and financial performance. • The company provides immediate vesting of certain equity awards upon a change in control rather than requiring that an executive also lose their position. | | |

Nutrien Ltd. Voted — Country of Trade: Canada — Annual Meeting Agenda 7/19/2018

• The company has not disclosed the performance objectives for its long-term compensation plan.

| Proposal 1 | Proposal Text Election of Directors | Mgmt Rec | Vote Cast |
|---------------|--|----------|-----------|
| | 1.1 Elect Christopher M. Burley | For | For |
| | 1.2 Elect Maura J. Clark | For | For |
| | 1.3 Elect John W. Estey | For | For |
| | 1.4 Elect David C. Everitt | For | For |

| | 1.5 Elect Russell K. Girling | For | For |
|---|---|-----|---------|
| | 1.6 Elect Gerald W. Grandey | For | For |
| | 1.7 Elect Miranda C. Hubbs | For | For |
| | 1.8 Elect Alice D. Laberge | For | For |
| | 1.9 Elect Consuelo E. Madere | For | For |
| | 1.10 Elect Charles V. Magro | For | For |
| | 1.11 Elect Keith G. Martell | For | For |
| | 1.12 Elect A. Anne McLellan | For | For |
| | 1.13 Elect Derek G. Pannell | For | For |
| | 1.14 Elect Aaron W. Regent | For | For |
| | 1.15 Elect Mayo M. Schmidt | For | For |
| | 1.16 Elect Jochen E. Tilk | For | For |
| 2 | Appointment of Auditor | For | For |
| 3 | 2018 Stock Option Plan | For | Against |
| | We oppose the use of stock options to compensate directors. | | |
| 4 | Advisory Vote on Executive Compensation | For | Against |
| | Vote Note: It is not clear that executive compensation sufficiently ties pay with performance | | |

in a manner that aligns executives with the long-term interests of the company. For example:

- Threshold performance for the growth in shareholder value metric is 25th percentile for Agrium and 8th out of 10 for Potashcorp versus peers which may not be sufficiently challenging.
- The company has not disclosed the performance thresholds for its short-term compensation plan and parts of its long-term plan.

Nutrien Ltd. Voted — Country of Trade: Canada — Annual Meeting Agenda 5/9/2019

| Proposal | Proposal Text | Mgmt Rec | Vote Cas |
|----------|--|----------|----------|
| 1 | Election of Directors | | |
| | 1.1 Elect Christopher M. Burley | For | For |
| | 1.2 Elect Maura J. Clark | For | For |
| | 1.3 Elect John W. Estey | For | For |
| | 1.4 Elect David C. Everitt | For | For |
| | 1.5 Elect Russell K. Girling | For | For |
| | 1.6 Elect Miranda C. Hubbs | For | For |
| | 1.7 Elect Alice D. Laberge | For | For |
| | 1.8 Elect Consuelo E. Madere | For | For |
| | 1.9 Elect Charles V. Magro | For | For |
| | 1.10 Elect Keith G. Martell | For | For |
| | 1.11 Elect Aaron W. Regent | For | For |
| | 1.12 Elect Mayo M. Schmidt | For | For |
| 2 | Appointment of Auditor | For | For |
| 3 | Advisory Vote on Executive Compensation | For | Against |
| | Vote Note: It is not clear that executive compensation sufficiently ties pay with performance in a manner that aligns executives with the long term interests of the company. For example: | | |

in a manner that aligns executives with the long-term interests of the company. For example:

- The use of absolute metrics for the short-term incentive program may not be appropriate as it may reflect economic or industry factors beyond the control of executives. Performance conditions should include relative targets.
- Threshold performance for the growth in shareholder value metric is 25th percentile versus peers which may not be sufficiently challenging.
- The use of a single metric for the long-term incentive program may not be appropriate. Performance related compensation should be linked to a variety of specific objective measures of the company's operational and financial performance.

Open Text Corp. Voted — Country of Trade: Canada — Annual Meeting Agenda 9/5/2018

| Proposal | Proposal Text | Mgmt Rec | Vote Cast |
|----------|-------------------------------|----------|-----------|
| 1 | Election of Directors | | |
| | 1.1 Elect P. Thomas Jenkins | For | For |
| | 1.2 Elect Mark J. Barrenechea | For | For |
| | 1.3 Elect Randy Fowlie | For | For |
| | 1.4 Elect David Fraser | For | For |
| | 1.5 Elect Gail E. Hamilton | For | For |
| | 1.6 Elect Stephen J. Sadler | For | For |

| | 1.7 Elect Harmit J. Singh | For | For |
|---|---|-----|---------|
| | 1.8 Elect Michael Slaunwhite | For | For |
| | 1.9 Elect Katharine B. Stevenson | For | For |
| | 1.10 Elect Carl Jürgen Tinggren | For | For |
| | 1.11 Elect Deborah Weinstein | For | For |
| 2 | Appointment of Auditor | For | For |
| 3 | Advisory Vote on Executive Compensation | For | Against |

Vote Note: It is not clear that executive compensation sufficiently ties pay with performance in a manner that aligns executives with the long-term interests of the company. For example:

- The use of a single metric for the long-term incentive program may not be appropriate. Performance related compensation should be linked to a variety of specific objective measures of the company's operational and financial performance.
- The use of absolute metrics for the short-term incentive program may not be appropriate as it may reflect economic or industry factors beyond the control of executives. Performance conditions should include relative targets.
- Threshold performance for the growth in shareholder value metric is 1st percentile versus peers which may not be sufficiently challenging.

Pembina Pipeline Corporation Voted - Country of Trade: Canada - Special Meeting Agenda 5/3/2019

| Proposal | Proposal Text | Mgmt Rec | Vote Cast |
|----------|--|----------|-----------|
| 1 | Election of Directors | | |
| | 1.1 Elect Anne-Marie N. Ainsworth | For | For |
| | 1.2 Elect Michael H. Dilger | For | For |
| | 1.3 Elect Randall J. Findlay | For | For |
| | 1.4 Elect Maureen E. Howe | For | For |
| | 1.5 Elect Gordon J. Kerr | For | For |
| | 1.6 Elect David M.B. LeGresley | For | For |
| | 1.7 Elect Robert B. Michaleski | For | For |
| | 1.8 Elect Leslie A. O'Donoghue | For | For |
| | 1.9 Elect Bruce D. Rubin | For | For |
| | 1.10 Elect Jeffery T. Smith | For | For |
| | 1.11 Elect Henry W. Sykes | For | For |
| 2 | Appointment of Auditor and Authority to Set Fees | For | Withhold |
| | Vote Note: The non-audit-related fees are 25.6% of the total fees paid to the auditor. We believe that non-audit-related work could have been performed by a separate auditor so as to not compromise | | |
| 2 | the independence of the auditor and the integrity of the Company's financial statements. | F | F |
| 3 | Shareholder Rights Plan Renewal | For | For |
| 4 | Increase in Class A Preferred Shares | For | For |
| 5 | Advisory Vote on Executive Compensation | For | For |
| | Vote Note: We are supporting this advisory vote on compensation even though this company's practices are not entirely consistent with our Proxy Voting guidelines. Short-term incentive program includes metrics that are not included in the long-term compensation plan. These include those pipeline integrity, environment, process safety management and emergency preparedness (20% of target); capital spending and business development etc. The Medium-term incentive plan balances per share targets with relative TSR targets which are sufficiently challenging. | | |

Restaurant Brands International Inc. Voted - Country of Trade: United States -

Annual Meeting Agenda 6/11/2019

| Proposal 1 | Proposal Text Election of Directors | Mgmt Rec | Vote Cast |
|---------------|--|----------|-----------|
| | 1.1 Elect Alexandre Behring Vote Note: This director is not independent as he is the Co-founder and managing partner of 3G Capital, which together with 3G Restaurant Brands Holdings General Partner Ltd. beneficially own approximately 91.6% of the Company's Partnership exchangeable units, representing approximately 41.6% of the Company's total voting power. Having an independent chair can lead to a clearer separation of responsibility between the board and management, reduce conflicts related to executive compensation and succession planning and help with the recruitment of independent directors. An independent director may increase the diversity of information available to the board and promote an independent mindset in the other directors. This director chairs the compensation, governance/nominating committees, these committees should be 100% independent. | For | Withhold |
| | 1.2 Elect Marc Caira | For | For |
| | 1.3 Elect João M. Castro-Neves | For | For |
| | 1.4 Elect Martin E. Franklin | For | For |

| | 1.5 Elect Paul J. Fribourg1.6 Elect Neil Golden1.7 Elect Ali Hedayat | For For For | For For For |
|---|---|-------------------|-------------------|
| | 1.8 Elect Golnar Khosrowshahi | For | For |
| | 1.9 Elect Daniel S. Schwartz | For | For |
| | 1.10 Elect Carlos Alberto Sicupira Vote Note: This director is not independent as he is the founding principal partner of 3G Capital. This director is on the compensation, governance/nominating committees. These committees should be 100% independent. | For | Withhold |
| | 1.11 Elect Roberto Moses Thompson Motta Vote Note: This director nominee appears to have too many commitments to fulfill his duties as a director. He sits on a total of five public company boards. | For | Withhold |
| | 1.12 Elect Alexandre Van Damme | For | For |
| 2 | Advisory Vote on Executive Compensation | For | Against |
| | Vote Note: It is not clear that executive compensation sufficiently ties pay with performance in a manner that aligns executives with the long-term interests of the company. For example: • The company's long-term incentive program does not use any performance metrics. • The use of absolute metrics for incentive programs may not be appropriate as it may reflect economic or industry factors beyond the control of executives. Performance conditions should include relative targets. • The company has not disclosed the performance thresholds for the adjustment factors for its short-term compensation plan. • The company granted NEOs discretionary awards of roughly \$39 million in one-time PBRSUs outside of its normal incentive plans. | | |
| 3 | Appointment of Auditor and Authority to Set Fees | For | Abstain |
| | Vote Note: The non-audit-related fees are 76.4% of the total fees paid to the auditor. We believe that non-audit-related work could have been performed by a separate auditor so as to not compromise the independence of the auditor and the integrity of the Company's financial statements. | | |
| 4 | Shareholder Proposal Regarding Report on Workforce Practices Vote Note: There is broad consensus that good human capital management is important to the bottom line, especially in customer-facing service industries where an employee's conduct and efficiency are critical to the customer experience. Within a franchise operating model, the success and reputation of the Company's business depend on a highly-engaged, customer-facing workforce and strong franchisor-franchisee relationships. While franchisees have a direct employment relationship and related responsibilities for the workforce, the Company is responsible for providing both standards and expectations of human capital management, and the collaboration required to uphold strong workplace standards including supportive training, development, and appropriate financial arrangements. Establishing minimum requirements and standards for Company branded operations and franchisees to ensure decent work and supporting franchisee capacity to provide decent work would help the Company to ensure that its direct and franchisee workforce is protected. Ultimately, establishing minimum requirements would help to ensure that the conditions are in place to deliver high levels of customer service and productivity across all Company operations. | Against | For |
| 5 | Shareholder Proposal Regarding Report on Supply Chain Impacts of Deforestation Vote Note: Better disclosure around supply chain impacts on deforestation will help us understand reputational and operational risks facing RBI. | Against | For |
| 6 | Shareholder Proposal Regarding Report on Sustainable Packaging and Plastic Pollution Vote Note: Plastic pollution is a global environmental crisis and the Company has not developed comprehensive packaging sustainability policies to deal with low recycling rates of its packaging and the high volume of plastic waste that ends up in oceans. Competitor Starbucks has a specific goal to promote reusable coffee containers, to recycle all plastic and paper cups left in its stores and has set a deadline for phase-out of plastic straws, and uses 10% recycled paper cup fibre. The Company's brands lack commitments similar to its competitors. | Against | For |

Royal Bank of Canada Voted — Country of Trade: Canada — Annual Meeting Agenda 4/4/2019

| Proposal 1 | Proposal Text Election of Directors | Mgmt Rec | Vote Cast |
|---------------|--|----------|-----------|
| | 1.1 Elect Andrew A. Chisholm | For | For |
| | 1.2 Elect Jacynthe Côté | For | For |
| | 1.3 Elect Toos N. Daruvala | For | For |
| | 1.4 Elect David F. Denison | For | For |
| | 1.5 Elect Alice D. Laberge | For | For |
| | 1.6 Elect Michael H. McCain | For | For |
| | 1.7 Elect David I. McKay | For | For |
| | 1.8 Elect Heather Munroe-Blum | For | For |
| | 1.9 Elect Kathleen P. Taylor | For | For |
| | 1.10 Elect Bridget A. van Kralingen | For | For |
| | 1.11 Elect Thierry Vandal | For | For |

| | 1.12 Elect Jeffery W. Yabuki | For | For |
|---|--|---------|---------|
| 2 | Appointment of Auditor | For | For |
| 3 | Advisory Vote on Executive Compensation | For | Against |
| | Vote Note: It is not clear that executive compensation sufficiently ties pay with performance in a manner that aligns executives with the long-term interests of the company. For example: • The company has not provided a clear description of goals under the STI plan and the vesting conditions for performance-based equity awards granted under the LTI plan. • Threshold performance for the growth in shareholder value metric as low as 7th place in the peer group of 10 which may not be sufficiently challenging. | | |
| 4 | Shareholder Proposal Regarding Equity Ratio | Against | For |
| | Vote Note: One of the tools used to inform shareholders is the equity ratio, or the difference between the CEOs' total compensation and an employee's median compensation, known as the equity ratio. Disclosure of the equity ratio would allow shareholders to judge whether this compensation program is aligned with shareholders' interests. | | |
| 5 | Shareholder Proposal Regarding Creation of Technology Committee | Against | Abstain |
| | Vote Note: While we agree with the spirit of the proposal, we find certain sections of the resolution to be overly prescriptive. | | |

Shopify Inc. Voted — Country of Trade: Canada — Annual Meeting Agenda 5/29/2019

| Proposal 1 | Proposal Text Election of Directors | Mgmt Rec | Vote Cast |
|---------------|---|----------|-----------|
| | 1.1 Elect Tobias Lütke | For | For |
| | 1.2 Elect Robert G. Ashe | For | For |
| | 1.3 Elect Gail Goodman | For | For |
| | 1.4 Elect Colleen M. Johnston | For | For |
| | 1.5 Elect Jeremy Levine | For | For |
| | 1.6 Elect John Phillips | For | For |
| 2 | Appointment of Auditor and Authority to Set Fees | For | For |
| 3 | Advisory Vote on Executive Compensation | For | Against |
| | Vote Note: It is not clear that executive compensation sufficiently ties pay with performance | | |

in a manner that aligns executives with the long-term interests of the company. For example:

- The company's incentive plans do not appear to have a clawback provision that would enable the company to recoup bonus awards in the event of material fraud or misconduct by the recipient of a bonus award.
- The company provides immediate vesting of certain equity awards upon a change in control rather than requiring that an executive also lose their position.
- Performance of executives is reviewed against the factors listed on page 28 of the attached circular for the long-term incentive program, however these are not components of an objective, formula based compensation calculation for the long-term incentive.
- The company does not have any performance-based short-term incentives.

SNC - Lavalin Group Inc. Voted — Country of Trade: Canada — Annual Meeting Agenda 5/2/2019

| Proposal 1 | Proposal Text Election of Directors | Mgmt Rec | Vote Cast |
|---------------|--|----------|-----------|
| | 1.1 Elect Jacques Bougie | For | For |
| | 1.2 Elect Neil Bruce | For | For |
| | 1.3 Elect Isabelle Courville | For | For |
| | 1.4 Elect Catherine J. Hughes | For | For |
| | 1.5 Elect Kevin G. Lynch | For | For |
| | 1.6 Elect Steven L. Newman | For | For |
| | 1.7 Elect Jean Raby | For | For |
| | 1.8 Elect Alain Rhéaume | For | For |
| | 1.9 Elect Eric D. Siegel | For | For |
| | 1.10 Elect Zin Smati | For | For |
| | 1.11 Elect Benita Warmbold | For | For |
| 2 | Appointment of Auditor and Authority to Set Fees | For | For |

| 3 | Advisory Vote on Executive Compensation Vote Note: It is not clear that executive compensation sufficiently ties pay with performance in a manner that aligns executives with the long-term interests of the company. For example: • The use of a single metric for the long-term incentive program may not be appropriate. Performance related compensation should be linked to a variety of specific objective measures of the company's operational and financial performance. • Threshold performance for the growth in shareholder value metric is 25th percentile versus peers which may not be sufficiently challenging. | For | Against |
|---|---|---------|---------|
| 4 | Shareholder Proposal Regarding Linking Compensation to ESG Criteria Vote Note: Linking sustainability metrics to executive compensation could reduce risks related to sustainability underperformance, incent employees to meet sustainability goals and achieve resultant benefits, and increase accountability. While the company already integrates some health, safety, security and environmental considerations into its bonus plan, this proposal is requesting a report on the importance accorded to that integration. This is relevant considering the recent controversies the company has been involved in. | Against | For |
| 5 | Shareholder Proposal Regarding Disclosure of Board Independence Qualifications | Against | Against |

Suncor Energy, Inc. Voted — Country of Trade: Canada — Annual Meeting Agenda 5/2/2019

| Proposal | Proposal Text | Mgmt Rec | Vote Cast |
|----------|--|----------|-----------|
| 1 | Election of Directors | | |
| | 1.1 Elect Patricia M. Bedient | For | For |
| | 1.2 Elect Mel E. Benson | For | For |
| | 1.3 Elect John D. Gass | For | For |
| | 1.4 Elect Dennis M. Houston | For | For |
| | 1.5 Elect Mark S. Little | For | For |
| | 1.6 Elect Brian P. MacDonald | For | For |
| | 1.7 Elect Maureen McCaw | For | For |
| | 1.8 Elect Eira Thomas | For | For |
| | 1.9 Elect Michael M. Wilson | For | For |
| 2 | Appointment of Auditor | For | For |
| 3 | Advisory Vote on Executive Compensation Vote Note: It is not clear that executive compensation sufficiently ties pay with performance in a manner that aligns executives with the long-term interests of the company. For example: | For | Against |
| | The use of a single metric for the long-term incentive program may not be appropriate. Performance related compensation should be linked to a variety of specific objective measures of the company's operational and financial performance. Threshold performance for the growth in shareholder value metric is below average versus peers which may not be sufficiently challenging. The company has not disclosed all of the performance objectives for its short-term compensation plan. | | |

Toromont Industries Ltd. Voted — Country of Trade: Canada — Annual Meeting Agenda 5/3/2019

| Proposal | Proposal Text | Mgmt Rec | Vote Cast |
|----------|---|----------|-----------|
| 1 | Election of Directors | | |
| | 1.1 Elect Peter J. Blake | For | For |
| | 1.2 Elect Jeffrey S. Chisholm | For | For |
| | 1.3 Elect Cathryn E. Cranston | For | For |
| | 1.4 Elect Robert M. Franklin | For | For |
| | 1.5 Elect James W. Gill | For | For |
| | 1.6 Elect Wayne S. Hill | For | Withhold |
| | Vote Note: This director is not independent because he is a former executive vice president of the company (until May 2008). He is the chair of the audit committee and is on the compensation committee, which should be 100% independent. | | |
| | 1.7 Elect Sharon Hodgson | For | For |
| | 1.8 Elect Scott J. Medhurst | For | For |
| | 1.9 Elect Robert M. Ogilvie | For | For |
| | 1.10 Elect Katherine A. Rethy | For | For |
| | 1.11 Elect Richard G. Roy | For | For |
| 2 | Appointment of Auditor and Authority to Set Fees | For | For |
| 3 | Advisory Vote on Executive Compensation | For | For |

Toronto Dominion Bank Voted — Country of Trade: Canada — Annual Meeting Agenda 4/4/2019

| Proposal | Proposal Text | Mgmt Rec | Vote Cast |
|----------|---|------------|-----------|
| 1 | Election of Directors | | |
| | 1.1 Elect William E. Bennett | For | For |
| | 1.2 Elect Amy Woods Brinkley | For | For |
| | 1.3 Elect Brian C. Ferguson | For | For |
| | 1.4 Elect Colleen A. Goggins | For | For |
| | 1.5 Elect Mary Jo Haddad | For | For |
| | 1.6 Elect Jean-René Halde | For | For |
| | 1.7 Elect David E. Kepler | For | For |
| | 1.8 Elect Brian M. Levitt | For | For |
| | 1.9 Elect Alan N. MacGibbon | For | For |
| | 1.10 Elect Karen E. Maidment | For | For |
| | 1.11 Elect Bharat B. Masrani | For | For |
| | 1.12 Elect Irene R. Miller | For | For |
| | 1.13 Elect Nadir H. Mohamed | For | For |
| | 1.14 Elect Claude Mongeau | For | For |
| 2 | Appointment of Auditor | For | For |
| 3 | Advisory Vote on Executive Compensation | For | Against |
| | Vote Note: It is not clear that executive compensation sufficiently ties pay with performance | | |
| | in a manner that aligns executives with the long-term interests of the company. For example: • The short-term and long-term incentive programs are based on similar financial metrics which allows | | |
| | for a high level of pay-out (or lack thereof) for hitting similar targets rather than considering a variety | | |
| | of financial and operational metrics. | | |
| | Threshold performance for the growth in shareholder value metric is 6.67% below peer average which may not be sufficiently challenging. | | |
| | While the company discloses the targets for the compensation plan they fail to disclose | | |
| | the threshold and maximum performance levels. | | |
| 4 | Shareholder Proposal Regarding GHG-Intensive Financing | Against | Abstain |
| | Vote Note: While we agree with the spirit of the proposal, we find certain sections of the resolution to be overly prescriptive. | | |
| 5 | Shareholder Proposal Regarding Equity Ratio | Against | For |
| J | Vote Note: One of the tools used to inform shareholders is the equity ratio, or the difference between | , 15411136 | . 51 |
| | the CEOs' total compensation and an employee's median compensation, known as the equity ratio. | | |
| | Disclosure of the equity ratio would allow shareholders to judge whether this compensation program | | |
| | is aligned with shareholders' interests. | | |

Tourmaline Oil Corp. Voted — Country of Trade: Canada — Annual Meeting Agenda 6/5/2019

| Proposal | Proposal Text Election of Directors | Mgmt Rec | Vote Cast |
|----------|--|----------|-----------|
| ı | Election of Directors | | |
| | 1.1 Elect Michael L. Rose | For | For |
| | 1.2 Elect Brian G. Robinson | For | For |
| | 1.3 Elect Jill T. Angevine | For | For |
| | 1.4 Elect William D. Armstrong | For | For |
| | 1.5 Elect Lee A. Baker | For | For |
| | 1.6 Elect John W. Elick | For | For |
| | 1.7 Elect Andrew B. MacDonald | For | For |
| | 1.8 Elect Lucy M. Miller | For | For |
| | 1.9 Elect Ronald C. Wigham | For | For |
| 2 | Appointment of Auditor and Authority to Set Fees | For | For |

Transcanada Corp. Voted — Country of Trade: Canada — Annual Meeting Agenda 5/3/2019

| Proposal 1 | Proposal Text Election of Directors | Mgmt Rec | Vote Cast |
|---------------|--|----------|-----------|
| | 1.1 Elect Stéphan Crétier | For | For |
| | 1.2 Elect Russell K. Girling | For | For |
| | 1.3 Elect S. Barry Jackson | For | For |

| 1.4 Elect Randy L. Limbacher | For | For |
|---|---|--|
| 1.5 Elect John E. Lowe | For | For |
| 1.6 Elect Una M. Power | For | For |
| 1.7 Elect Mary Pat Salomone | For | For |
| 1.8 Elect Indira V. Samarasekera | For | For |
| 1.9 Elect D. Michael G. Stewart | For | For |
| 1.10 Elect Siim A. Vanaselja | For | For |
| 1.11 Elect Thierry Vandal | For | For |
| 1.12 Elect Steven W. Williams | For | For |
| Appointment of Auditor and Authority to Set Fees | For | For |
| Advisory Vote on Executive Compensation | For | Against |
| Vote Note: It is not clear that executive compensation sufficiently ties pay with performance in a manner that aligns executives with the long-term interests of the company. For example: • The company has not disclosed the performance objectives for its long-term compensation plan going forward. However, for the 2016 ESU awards granted in 2018 threshold performance for the growth in shareholder value metric was 25 th percentile versus peers which may not be sufficiently challenging. For more details see page 92 of the circular. | | |
| Company Name Change | For | For |
| Amendment to Shareholder Rights Plan | For | For |
| Shareholder Proposal Regarding Report on Indigenous Peoples' Rights Vote Note: The Company's approach to Indigenous relations varies across jurisdictions, making it difficult for investors to understand whether, and to what extent, it aligns with international standards. In Canada and the U.S., failure to adequately address Indigenous rights and relations have contributed to the delay or cancellation of Trans Mountain Pipeline Extension, Northern Gateway Pipeline, Dakota Access Pipeline, TransCanada Energy East Pipeline, and Transcanada Keystone XL Pipeline, among others. | Against | For |
| | 1.5 Elect John E. Lowe 1.6 Elect Una M. Power 1.7 Elect Mary Pat Salomone 1.8 Elect Indira V. Samarasekera 1.9 Elect D. Michael G. Stewart 1.10 Elect Siim A. Vanaselja 1.11 Elect Thierry Vandal 1.12 Elect Steven W. Williams Appointment of Auditor and Authority to Set Fees Advisory Vote on Executive Compensation Vote Note: It is not clear that executive compensation sufficiently ties pay with performance in a manner that aligns executives with the long-term interests of the company. For example: • The company has not disclosed the performance objectives for its long-term compensation plan going forward. However, for the 2016 ESU awards granted in 2018 threshold performance for the growth in shareholder value metric was 25th percentile versus peers which may not be sufficiently challenging. For more details see page 92 of the circular. Company Name Change Amendment to Shareholder Rights Plan Shareholder Proposal Regarding Report on Indigenous Peoples' Rights Vote Note: The Company's approach to Indigenous relations varies across jurisdictions, making it difficult for investors to understand whether, and to what extent, it aligns with international standards. In Canada and the U.S., failure to adequately address Indigenous rights and relations have contributed to the delay or cancellation of Trans Mountain Pipeline Extension, Northern Gateway Pipeline, Dakota Access Pipeline, TransCanada Energy East Pipeline, and Transcanada Keystone XL | 1.5 Elect John E. Lowe 1.6 Elect Una M. Power 1.7 Elect Mary Pat Salomone 1.8 Elect Indira V. Samarasekera 1.9 Elect D. Michael G. Stewart 1.10 Elect Siim A. Vanaselja 1.11 Elect Thierry Vandal 1.12 Elect Steven W. Williams 1.12 Elect Steven W. Williams 1.13 Appointment of Auditor and Authority to Set Fees 1.14 Advisory Vote on Executive Compensation 1.15 Vote Note: It is not clear that executive compensation sufficiently ties pay with performance in a manner that aligns executives with the long-term interests of the company. For example: 1.6 The company has not disclosed the performance objectives for its long-term compensation plan going forward. However, for the 2016 ESU awards granted in 2018 threshold performance for the growth in shareholder value metric was 25th percentile versus peers which may not be sufficiently challenging. For more details see page 92 of the circular. 1. Company Name Change 1. Amendment to Shareholder Rights Plan 1. For Shareholder Proposal Regarding Report on Indigenous Peoples' Rights 1. Vote Note: The Company's approach to Indigenous relations varies across jurisdictions, making it difficult for investors to understand whether, and to what extent, it aligns with international standards. In Canada and the U.S., failure to adequately address Indigenous rights and relations have contributed to the delay or cancellation of Trans Mountain Pipeline Extension, Northern Gateway Pipeline, Dakota Access Pipeline, TransCanada Energy East Pipeline, and Transcanada Keystone XL |

Waste Connections, Inc. Voted — Country of Trade: Canada — Annual Meeting Agenda 5/17/2019

| Proposal | Proposal Text | Mgmt Rec | Vote Cast |
|----------|--|----------|-----------|
| 1 | Election of Directors | | |
| | 1.1 Elect Ronald J. Mittelstaedt | For | For |
| | 1.2 Elect Robert H. Davis | For | Withhold |
| | Vote Note: Candidate withdrawn | | |
| | 1.3 Elect Edward E. Guillet | For | For |
| | 1.4 Elect Michael W. Harlan | For | For |
| | 1.5 Elect Larry S. Hughes | For | For |
| | 1.6 Elect Susan Lee | For | For |
| | 1.7 Elect William J. Razzouk | For | For |
| 2 | Advisory Vote on Executive Compensation | For | Against |
| | Vote Note: It is not clear that executive compensation sufficiently ties pay with performance | | |
| | in a manner that aligns executives with the long-term interests of the company. For example:The use of only absolute metrics for the incentive programs may not be appropriate as it may reflect | | |
| | economic or industry factors beyond the control of executives. Performance conditions should include | | |
| | relative targets. | | |
| | The company has not disclosed the performance thresholds and maximums for its short-term compensation plan. | | |
| 3 | Appointment of Auditor and Authority to Set Fees | For | For |
| 4 | Board Size | For | For |
| 5 | Shareholder Proposal Regarding Diversity Policy | Against | For |
| | Vote Note: Improved disclosure of the company's director diversity policies and practices could help with the evaluation of related risks and opportunities. The company lags its peers and best practice with regard to the diversity of its board. | - | |

West Fraser Timber Co., Ltd. Voted — Country of Trade: Canada — Annual Meeting Agenda 4/23/2019

| Proposal 1 | Proposal Text Election of Directors | Mgmt Rec | Vote Cast |
|---------------|-------------------------------------|----------|-----------|
| | 1.1 Elect Hank Ketcham | For | For |
| | 1.2 Elect Reid Carter | For | For |
| | 1.3 Elect Raymond Ferris | For | For |
| | 1.4 Elect John Floren | For | For |
| | 1.5 Elect Brian G. Kenning | For | For |

| | 1.6 Elect John K. Ketcham Vote Note: This nominee is not independent because he is the cousin of the Chair, Hank Ketcham, who controls 10% of the company's voting power. John sits on the nominating and corporate governance committees and these committees should be 100% independent. | For | Withhold |
|---|---|-----|----------|
| | 1.7 Elect Gerald J. Miller Vote Note: This nominee is not independent as he is the former CFO of the Company (until July 2011), and is the chair of the audit, nominating and corporate governance committees and these committees should be 100% independent. | For | Withhold |
| | 1.8 Elect Robert L. Phillips | For | For |
| | 1.9 Elect Janice Rennie | For | For |
| | 1.10 Elect Gillian D. Winckler | For | For |
| 2 | Appointment of Auditor and Authority to Set Fees Vote Note: The non-audit-related fees are 29.2% of the total fees paid to the auditor. We believe that non-audit-related work could have been performed by a separate auditor so as to not compromise the independence of the auditor and the integrity of the Company's financial statements. | For | Withhold |
| 3 | Advisory Vote on Executive Compensation Vote Note: It is not clear that executive compensation sufficiently ties pay with performance in a manner that aligns executives with the long-term interests of the company. For example: • The company has not provided the performance objectives for its long-term compensation plans. • Less than 1/3rd of the company's long-term incentive program is based on performance metrics. Long-term incentive programs should have performance conditions that are measured over at least three consecutive years. Going forward the company has increased this proportion to 50% but this still allows for discretion within the incentive plan. | For | Against |

Wheaton Precious Metals Corp Voted — Country of Trade: Canada — Annual Meeting Agenda 5/9/2019

| Proposal | Proposal Text | Mgmt Rec | Vote Cast |
|----------|---|----------|-----------|
| 1 | Election of Directors | | |
| | 1.1 Elect George L. Brack | For | For |
| | 1.2 Elect John A. Brough | For | For |
| | 1.3 Elect R. Peter Gillin | For | Withhold |
| | Vote Note: This director nominee appears to have too many commitments to fulfill his duties as a director. He is an executive of a publicly traded company and he sits on a total of five public company boards. | | |
| | 1.4 Elect Chantal Gosselin | For | For |
| | 1.5 Elect Douglas M. Holtby | For | For |
| | 1.6 Elect Charles A. Jeannes | For | For |
| | 1.7 Elect Eduardo Luna | For | Withhold |
| | Vote Note: This director is not independent because he is the former interim CEO (from October 2004 to April 2006). He is on the compensation and nominating committees which should be 100% independent. | | |
| | 1.8 Elect Marilyn Schonberner | For | For |
| | 1.9 Elect Randy V.J. Smallwood | For | For |
| 2 | Appointment of Auditor and Authority to Set Fees | For | For |
| 3 | Advisory Vote on Executive Compensation | For | Against |
| | Vote Note: It is not clear that executive compensation sufficiently ties pay with performance in a manner that aligns executives with the long-term interests of the company. For example: • The use of a single metric for the long-term incentive program may not be appropriate. Performance related compensation should be linked to a variety of specific objective measures of the company's operational and financial performance. • Threshold performance for the growth in shareholder value metric is 37th percentile versus peers which may not be sufficiently challenging. • The company provides immediate vesting of certain equity awards upon a change in control rather than requiring that an executive also lose their position. | | |

Winpak Ltd. Voted — Country of Trade: Canada — Annual Meeting Agenda 4/23/2019

| Proposal | Proposal Text Election of Directors | Mgmt Rec | Vote Cast |
|----------|--|----------|-----------|
| ı | 1.1 Elect Antti I Aarnio-Wihuri Vote Note: These nominees are not independent and sit on the compensation, governance, | For | Withhold |
| | and nominating committees, these committees should be 100% independent. 1.2 Elect Martti H. Aarnio-Wihuri Vote Note: These nominees are not independent and sit on the compensation, governance, | For | Withhold |
| | and nominating committees, these committees should be 100% independent. 1.3 Elect Rakel J. Aarnio-Wihuri | For | For |

| | 1.4 Elect Karen A. Albrechtsen | For | For |
|---|---|-----|----------|
| | 1.5 Elect Bruce J. Berry | For | For |
| | 1.6 Elect Donald R.W. Chatterley | For | For |
| | 1.7 Elect Juha M. Hellgren | For | Withhold |
| | Vote Note: These nominees are not independent and sit on the compensation, governance, and nominating committees, these committees should be 100% independent. | | |
| | 1.8 Elect Dayna Spiring | For | For |
| | 1.9 Elect Ilkka T. Suominen | For | Withhold |
| | Vote Note: This nominee is not independent and sits on the audit committee and this committee should be 100% independent. | | |
| 2 | Appointment of Auditor | For | For |
| 3 | Advisory Vote on Executive Compensation | For | Against |
| | Vote Note: It is not clear that executive compensation sufficiently ties pay with performance in a manner that aligns executives with the long-term interests of the company. For example: • The company's incentive plans do not appear to have a clawback provision that would enable the company to recoup bonus awards in the event of material fraud or misconduct by the recipient of a bonus award. | | J |

WSP Global Inc. Voted — Country of Trade: Canada — Annual Meeting Agenda 5/15/2019

measures of the company's operational and financial performance.

• The use of a single, absolute metric for the short and long-term incentive programs may not be appropriate. Performance related compensation should be linked to a variety of specific objective

| Proposal | Proposal Text | Mgmt Rec | Vote Cast |
|----------|---|----------|-----------|
| 1 | Election of Directors | | |
| | 1.1 Elect Louis-Philippe Carrière | For | For |
| | 1.2 Elect Christopher Cole | For | For |
| | 1.3 Elect Linda Galipeau | For | For |
| | 1.4 Elect Alexandre L'Heureux | For | For |
| | 1.5 Elect Birgit W. Nørgaard | For | For |
| | 1.6 Elect Suzanne Rancourt | For | For |
| | 1.7 Elect Paul Raymond | For | For |
| | 1.8 Elect Pierre Shoiry | For | For |
| 2 | Appointment of Auditor | For | For |
| 3 | Advisory Vote on Executive Compensation | For | Against |
| | Vote Note: It is not clear that executive compensation sufficiently ties pay with performance in a manner that aligns executives with the long-term interests of the company. For example: • Threshold performance for the growth in shareholder value metric is 25 th percentile versus peers which may not be sufficiently challenging. | | |

Addenda EAFE Equity Pooled Fund

 ${\color{red}\textbf{ABB Ltd.}} \ \ \text{Voted}-\text{Country of Trade: Switzerland}-\text{Annual Meeting Agenda 5/2/2019}$

| Proposal | Proposal Text | Mgmt Rec | Vote Cast |
|----------|---|----------|------------------|
| 1 | Non-Voting Meeting Note | | |
| 2 | Accounts and Reports | For | For |
| 3 | Compensation Report Vote Note: It is not clear that executive compensation sufficiently ties pay with performance in a manner that aligns executives with the long-term interests of the company. For example: • The company provides immediate vesting of certain equity awards upon a change in control rather than requiring that an executive also lose their position. • The company does not require a portion of the annual cash bonus be deferred into shares. Deferral discourages risky or short-sighted strategies. • The company has not provided the performance objectives for its short or long term compensation plans. • Threshold performance for the growth in shareholder value metric is 25th percentile which may not be sufficiently challenging. | For | Against |
| 4 | Ratification of Board and Management Acts | For | For |
| 5 | Allocation of Profits/Dividends | For | For |
| 6 | Increase in Authorised Capital | For | For |
| 7 | Board Compensation | For | For |

| 8 | Executive Compensation Vote Note: It is not clear that executive compensation sufficiently ties pay with performance in a manner that aligns executives with the long-term interests of the company. For example: • The company provides immediate vesting of certain equity awards upon a change in control rather than requiring that an executive also lose their position. • The company does not require a portion of the annual cash bonus be deferred into shares. Deferral discourages risky or short-sighted strategies. • The company has not provided the performance objectives for its short or long term compensation plans. • Threshold performance for the growth in shareholder value metric is 25th percentile which may not be sufficiently challenging. | For | Against |
|----|--|-----|---------|
| 9 | Elect Matti Alahuhta | For | For |
| 10 | Elect Gunnar Brock | For | For |
| 11 | Elect David E. Constable | For | For |
| 12 | Elect Frederico Fleury Curado | For | For |
| 13 | Elect Lars Förberg | For | Against |
| | Vote Note: This director is managing partner and co-founder of Cevian Capital, which beneficially owns 5.34% of the Company's issued share capital, which means he is not independent. He is on the company's governance and nominating committees and these committees should be 100% independent. | | |
| 14 | Elect Jennifer Xin-Zhe Li | For | For |
| 15 | Elect Geraldine Matchett | For | For |
| 16 | Elect David Meline | For | For |
| 17 | Elect Satish Pai | For | For |
| 18 | Elect Jacob Wallenberg | For | Against |
| | Vote Note: He is also chair of Investor AB, which beneficially owns 10.71% of the Company's issued share capital; the Wallenberg family controls 50.1% of Investor AB's voting rights. In addition to this, he has served on the board for more than 12 years. He is on the company's governance and nominating committees and these committees should be 100% independent. | | |
| 19 | Elect Peter R. Voser as Board Chair | For | For |
| 20 | Elect David E. Constable as Compensation Committee Member | For | For |
| 21 | Elect Frederico Fleury Curado as Compensation Committee Member | For | For |
| 22 | Elect Jennifer Xin-Zhe Li as Compensation Committee Member | For | For |
| 23 | Appointment of Independent Proxy | For | For |
| 24 | Appointment of Auditor | For | For |
| 25 | Non-Voting Meeting Note | For | For |
| | - | | |

Air Liquide S.A. Voted — Country of Trade: France — Annual Meeting Agenda 5/7/2019

| Proposal 1 | Proposal Text Non-Voting Meeting Note | Mgmt Rec | Vote Cast |
|---------------|---|----------|-----------|
| 2 | Non-Voting Meeting Note | | |
| 3 | Non-Voting Meeting Note | | |
| 4 | Accounts and Reports | For | For |
| 5 | Consolidated Accounts and Reports | For | For |
| 6 | Allocation of Profits/Dividends | For | For |
| 7 | Authority to Repurchase and Reissue Shares | For | For |
| 8 | Elect Siân Herbert-Jones | For | For |
| 9 | Elect Geneviève B. Berger | For | For |
| 10 | Special Auditors Report on Regulated Agreements | For | For |
| 11 | Remuneration of Benoît Potier, Chair and CEO Vote Note: It is not clear that executive compensation sufficiently ties pay with performance in a manner that aligns executives with the long-term interests of the company. For example: • The company has not provided the performance objectives for its compensation plans. • The company does not require a portion of the annual cash bonus be deferred into shares. Deferral discourages risky or short-sighted strategies. • The company's incentive plans do not appear to have a clawback provision that would enable the company to recoup bonus awards in the event of material fraud or misconduct by the recipient of a bonus award. | For | Against |

| 12 | Remuneration Policy (Executives) | For | Against |
|----|---|-----|---------|
| | Vote Note: It is not clear that executive compensation sufficiently ties pay with performance | | |
| | in a manner that aligns executives with the long-term interests of the company. For example: | | |
| | The company has not provided the performance objectives for its compensation plans. The company does not require a portion of the annual cash bonus be deferred into shares. | | |
| | Deferral discourages risky or short-sighted strategies. | | |
| | The company's incentive plans do not appear to have a clawback provision that would enable | | |
| | the company to recoup bonus awards in the event of material fraud or misconduct by the recipient | | |
| | of a bonus award. | | |
| 13 | Authority to Cancel Shares and Reduce Capital | For | For |
| 14 | Authority to Issue Shares and Convertible Debt w/ Preemptive Rights | For | For |
| 15 | Greenshoe | For | For |
| 16 | Authority to Grant Stock Options | For | For |
| 17 | Authority to Issue Performance Shares | For | For |
| 18 | Employee Stock Purchase Plan | For | For |
| 19 | Stock Purchase Plan for Overseas Employees | For | For |
| 20 | Authorisation of Legal Formalities | For | For |
| 21 | Non-Voting Meeting Note | | |

Air Water Inc. Voted — Country of Trade: Japan — Annual Meeting Agenda 6/26/2019

| Proposal | Proposal Text | Mgmt Rec | Vote Cast |
|----------|---|----------|-----------|
| 1 | Non-Voting Meeting Note | | |
| 2 | Amendments to Articles | For | For |
| 3 | Elect Masahiro Toyoda Vote Note: The board does not have a sufficient number of independent directors, which raises serious concerns about its objectivity, independence and ability to perform proper oversight. To voice our concerns, we are voting against this director as he is the CEO and chair and should be | For | Against |
| 4 | held accountable for allowing insufficient independent representation. | Ган | Ган |
| 4 | Elect Yasuo Imai | For | For |
| 5 | Elect Kikuo Toyoda | For | For |
| 6 | Elect Kiyoshi Shirai | For | For |
| / | Elect Yu Karato | For | For |
| 8 | Elect Masato Machida | For | For |
| 9 | Elect Hideo Tsutsumi | For | For |
| 10 | Elect Yoshio Shiomi | For | For |
| 11 | Elect Yasushi Sogabe | For - | For |
| 12 | Elect Hirokazu Kawata | For - | For |
| 13 | Elect Katsumi Kajiwara | For | For |
| 14 | Elect Atsushi linaga | For | For |
| 15 | Elect Kosuke Komura | For | For |
| 16 | Elect Akihiro Toyonaga | For | For |
| 17 | Elect Ryosuke Matsubayashi | For | For |
| 18 | Elect Masahiro Kanazawa | For | For |
| 19 | Elect Yasunori Kato | For | For |
| 20 | Elect Koji Tanaka | For | For |
| 21 | Elect Yukiko Sakamoto | For | For |
| 22 | Elect Isamu Shimizu | For | For |
| 23 | Adoption of Restricted Stock Plan | For | For |

Allianz SE Voted — Country of Trade: Germany — Annual Meeting Agenda 5/8/2019

| Proposal | Proposal Text | Mgmt Rec | Vote Cast |
|----------|--|----------|-----------|
| 1 | Non-Voting Meeting Note | | |
| 2 | Non-Voting Meeting Note | | |
| 3 | Non-Voting Meeting Note | | |
| 4 | Non-Voting Meeting Note | | |
| 5 | Non-Voting Agenda Item | | |
| 6 | Allocation of Profits/Dividends | For | For |
| 7 | Ratification of Management Board Acts | For | For |
| 8 | Ratification of Supervisory Board Acts | For | For |

| 9 | Amendments to Remuneration Policy | For | Against |
|----|--|-----|---------|
| | Vote Note: While we recognize that some of the amendments are positive, it is not clear that | | |
| | executive compensation sufficiently ties pay with performance in a manner that aligns executives | | |
| | with the long-term interests of the company. For example: | | |
| | The company does not require a portion of the annual cash bonus be deferred into shares. | | |
| | Deferral discourages risky or short-sighted strategies. | | |
| | Threshold performance for the growth in shareholder value metric is below median which | | |
| | may not be sufficiently challenging. | | |
| | The company has not disclosed the performance objectives for its long-term compensation plan. | | |
| 10 | Approval of Intra-Company Control Agreement with AllSecur Deutschland AG | For | For |

Bunzl plc Voted — Country of Trade: Great Britain — Annual Meeting Agenda 4/17/2019

| Proposal | Proposal Text | Mgmt Rec | Vote Cast |
|----------|---|----------|-----------|
| 1 | Accounts and Reports | For | For |
| 2 | Allocation of Profits/Dividends | For | For |
| 3 | Elect Philip G. Rogerson | For | For |
| 4 | Elect Frank van Zanten | For | Against |
| | Vote Note: This director is considered an insider by Glass Lewis, and the Company classifies the director as not independent. This director is also on the nominating committee; this committee should be 100% independent. | | |
| 5 | Elect Brian M. May | For | For |
| 6 | Elect Eugenia Ulasewicz | For | For |
| 7 | Elect Vanda Murray | For | For |
| 8 | Elect Lloyd Pitchford | For | For |
| 9 | Elect Stephan Ronald Nanninga | For | Against |
| | Vote Note: This director nominee appears to have too many commitments to fulfill his duties as a director. He is a public company executive and serves on a total of three public company boards. | | |
| 10 | Appointment of Auditor | For | For |
| 11 | Authority to Set Auditor's Fees | For | For |
| 12 | Remuneration Report (Advisory) | For | Against |
| | Vote Note: It is not clear that executive compensation sufficiently ties pay with performance in a manner that aligns executives with the long-term interests of the company. For example: • The short-term and long-term incentive programs are based on similar financial metrics which allows for a high level of pay-out (or lack thereof) for hitting similar targets rather than considering a variety of financial and operational metrics. | | |
| 13 | Authority to Issue Shares w/ Preemptive Rights | For | For |
| 14 | Authority to Issue Shares w/o Preemptive Rights | For | For |
| 15 | Authority to Issue Shares w/o Preemptive Rights (Specified Capital Investment) | For | For |
| 16 | Authority to Repurchase Shares | For | For |
| 17 | Authority to Set General Meeting Notice Period at 14 Days | For | Against |
| | Vote Note: A shortened notice period may not provide non-UK shareholders with sufficient time to adequately review proposals being presented at an extraordinary general meeting. | | |
| 18 | Non-Voting Meeting Note | | |

Compagnie financière Richemont SA Voted — Country of Trade: Switzerland — Annual Meeting Agenda 9/10/2018

| Proposal 1 | Proposal Text Accounts and Reports | Mgmt Rec For | Vote Cast For |
|---------------|---|-----------------|-------------------------|
| 2 | Allocation of Profits/Dividends | For | For |
| 3 | Ratification of Board and Management Acts | For | For |
| 4 | Elect Johann Rupert as Board Chair | For | Against |
| | Vote Note: This nominee is not considered independent. This nominee is chair of the company's nominating committee and this committee should be 100% independent. | | |
| 5 | Elect Josua (Dillie) Malherbe | For | For |
| 6 | Elect Nikesh Arora | For | Against |
| | Vote Note: This nominee is not considered independent. This nominee is on the company's nominating committee and this committee should be 100% independent. | | |
| 7 | Elect Nicolas Bos | For | For |
| 8 | Elect Clay Brendish | For | For |

| 9 | Elect Jean-Blaise Eckert Vote Note: This nominee, either personally or through closely-related entities, received material consulting and/or legal fees and/or donations from the Company in the past fiscal year. We believe that such relationships could cause significant conflicts for directors. This nominee is also on the company's audit and nominating committees and these committees should be 100% independent. | For | Against |
|----|--|-----|---------|
| 10 | Elect Burkhart Grund | For | For |
| 11 | | For | For |
| | Elect Keyu Jin | | |
| 12 | Elect Jérôme Lambert | For | For |
| 13 | Elect Ruggero Magnoni Vote Note: This nominee, either personally or through closely-related entities, received material consulting and/or legal fees and/or donations from the Company in the past fiscal year. We believe that such relationships could cause significant conflicts for directors. This nominee is also on the company's audit and nominating committees and these committees should be 100% independent. | For | Against |
| 14 | Elect Jeff Moss | For | For |
| 15 | Elect Vesna Nevistic Vote Note: This nominee is not considered independent. This nominee is on the company's nominating committee and this committee should be 100% independent. | For | Against |
| 16 | Elect Guillaume Pictet | For | For |
| 17 | Elect Alan G. Quasha | For | |
| 17 | Vote Note: This nominee is not considered independent. This nominee is on the company's nominating committee and this committee should be 100% independent. | FUI | Against |
| 18 | Elect Maria Ramos | For | Against |
| | Vote Note: This director nominee appears to have too many commitments to fulfill her duties as a director. He sits on three public company boards while serving as CEO of one of them. | | |
| 19 | Elect Anton Rupert | For | Against |
| | Vote Note: This nominee is not considered independent. This nominee is on the company's nominating committee and this committee should be 100% independent. | | |
| 20 | Elect Jan Rupert | For | Against |
| | Vote Note: This nominee is not considered independent. This nominee is on the company's nominating committee and this committee should be 100% independent. | _ | |
| 21 | Elect Gary Saage | For | Against |
| | Vote Note: This nominee is not considered independent. This nominee is on the company's nominating committee and this committee should be 100% independent. | | |
| 22 | Elect Cyrille Vigneron | For | For |
| 23 | Elect Sophie Guieysse | For | For |
| 24 | Elect Clay Brendish as Compensation Committee Member | For | For |
| 25 | | | |
| | Elect Guillaume Pictet as Compensation Committee Member | For | For |
| 26 | Elect Maria Ramos as Compensation Committee Member | For | For |
| 27 | Elect Keyu Jin as Compensation Committee Member | For | For |
| 28 | Appointment of Auditor | For | For |
| 29 | Appointment of Independent Proxy | For | For |
| 30 | Board Compensation | For | For |
| 31 | Executive Compensation (Fixed) | For | Against |
| | Vote Note: It is not clear that the executive compensation policy sufficiently ties pay with performance in a manner that aligns executives with the long-term interests of the company. For example: • The company has not disclosed the performance objectives for its short and long-term compensation plan. | | |
| | The use of a single metric for the long-term incentive program may not be appropriate. Performance related compensation should be linked to a variety of specific objective measures of the company's operational and financial performance. The company does not require a portion of the annual cash bonus be deferred into shares. | | |
| | Deferral discourages risky or short-sighted strategies. • The company potentially provides accelerated vesting of certain equity awards upon a change in control rather than requiring that an executive also lose their position. | | |
| 32 | Executive Compensation (Variable) | For | Against |
| | Vote Note: It is not clear that the executive compensation policy sufficiently ties pay | | J |
| | with performance in a manner that aligns executives with the long-term interests of the company. For example: | | |
| | The company has not disclosed the performance objectives for its short and long-term compensation plan. The use of a single metric for the long-term incentive program may not be appropriate. Performance | | |
| | related compensation should be linked to a variety of specific objective measures of the company's operational and financial performance. | | |
| | The company does not require a portion of the annual cash bonus be deferred into shares. Deferral discourages risky or short-sighted strategies. The company potentially provides accelerated vesting of certain equity awards upon a change in | | |
| | control rather than requiring that an executive also lose their position. | | |
| 33 | Non-Voting Meeting Note | | |

Danone Voted — Country of Trade: France — Annual Meeting Agenda 4/25/2019

| Proposal | Proposal Text | Mgmt Rec | Vote Cast |
|----------|--|----------|-----------|
| 1 | Non-Voting Meeting Note | | |
| 2 | Non-Voting Meeting Note | | |
| 3 | Non-Voting Meeting Note | | |
| 4 | Accounts and Reports | For | For |
| 5 | Consolidated Accounts and Reports | For | For |
| 6 | Allocation of Profits/Dividends | For | For |
| 7 | Elect Franck Riboud | For | For |
| 8 | Elect Emmanuel Faber | For | For |
| 9 | Elect Clara Gaymard | For | For |
| 10 | Special Auditors Report on Regulated Agreements | For | For |
| 11 | Remuneration of Emmanuel Faber, CEO and Chair | For | Against |
| | Vote Note: It is not clear that executive compensation sufficiently ties pay with performance in a manner that aligns executives with the long-term interests of the company. For example: • The company provides accelerated vesting of certain equity awards upon a change in control rather than requiring that an executive also lose their position. • The company does not require a portion of the annual cash bonus be deferred into shares. Deferral discourages risky or short-sighted strategies. | | |
| | The company's incentive plans do not appear to have a clawback provision that would enable the company to recoup bonus awards in the event of material fraud or misconduct by the recipient of a bonus award. The use of a single, absolute metric for the short-term incentive program may not be appropriate. Performance related compensation should be linked to a variety of specific objective measures of the company's operational and financial performance. | | |
| 12 | Remuneration Policy (Corporate Officers) | For | Against |
| | Vote Note: • The company does not require a portion of the annual cash bonus be deferred into shares. Deferral discourages risky or short-sighted strategies. • The company's incentive plans do not appear to have a clawback provision that would enable the company to recoup bonus awards in the event of material fraud or misconduct by the recipient of a bonus award. | | |
| 13 | Authority to Repurchase and Reissue Shares | For | For |
| 14 | Authority to Issue Shares and Convertible Debt w/ Preemptive Rights | For | For |
| 15 | Authority to Issue Shares and Convertible Debt w/o Preemptive Rights and w/ | For | For |
| | Priority Subscription | | |
| 16 | Greenshoe | For | For |
| 17 | Authority to Increase Capital in Case of Exchange Offer | For | For |
| 18 | Authority to Increase Capital in Consideration for Contributions in Kind | For | For |
| 19 | Authority to Increase Capital Through Capitalisations | For | For |
| 20 | Employee Stock Purchase Plan | For | For |
| 21 | Stock Purchase Plan for Overseas Employees | For | For |
| 22 | Authority to Issue Performance Shares | For | For |
| 23 | Authority to Cancel Shares and Reduce Capital | For | For |
| 24 25 | Authorization of Legal Formalities Non-Voting Meeting Note | For | For |

Diageo plc Voted — Country of Trade: Great Britain — Annual Meeting Agenda 9/20/2018

| Proposal 1 | Proposal Text Accounts and Reports | Mgmt Rec For | Vote Cast For |
|---------------|---|-----------------|-------------------------|
| 2 | Remuneration Report (Advisory) | For | For |
| 3 | Allocation of Profits/Dividends | For | For |
| 4 | Elect Susan Kilsby | For | For |
| 5 | Elect Lord Mervyn Davies | For | For |
| 6 | Elect Javier Ferrán | For | For |
| 7 | Elect HO Kwon Ping | For | Against |
| | Vote Note: This director nominee appears to have too many commitments to fulfill his duties as a director. He sits on a total of four public company boards while serving as executive chairman of one of them and non-executive chairman of two. | | |

| 8 | Elect Nicola Mendelsohn | For | For |
|----|---|-----|---------|
| 9 | Elect Ivan Menezes | For | For |
| 10 | Elect Kathryn A. Mikells | For | For |
| 11 | Elect Alan Stewart | For | For |
| 12 | Appointment of Auditor | For | For |
| 13 | Authority to Set Auditor's Fees | For | For |
| 14 | Authorisation of Political Donations | For | For |
| 15 | Authority to Issue Shares w/ Preemptive Rights | For | For |
| 16 | Authority to Issue Shares w/o Preemptive Rights | For | For |
| 17 | Authority to Repurchase Shares | For | For |
| 18 | Amendments to Articles | For | For |
| 19 | Authority to Set General Meeting Notice Period at 14 Days | For | Against |
| | Vote Note: A shortened notice period may not provide non-UK shareholders with sufficient time to adequately review proposals being presented at an extraordinary general meeting. | | |
| 20 | Non-Voting Meeting Note | | |

Experian Plc Voted — Country of Trade: Jersey — Annual Meeting Agenda 7/18/2018

| Proposal 1 | Proposal Text Accounts and Reports | Mgmt Rec For | Vote Cast For |
|---------------|--|-----------------|------------------|
| 2 | Remuneration Report (Advisory) Vote Note: It is not clear that the executive compensation policy sufficiently ties pay with performance in a manner that aligns executives with the long-term interests of the company. For example: • The short-term and long-term incentive programs are based on similar financial metrics which allows for a high level of pay-out (or lack thereof) for hitting similar targets rather than considering a variety of financial and operational metrics. • The use of a single, absolute metric for the short-term incentive program may not be appropriate as it may reflect economic or industry factors beyond the control of executives. Performance conditions should include relative targets. | For | Against |
| 3 | Elect Ruba Borno | For | For |
| 4 | Elect Brian Cassin | For | For |
| 5 | Elect Caroline F. Donahue | For | For |
| 6 | Elect Luiz Fernando Vendramini Fleury | For | For |
| 7 | Elect Deirdre Mahlan | For | For |
| 8 | Elect Lloyd Pitchford | For | For |
| 9 | Elect Don Robert | For | Against |
| | Vote Note: This director is not independent because he is the former CEO (until July 16, 2014). This director is on the company's nominating committee and this committee should be 100% independent. | | |
| 10 | Elect Mike Rogers | For | For |
| 11 | Elect George Rose | For | For |
| 12 | Elect Paul A. Walker | For | For |
| 13 | Elect Kerry Williams | For | For |
| 14 | Appointment of Auditor | For | For |
| 15 | Authority to Set Auditor's Fees | For | For |
| 16 | Authority to Issue Shares w/ Preemptive Rights | For | For |
| 17 | Authority to Issue Shares w/o Preemptive Rights | For | For |
| 18 | Authority to Issue Shares w/o Preemptive Rights (Specified Capital Investment) | For | For |
| 19 | Authority to Repurchase Shares | For | For |

Fresenius SE & Co. KGaA Voted — Country of Trade: Germany — Annual Meeting Agenda 5/17/2019

| Proposal | Proposal Text | Mgmt Rec | Vote Cast |
|----------|--|----------|-----------|
| 1 | Non-Voting Meeting Note | | |
| 2 | Non-Voting Meeting Note | | |
| 3 | Non-Voting Meeting Note | | |
| 4 | Accounts and Reports | For | For |
| 5 | Allocation of Profits/Dividends | For | For |
| 6 | Ratification of General Partner Acts | For | For |
| 7 | Ratification of Supervisory Board Acts | For | For |
| 8 | Appointment of Auditor | For | For |

$\textbf{G4S Plc} \quad \text{Voted} - \text{Country of Trade: Great Britain} - \text{Annual Meeting Agenda 5/16/2019}$

| Proposal | Proposal Text | Mgmt Rec | Vote Cast |
|----------|--|----------|-----------|
| 1 | Accounts and Reports | For | For |
| 2 | Remuneration Report (Advisory) | For | For |
| 3 | Allocation of Profits/Dividends | For | For |
| 4 | Elect Elisabeth Fleuriot | For | For |
| 5 | Elect Ashley Almanza | For | For |
| 6 | Elect John P. Connolly | For | For |
| 7 | Elect Winnie Kin Wah Fok | For | For |
| 8 | Elect Steven L. Mogford | For | For |
| 9 | Elect John Ramsay | For | For |
| 10 | Elect Paul Spence | For | For |
| 11 | Elect Barbara Milian Thoralfsson | For | For |
| 12 | Elect Tim Weller | For | For |
| 13 | Appointment of Auditor | For | For |
| 14 | Authority to Set Auditor's Fees | For | For |
| 15 | Authorisation of Political Donations | For | For |
| 16 | Authority to Issue Shares w/ Preemptive Rights | For | For |
| 17 | Authority to Issue Shares w/o Preemptive Rights | For | For |
| 18 | Authority to Issue Shares w/o Preemptive Rights (Specified Capital Investment) | For | For |
| 19 | Authority to Repurchase Shares | For | For |
| 20 | Authority to Set General Meeting Notice Period at 14 Days Vote Note: A shortened notice period may not provide non-UK shareholders with sufficient time to adequately review proposals being presented at an extraordinary general meeting. | For | Against |
| 21 | Non-Voting Meeting Note | | |

$\textbf{Grifols SA} \quad \text{Voted} - \text{Country of Trade: Spain} - \text{Annual Meeting Agenda 5/23/2019}$

| Proposal | Proposal Text | Mgmt Rec | Vote Cast |
|----------|--|----------|-----------|
| 1 | Non-Voting Meeting Note | | |
| 2 | Non-Voting Meeting Note | | |
| 3 | Individual Accounts and Reports; Allocation of Profits/Dividends | For | For |
| 4 | Consolidated Accounts and Reports | For | For |
| 5 | Report on Non-Financial Information | For | For |
| 6 | Ratification of Board Acts | For | For |
| 7 | Appointment of Auditor (Individual Accounts) | For | For |
| 8 | Appointment of Auditor (Consolidated Accounts) | For | For |
| 9 | Resignation of Anna Veiga Lluch | For | For |
| 10 | Elect Enriqueta Felip Font | For | For |
| 11 | Elect Raimon Grifols Roura | For | For |
| 12 | Elect Tomás Dagá Gelabert | For | Against |
| | Vote Note: This director is not independent because they are the founder and partner of Osborne Clarke SL, a law firm that provides legal and financial services to the Company as well as a shareholder of Scranton Enterprises B.V. («Scranton Enterprises»), which beneficially owns 8.7% of the Company's voting share capital. He has also served on the board for more than 12 years. They are on the remuneration and nominating committees. These committees should be 100% independent. | | |
| 13 | Elect Carina Szpilka Lázaro | For | For |
| 14 | Elect Iñigo Sanchez-Asiaín Mardones | For | For |
| 15 | Amendments to Articles (Distance Voting) | For | For |
| 16 17 | Amendments to General Meeting Regulations (Distance Voting) Non-Voting Agenda Item | For | For |

| 18 | Remuneration Report (Advisory) | For | Against |
|----|---|-----|---------|
| | Vote Note: It is not clear that executive compensation sufficiently ties pay with performance | | |
| | in a manner that aligns executives with the long-term interests of the company. For example: | | |
| | The company does not have a long-term incentive program. Some elements of variable pay | | |
| | should have performance conditions measured over at least three consecutive years. | | |
| | • The company does not require a portion of the annual cash bonus be deferred into shares. | | |
| | Deferral discourages risky or short-sighted strategies. | | |
| | The use of absolute metrics for incentive programs may not be appropriate as it may reflect | | |
| | economic or industry factors beyond the control of executives. Performance conditions should | | |
| | include relative targets. | | |
| | The use of a single metric for its incentive programs may not be appropriate. Performance | | |
| | related compensation should be linked to a variety of specific objective measures of the company's operational and financial performance. | | |
| 19 | Authorisation of Legal Formalities | For | For |
| 20 | Non-Voting Agenda Item | | |
| 21 | Non-Voting Meeting Note | | |

Heineken N.V. Voted — Country of Trade: Netherlands — Annual Meeting Agenda 4/25/2019

| Proposal | Proposal Text | Mgmt Rec | Vote Cast |
|----------|---|----------|-----------|
| 1 | Non-Voting Agenda Item | | |
| 2 | Non-Voting Agenda Item | | |
| 3 | Accounts and Reports | For | For |
| 4 | Non-Voting Agenda Item | | |
| 5 | Allocation of Profits/Dividends | For | For |
| 6 | Ratification of Management Board Acts | For | For |
| 7 | Ratification of Supervisory Board Acts | For | For |
| 8 | Authority to Repurchase Shares | For | For |
| 9 | Authority to Issue Shares w/ Preemptive Rights | For | For |
| 10 | Authority to Suppress Preemptive Rights | For | For |
| 11 | Supervisory Board Fees | For | For |
| 12 | Election of Laurence Debroux to the Management Board | For | For |
| 13 | Election of Michel de Carvalho to the Supervisory Board | For | Against |
| | Vote Note: This director is not independent. This director is on the company's nominating, and remuneration committees and these committees should be 100% independent. | | |
| 14 | Election of Rosemary L. Ripley to the Supervisory Board | For | For |
| 15 | Election of Ingrid-Helen Arnold to the Supervisory Board | For | For |
| 16 | Non-Voting Meeting Note | | |

Henkel AG & Co. KGAA Voted — Country of Trade: Germany — Annual Meeting Agenda 4/8/2019

| Proposal 1 | Proposal Text Non-Voting Meeting Note | Mgmt Rec | Vote Cast |
|---------------|---|----------|-----------|
| 2 | Non-Voting Meeting Note | | |
| 3 | Non-Voting Meeting Note | | |
| 4 | Non-Voting Agenda Item | | |
| 5 | Special Resolution for Preferred Shareholders: Increase in Authorised Capital | For | For |

Hoya Corporation Voted — Country of Trade: Japan — Annual Meeting Agenda 6/26/2019

| Proposal | Proposal Text | Mgmt Rec | Vote Cast |
|----------|-------------------------|----------|-----------|
| 1 | Non-Voting Meeting Note | | |
| 2 | Elect Yukako Uchinaga | For | For |
| 3 | Elect Mitsudo Urano | For | For |
| 4 | Elect Takeo Takasu | For | For |
| 5 | Elect Shuzo Kaihori | For | For |
| 6 | Elect Hiroaki Yoshihara | For | For |
| 7 | Elect Hiroshi Suzuki | For | For |

HSBC Holdings plc Voted — Country of Trade: Great Britain — Annual Meeting Agenda 4/12/2019

| Proposal | Proposal Text | Mgmt Rec | Vote Cast |
|----------|---|----------|-----------|
| 1 | Accounts and Reports | For | For |
| 2 | Remuneration Report (Advisory) | For | For |
| 3 | Remuneration Policy (Binding) | For | Against |
| | Vote Note: It is not clear that executive compensation sufficiently ties pay with performance in a manner that aligns executives with the long-term interests of the company. For example: • The company has failed to fully disclose the specific targets used under the Company's bonus scheme. • The use of only absolute metrics for the long term incentive program may not be appropriate | | |
| | as it may reflect economic or industry factors beyond the control of executives. Performance conditions should include relative targets. | | |
| 4 | Elect Ewen Stevenson | For | For |
| 5 | Elect José Antonio Meade Kuribeña | For | For |
| 6 | Elect Kathleen L. Casey | For | For |
| 7 | Elect Laura M.L. Cha | For | For |
| 8 | Elect Henri de Castries | For | For |
| 9 | Elect John M. Flint | For | For |
| 10 | Elect Irene LEE Yun Lien | For | For |
| | Vote Note: This director exceeds our guidelines in terms of director commitments, however, the company provides additional disclosure on the director's ability to be an effective representative of shareholders given her commitments beyond the company's board. | | |
| 11 | Elect Heidi G. Miller | For | For |
| 12 | Elect Marc Moses | For | For |
| 13 | Elect David T. Nish | For | For |
| 14 | Elect Jonathan R. Symonds | For | For |
| 15 | Elect Jackson P. Tai | For | For |
| 16 | Elect Mark E. Tucker | For | For |
| 17 | Elect Pauline van der Meer Mohr | For | For |
| 18 | Appointment of Auditor | For | For |
| 19 | Authority to Set Auditor's Fees | For | For |
| 20 | Authorisation of Political Donations | For | For |
| 21 | Authority to Issue Shares w/ Preemptive Rights | For | For |
| 22 | Authority to Issue Shares w/o Preemptive Rights | For | For |
| 23 | Authority to Issue Shares w/o Preemptive Rights (specified capital investment) | For | For |
| 24 | Authority to Issue Repurchased Shares | For | For |
| 25 | Authority to Repurchase Shares | For | For |
| 26 | Authority to Issue Shares w/ Preemptive Rights (contingent convertible securities) | For | For |
| 27 | Authority to Issue Shares w/o Preemptive Rights (contingent convertible | For | For |
| 28 | securities) Scrip Dividend | For | For |
| 29 | Authority to Set General Meeting Notice Period at 14 Days | For | Against |
| L7 | Vote Note: A shortened notice period may not provide non-UK shareholders with sufficient time to adequately review proposals being presented at an extraordinary general meeting. | 101 | Agailist |
| 30 | Shareholder Proposal Regarding Pension Scheme Vote Note: We do not have enough information to support or vote against this proposal. | Against | Abstain |

ING Groep N.V. Voted — Country of Trade: Netherlands — Annual Meeting Agenda 4/23/2019

| Proposal Text | Mgmt Rec | Vote Cast |
|-------------------------|--|--|
| Non-Voting Agenda Item | | |
| Accounts and Reports | For | For |
| Non-Voting Agenda Item | | |
| Allocation of Dividends | For | For |
| | Non-Voting Agenda Item Accounts and Reports Non-Voting Agenda Item | Non-Voting Agenda Item Accounts and Reports Non-Voting Agenda Item |

| 9 | Ratification of Management Board Acts Vote Note: There have been legal and regulatory issues regarding the company's shortcomings in the execution of customer due diligence policies intended to prevent financial crime between 2010 and 2016. Reputational damage from these issues may lead to a negative impact on shareholder value. Given that the members of the management and supervisory boards are ultimately accountable for the implementation of an appropriate money laundering prevention policy, we cannot support these proposals. | For | Against |
|----|---|-----|---------|
| 10 | Ratification of Supervisory Board Acts Vote Note: There have been legal and regulatory issues regarding the company's shortcomings in the execution of customer due diligence policies intended to prevent financial crime between 2010 and 2016. Reputational damage from these issues may lead to a negative impact on shareholder value. Given that the members of the management and supervisory boards are ultimately accountable for the implementation of an appropriate money laundering prevention policy, we cannot support these proposals. | For | Against |
| 11 | Appointment of Auditor | For | For |
| 12 | Elect Tanate Phutrakul to the Management Board | For | For |
| 13 | Elect Mariana Gheorghe to the Supervisory Board | For | For |
| 14 | Elect Michael G. Rees to the Supervisory Board | For | For |
| 15 | Elect Herna W.P.M.A. Verhagen to the Supervisory Board Vote Note: This director nominee appears to have too many commitments to fulfill her duties as a director. She is a public company executive and serves on a total of three public company boards. | For | Against |
| 16 | Authority to Issue Shares w/ Preemptive Rights | For | For |
| 17 | Elect Pauline van der Meer Mohr | For | For |
| 18 | Appointment of Auditor | For | For |

Ingenico Group Voted — Country of Trade: France — Annual Meeting Agenda 6/11/2019

| Proposal | Proposal Text | Mgmt Rec | Vote Cast |
|----------|--|------------|--------------------|
| 1 | Non-Voting Meeting Note | | |
| 2 | Non-Voting Meeting Note | | |
| 3 | Non-Voting Meeting Note | | |
| 4 | Non-Voting Meeting Note | | |
| 5 | Accounts and Reports; Non Tax-Deductible Expenses | For | For |
| 6 | Consolidated Accounts and Reports | For | For |
| 7 | Allocation of Profits/Dividends | For | For |
| 8 | Scrip Dividend | For | For |
| 9 | Special Auditors Report on Regulated Agreements | For | For |
| 10 | Severance Agreement (Nicolas Huss, CEO) | For | For |
| 11 | Ratification of Co-Option of Nicolas Huss | For | For |
| 12 | Elect Nicolas Huss | For | For |
| 13 | Elect Diaa Elyaacoubi | For | For |
| 14 | Elect Sophie Stabile | For | For |
| 15 | Elect Agnès Audier | For | For |
| 16 | Elect Zeynep Nazan Somer Ozelgin | For | For |
| 17 | Elect Michael Stollarz | For | For |
| 18 | Remuneration of Philippe Lazare, Chair and CEO (until November 5, 2018) Vote Note: It is not clear that executive compensation sufficiently ties pay with performance in a manner that aligns executives with the long-term interests of the company. For example: • The company does not require a portion of the annual cash bonus be deferred into shares. Deferral discourages risky or short-sighted strategies. • The company's incentive plans do not appear to have a clawback provision that would enable the company to recoup bonus awards in the event of material fraud or misconduct by the recipient of a bonus award. • The company has not disclosed the performance objectives for its compensation plans. Remuneration of Nicolas Huss, CEO (from November 5, 2018) Vote Note: It is not clear that executive compensation sufficiently ties pay with performance in a manner that aligns executives with the long-term interests of the company. For example: | For For | Against Against |
| 20 | The company does not require a portion of the annual cash bonus be deferred into shares. Deferral discourages risky or short-sighted strategies. The company's incentive plans do not appear to have a clawback provision that would enable the company to recoup bonus awards in the event of material fraud or misconduct by the recipient of a bonus award. The company has not disclosed the performance objectives for its compensation plans. Remuneration of Bernard Bourigeaud, Chair (from November 5, 2018) | For | For |

| 21 | Remuneration Policy (CEO) Vote Note: It is not clear that executive compensation sufficiently ties pay with performance in a manner that aligns executives with the long-term interests of the company. For example: • The company does not require a portion of the annual cash bonus be deferred into shares. Deferral discourages risky or short-sighted strategies. • The company's incentive plans do not appear to have a clawback provision that would enable the company to recoup bonus awards in the event of material fraud or misconduct by the recipient of a bonus award. • The company has not disclosed the performance objectives for its compensation plans. | For | Against |
|----|--|-----|---------|
| 22 | Remuneration Policy (Chair) | For | Against |
| | Vote Note: The Company grants restricted shares to the chair of the board of directors in lieu of fees paid in cash; we are concerned that the Company has not stated whether the vesting of these awards is contingent upon continuous service on the board of directors. Directors locked in by such type of awards could be inhibited from expressing dissenting views at the board and, in extreme cases, taking the ultimate sanction of resigning. In short, we believe that the issue of could create a situation wherein directors are no longer representing the best interests of the shareholders. | | |
| 23 | Directors' Fees | For | For |
| 24 | Authority to Repurchase and Reissue Shares | For | For |
| 25 | Authority to Increase Capital Through Capitalisations | For | For |
| 26 | Employee Stock Purchase Plan | For | For |
| 27 | Stock Purchase Plan for Overseas Employees | For | For |
| 28 | Authority to Issue Performance Shares | For | For |
| 29 | Amendments to Articles Regarding Chair Age Limits | For | For |
| 30 | Amendments to Articles Regarding Vice Chair | For | For |
| 31 | Amendments to Articles Regarding Directors' Share Ownership | For | For |
| 32 | Authorisation of Legal Formalities | For | For |

IPSOS Voted — Country of Trade: France — Annual Meeting Agenda 5/28/2019

| Proposal | Proposal Text | Mgmt Rec | Vote Cas |
|----------|---|----------|----------|
| 1 | Non-Voting Meeting Note | | |
| 2 | Non-Voting Meeting Note | | |
| 3 | Non-Voting Meeting Note | | |
| 4 | Non-Voting Meeting Note | | |
| 5 | Accounts and Reports | For | For |
| 5 | Consolidated Accounts and Reports | For | For |
| 7 | Allocation of Profits/Dividends | For | For |
| 3 | Special Auditors Report on Regulated Agreements | For | For |
|) | Elect Patrick Artus | For | For |
| 10 | Elect Jennifer Hubber | For | For |
| 11 | Elect Neil Janin | For | For |
| 12 | Elect Laurence Stoclet | For | For |
| 13 | Elect Éliane Rouyer-Chevalier | For | For |
| 14 | Remuneration of Didier Truchot, Chair and CEO | For | Against |
| | Vote Note: It is not clear that executive compensation sufficiently ties pay with performance in a manner that aligns executives with the long-term interests of the company. For example: • The use of absolute metrics for incentive programs may not be appropriate as it may reflect economic or industry factors beyond the control of executives. Performance conditions should include relative targets. • The company does not require a portion of the annual cash bonus be deferred into shares. Deferral discourages risky or short-sighted strategies. • The company's incentive plans do not appear to have a clawback provision that would enable the company to recoup bonus awards in the event of material fraud or misconduct by the recipient of a bonus award. • The company has not disclosed the performance objectives for its short-term compensation plan. | | |
| 15 | Remuneration of Pierre Le Manh, Deputy CEO Vote Note: It is not clear that executive compensation sufficiently ties pay with performance in a manner that aligns executives with the long-term interests of the company. For example: • The use of absolute metrics for incentive programs may not be appropriate as it may reflect economic or industry factors beyond the control of executives. Performance conditions should include relative targets. • The company does not require a portion of the annual cash bonus be deferred into shares. Deferral discourages risky or short-sighted strategies. • The company's incentive plans do not appear to have a clawback provision that would enable the company to recoup bonus awards in the event of material fraud or misconduct by the recipient of a bonus award. • The company has not disclosed the performance objectives for its short-term compensation plan. | For | Against |

| 16 | Remuneration of Laurence Stoclet, Deputy CEO Vote Note: It is not clear that executive compensation sufficiently ties pay with performance | For | Against |
|----------|--|-----|---------|
| | in a manner that aligns executives with the long-term interests of the company. For example: • The use of absolute metrics for incentive programs may not be appropriate as it may reflect | | |
| | economic or industry factors beyond the control of executives. Performance conditions should | | |
| | include relative targets.The company does not require a portion of the annual cash bonus be deferred into shares. | | |
| | Deferral discourages risky or short-sighted strategies. | | |
| | The company's incentive plans do not appear to have a clawback provision that would enable the company to recoup bonus awards in the event of material fraud or misconduct by the recipient of a bonus award. | | |
| | • The company has not disclosed the performance objectives for its short-term compensation plan. | | |
| 17 | Remuneration of Henri Wallard, Deputy CEO | For | Against |
| | Vote Note: It is not clear that executive compensation sufficiently ties pay with performance in a manner that aligns executives with the long-term interests of the company. For example: • The use of absolute metrics for incentive programs may not be appropriate as it may reflect economic or industry factors beyond the control of executives. Performance conditions should | | |
| | include relative targets. | | |
| | The company does not require a portion of the annual cash bonus be deferred into shares. Deferral discourages risky or short-sighted strategies. | | |
| | The company's incentive plans do not appear to have a clawback provision that would enable | | |
| | the company to recoup bonus awards in the event of material fraud or misconduct by the recipient | | |
| | of a bonus award. • The company has not disclosed the performance objectives for its short-term compensation plan. | | |
| 18 | Remuneration Policy (Chair and CEO) | For | Against |
| 10 | Vote Note: It is not clear that executive compensation sufficiently ties pay with performance | 101 | Agamsc |
| | in a manner that aligns executives with the long-term interests of the company. For example: | | |
| | The use of absolute metrics for incentive programs may not be appropriate as it may reflect | | |
| | economic or industry factors beyond the control of executives. Performance conditions should include relative targets. | | |
| | The company does not require a portion of the annual cash bonus be deferred into shares. | | |
| | Deferral discourages risky or short-sighted strategies. | | |
| | The company's incentive plans do not appear to have a clawback provision that would enable the company to recoup bonus awards in the event of material fraud or misconduct by the recipient | | |
| | of a bonus award. | | |
| | • The company has not disclosed the performance objectives for its short-term compensation plan. | | |
| 19 | Remuneration Policy (Deputy CEOs) | For | Against |
| | Vote Note: It is not clear that executive compensation sufficiently ties pay with performance | | |
| | in a manner that aligns executives with the long-term interests of the company. For example: • The use of absolute metrics for incentive programs may not be appropriate as it may reflect | | |
| | economic or industry factors beyond the control of executives. Performance conditions should | | |
| | include relative targets. | | |
| | The company does not require a portion of the annual cash bonus be deferred into shares. Deferral discourages risky or short-sighted strategies. | | |
| | The company's incentive plans do not appear to have a clawback provision that would enable | | |
| | the company to recoup bonus awards in the event of material fraud or misconduct by the recipient of a bonus award. | | |
| 20 | The company has not disclosed the performance objectives for its short-term compensation plan. Authority to Depure has and Deissus Shares. | For | Fo |
| 20 21 | Authority to Repurchase and Reissue Shares | For | For |
| | Authority to Issue Performance Shares | For | For |
| 22 | Authorisation of Legal Formalities | For | For |
| | | | |

Lvmh Moet Hennessy Vuitton SE Voted — Country of Trade: France — Mix Meeting Agenda 4/18/2019

| Proposal 1 | Proposal Text Non-Voting Meeting Note | Mgmt Rec | Vote Cast |
|---------------|---|----------|-----------|
| 2 | Non-Voting Meeting Note | | |
| 3 | Non-Voting Meeting Note | | |
| 4 | Accounts and Reports | For | For |
| 5 | Consolidated Accounts and Reports | For | For |
| 6 | Allocation of Profits/Dividends | For | For |
| 7 | Special Auditors Report on Regulated Agreements | For | Against |
| | Vote Note: The company has been making large annual payments to an entity almost entirely owned by the controlling family, for services that are only vaguely disclosed by the Company. The Company has provided no information on how the value of these fees were determined, how Groupe Arnault functions, and the extent of the services included in the agreement. In addition, a company's decision regarding where to turn for the best professional services may be compromised when doing business with its board members or controlling shareholders. | | |
| 8 | Ratification of the Co-option of Sophie Chassat | For | For |

| 9 | Elect Bernard Arnault | For | Against |
|----|---|-----|---------|
| | Vote Note: This director nominee appears to have too many commitments to fulfill his duties | | |
| 10 | as a director. He is a public company executive and serves on a total of three public company boards. Elect Sophie Chassat | For | For |
| 11 | Elect Clara Gaymard | For | For |
| 12 | Elect Hubert Védrine | For | For |
| 13 | Elect Iris Knobloch | For | For |
| 14 | Elect Yann Arthus-Bertrand as Censor | For | Against |
| | Vote Note: The practice of appointing non-voting members to the board, who may exercise significant influence over the board's decisions, requires exceptional justification. The board has not provided a compelling rationale for the appointment, nor is the censor serving for a transitional period of two years or less. As such, we find no reason to support the appointment of the proposed censor at this time. | | |
| 15 | Remuneration of Bernard Arnault, Chair and CEO Vote Note: It is not clear that executive compensation sufficiently ties pay with performance in a manner that aligns executives with the long-term interests of the company. For example: • The company's incentive plans do not appear to have a clawback provision that would enable the company to recoup bonus awards in the event of material fraud or misconduct by the recipient of a bonus award. • The company has failed to disclose the performance targets for its short-term incentive plan. • The company has failed to disclose the performance period for its long-term incentive plan. • The company has failed to disclose the performance metrics for its long-term incentive plan. • The company does not require a portion of the annual cash bonus be deferred into shares. Deferral discourages risky or short-sighted strategies. | For | Against |
| | Executives are eligible to receive unlimited long-term incentive payments. This runs contrary to best practices and shareholder interests. | | |
| 16 | Remuneration Report of Antonio Belloni, Deputy CEO Vote Note: It is not clear that executive compensation sufficiently ties pay with performance in a manner that aligns executives with the long-term interests of the company. For example: • The company's incentive plans do not appear to have a clawback provision that would enable the company to recoup bonus awards in the event of material fraud or misconduct by the recipient of a bonus award. • The company has failed to disclose the performance targets for its short-term incentive plan. • The company has failed to disclose the performance period for its long-term incentive plan. • The company does not require a portion of the annual cash bonus be deferred into shares. Deferral discourages risky or short-sighted strategies. • Executives are eligible to receive unlimited long-term incentive payments. This runs contrary to best practices and shareholder interests. | For | Against |
| 17 | Remuneration Policy (Chair and CEO) Vote Note: It is not clear that executive compensation sufficiently ties pay with performance in a manner that aligns executives with the long-term interests of the company. For example: • The company's incentive plans do not appear to have a clawback provision that would enable the company to recoup bonus awards in the event of material fraud or misconduct by the recipient of a bonus award. • The company has failed to disclose the performance targets for its short-term incentive plan. • The company has failed to disclose the performance period for its long-term incentive plan. • The company has failed to disclose the performance metrics for its long-term incentive plan. • The company does not require a portion of the annual cash bonus be deferred into shares. Deferral discourages risky or short-sighted strategies. • Executives are eligible to receive unlimited long-term incentive payments. This runs contrary to best practices and shareholder interests. | For | Against |
| 18 | Remuneration Policy (Deputy CEO) Vote Note: It is not clear that executive compensation sufficiently ties pay with performance in a manner that aligns executives with the long-term interests of the company. For example: • The company's incentive plans do not appear to have a clawback provision that would enable the company to recoup bonus awards in the event of material fraud or misconduct by the recipient of a bonus award. • The company has failed to disclose the performance targets for its short-term incentive plan. • The company has failed to disclose the performance period for its long-term incentive plan. • The company does not require a portion of the annual cash bonus be deferred into shares. Deferral discourages risky or short-sighted strategies. • Executives are eligible to receive unlimited long-term incentive payments. This runs contrary to best practices and shareholder interests. | For | Against |
| 19 | Authority to Repurchase and Reissue Shares | For | For |
| 20 | Authority to Cancel Shares and Reduce Capital | For | For |
| 21 | Authority to Increase Capital Through Capitalisations | For | For |
| 22 | Authority to Issue Shares and/or Convertible Debt w/ Preemptive Rights | For | For |
| 23 | Authority to Issue Shares and Convertible Debt w/o Preemptive Rights Vote Note: The potential dilution to current shareholders from capital increases without preemptive rights is excessive. | For | Against |

| 24 | Authority to Issue Shares and/or Convertible Debt Through Private Placement Vote Note: The potential dilution to current shareholders from capital increases without preemptive rights is excessive. | For | Against |
|----|---|-----|---------|
| 25 | Authority to Set Offering Price of Shares | For | For |
| 26 | Greenshoe | For | Against |
| | Vote Note: The potential dilution to current shareholders from capital increases without preemptive rights is excessive. | | |
| 27 | Authority to Increase Capital in Case of Exchange Offers | For | Against |
| | Vote Note: The potential dilution to current shareholders from capital increases without preemptive rights is excessive. | | |
| 28 | Authority to Increase Capital in Consideration for Contributions In Kind | For | Against |
| | Vote Note: The potential dilution to current shareholders from capital increases without preemptive rights is excessive. | | |
| 29 | Authority to Issue Stock Options | For | Against |
| | Vote Note: The company has not explicitly tied grants for executives to stringent performance conditions. The company has not disclosed the vesting period that will apply to awards. Best practice advocates a minimum performance/vesting period of three years for long-term incentive plans unless a cogent justification of a shorter vesting period is disclosed. | | |
| 30 | Employee Stock Purchase Plan | For | For |
| 31 | Global Ceiling on Capital Increases | For | For |
| 32 | Non-Voting Meeting Note | | |

$\begin{tabular}{ll} \textbf{Nestle SA} & \textbf{Voted} - \textbf{Country of Trade: Switzerland} - \textbf{Mix Meeting Agenda 4/11/2019} \\ \end{tabular}$

| Proposal | Proposal Text | Mgmt Rec | Vote Cast |
|----------|---|----------|-----------|
| 1 | Non-Voting Meeting Note | | |
| 2 | Accounts and Reports | For | For |
| 3 | Compensation Report | For | Against |
| | Vote Note: It is not clear that executive compensation sufficiently ties pay with performance in a manner that aligns executives with the long-term interests of the company. For example: • Threshold performance for the growth in shareholder value metric is 20% below median which may not be sufficiently challenging. | | |
| 4 | Ratification of Board and Management Acts | For | For |
| 5 | Allocation of Profits/Dividends | For | For |
| 6 | Elect Paul Bulcke as Board Chair | For | Against |
| | Vote Note: Having an independent chair can lead to a clearer separation of responsibility between the board and management, reduce conflicts related to executive compensation and succession planning and help with the recruitment of independent directors. An independent director may increase the diversity of information available to the board and promote an independent mindset in the other directors. This director sits on the nominating committee and E&S committee and chairs the governance committee, these committees should be 100% independent. | | |
| 7 | Elect Ulf Mark Schneider | For | Against |
| | Vote Note: This director is the CEO of Nestlé. He is on the company's governance committee and the committee should be 100% independent. | | |
| 8 | Elect Henri de Castries | For | For |
| 9 | Elect Beat Hess | For | For |
| 10 | Elect Renato Fassbind | For | For |
| 11 | Elect Ann Veneman | For | For |
| 12 | Elect Eva Cheng | For | For |
| 13 | Elect Patrick Aebischer | For | For |
| 14 | Elect Ursula M. Burns | For | Against |
| | Vote Note: This director nominee appears to have too many commitments to fulfill her duties as a director. She is a public company executive and she sits on a total of three public company boards. | | |
| 15 | Elect Kasper Rorsted | For | For |
| 16 | Elect Pablo Isla | For | For |
| 17 | Elect Kimberly Ross | For | For |
| 18 | Elect Dick Boer | For | For |
| 19 | Elect Dinesh Paliwal | For | For |
| 20 | Elect Beat Hess as Compensation Committee Member | For | For |
| 21 | Elect Patrick Aebischer as Compensation Committee Member | For | For |
| 22 | Elect Ursula M. Burns as Compensation Committee Member | For | For |
| 23 | Elect Pablo Isla as Compensation Committee Member | For | For |
| 24 | Appointment of Auditor | For | For |
| 25 | Appointment of Independent Proxy | For | For |
| 26 | Board Compensation | For | For |

| 27 | Executive Compensation | For | For |
|----|--|---------|---------|
| 28 | Cancellation of Shares and Reduction in Share Capital | For | For |
| 29 | Additional or Amended Shareholder Proposals | Against | Abstain |
| | Vote Note: It is not recommended that shareholders authorise their independent representative to support or vote in accordance with the board of directors on amended or additional shareholder proposals that did not appear in the notice of meeting. In this case, the instructions presented specifically state that a vote against this proposal will be counted as a vote against any new or amended proposals from shareholders presented at the meeting. | | |
| 30 | Non-Voting Meeting Note | | |

Nidec Corporation Voted — Country of Trade: Japan — Mix Meeting Agenda 6/18/2019

| Proposal 1 | Proposal Text Non-Voting Meeting Note | Mgmt Rec | Vote Cast |
|---------------|---|----------|-----------|
| 2 | Elect Shigenobu Nagamori | For | For |
| 3 | Elect Hiroyuki Yoshimoto | For | For |
| 4 | Elect Hiroshi Kobe | For | For |
| 5 | Elect Mikio Katayama | For | For |
| 6 | Elect Akira Sato | For | For |
| 7 | Elect Toshihiko Miyabe | For | For |
| 8 | Elect Teiichi Sato | For | For |
| 9 | Elect Osamu Shimizu | For | For |
| 10 | Elect Takeshi Nakane as Statutory Auditor | For | For |

Novo Nordisk Voted — Country of Trade: Denmark — Mix Meeting Agenda 3/21/2019

| Proposal | Proposal Text | Mgmt Rec | Vote Cast |
|----------|--|----------|-----------|
| 1 | Non-Voting Meeting Note | | |
| 2 | Non-Voting Meeting Note | | |
| 3 | Non-Voting Meeting Note | | |
| 4 | Accounts and Reports | For | For |
| 5 | Directors' Fees for 2018 | For | For |
| 6 | Directors' Fees for 2019 | For | For |
| 7 | Allocation of Profits/Dividends | For | For |
| 8 | Elect Helge Lund | For | For |
| 9 | Elect Jeppe Christiansen | For | Against |
| | Vote Note: This director is a board member of Novo A/S, which beneficially owns 28.1% and 75.8% of the Company's issued share capital and voting rights, respectively. He is chair of the company's compensation committee and this committees should be 100% independent. | | J |
| 10 | Elect Brian Daniels | For | For |
| 11 | Elect Laurence Debroux | For | For |
| 12 | Elect Andreas Fibig | For | For |
| 13 | Elect Sylvie Grégoire | For | For |
| 14 | Elect Liz Hewitt | For | For |
| 15 | Elect Kasim Kutay | For | Against |
| | Vote Note: This director is the CEO of Novo A/S, which beneficially owns 28.1% and 75.8% of the Company's issued share capital and voting rights, respectively. He is on the nominating committee and this committee should be 100% independent. | | |
| 16 | Elect Martin Mackay | For | For |
| 17 | Appointment of Auditor | For | Against |
| | Vote Note: The non-audit-related fees are 33.4% of the total fees paid to the auditor. We believe that non-audit-related work could have been performed by a separate auditor so as to not compromise the independence of the auditor and the integrity of the Company's financial statements. | | |
| 18 | Authority to Reduce Share Capital | For | For |
| 19 | Authority to Repurchase Shares | For | For |
| 20 | Authority to Issue Shares w/o Preemptive Rights to Employees | For | For |
| 21 | Authority to Issue Shares w/ Preemptive Rights | For | For |
| 22 | Authority to Issue Shares w/o Preemptive Rights | For | For |

| 23 | Remuneration Policy | For | Against |
|----|--|---------|---------|
| | Vote Note: It is not clear that executive compensation sufficiently ties pay with performance | | |
| | in a manner that aligns executives with the long-term interests of the company. For example: | | |
| | The company does not require a portion of the annual cash bonus be deferred into shares. | | |
| | Deferral discourages risky or short-sighted strategies. | | |
| | The company has failed to fully disclose the specific targets used under the Company's | | |
| | bonus scheme. | | |
| 24 | Shareholder Proposal Regarding Price Reductions | Against | Against |
| 25 | Non-Voting Meeting Note | | |
| 26 | Non-Voting Meeting Note | | |

Pernod Ricard Voted — Country of Trade: France — Mix Meeting Agenda 11/21/2018

| Proposal | Proposal Text | Mgmt Rec | Vote Cast |
|----------|--|------------|------------|
| 1 | Non-Voting Meeting Note | | |
| 2 | Non-Voting Meeting Note | | |
| 3 | Non-Voting Meeting Note | | |
| 4 | Non-Voting Meeting Note | | |
| 5 | Accounts and Reports; Non Tax-Deductible Expenses | For | For |
| 6 | Consolidated Accounts and Reports | For | For |
| 7 | Allocation of Profits/Dividends | For | For |
| 8 | Approval of Related Party Transactions Report | For | For |
| 9 | Elect Martina Gonzalez-Gallarza | For | Against |
| | Vote Note: Board is not sufficiently independent | | |
| 10 | Elect Ian Gallienne | For | For |
| 11 | Elect Gilles Samyn | For | Against |
| | Vote Note: Board is not sufficiently independent | | |
| 12 | Elect Patricia Barbizet | For | For |
| 13 | Directors' Fees | For | For |
| 14 | Remuneration Policy (Chair and CEO) | For | For |
| 15 | Remuneration of Alexandre Ricard, Chair and CEO | For | For |
| 16 | Authority to Repurchase and Reissue Shares | For | For |
| 17 | Employee Stock Purchase Plan | For | For |
| 18 | Stock Purchase Plan for Overseas Employees | For | For |
| 19 | Amendments to Articles Regarding Shareholder Ownership Disclosure | For | Against |
| | Requirements' Notice Period Vote Note: Amendment is not in best interests of shareholders | | |
| 20 | | For | For |
| 20 21 | Amendments to Articles Regarding Share Ownership | For For | For |
| 21 | Amendments to Articles Regarding Alternate Statutory Auditors | | For For |
| | Authorisation of Legal Formalities | For | FUI |

Prudential plc Voted — Country of Trade: Great Britain — Annual Meeting Agenda 5/16/2019

| Proposal | Proposal Text | Mgmt Rec | Vote Cast |
|----------|---|----------|-----------|
| 1 | Accounts and Reports | For | For |
| 2 | Remuneration Report (Advisory) | For | For |
| 3 | Elect Fields Wicker-Miurin | For | For |
| 4 | Elect Howard J. Davies | For | For |
| 5 | Elect Mark FitzPatrick | For | For |
| 6 | Elect David Law | For | For |
| 7 | Elect Paul Manduca | For | For |
| 8 | Elect Kaikhushru Nargolwala | For | For |
| 9 | Elect Anthony Nightingale | For | Against |
| | Vote Note: This director nominee appears to have too many commitments to fulfill his duties as a director. He is on a total of ten public company boards. | | |
| 10 | Elect Philip Remnant | For | For |
| 11 | Elect Alice Schroeder | For | For |
| 12 | Elect Stuart James Turner | For | For |
| 13 | Elect Thomas R. Watjen | For | For |
| 14 | Elect Michael A. Wells | For | For |

| 15 | Appointment of Auditor | For | For |
|----|---|-----|---------|
| 16 | Authority to Set Auditor's Fees | For | For |
| 17 | Authorisation of Political Donations | For | For |
| 18 | Authority to Issue Shares w/ Preemptive Rights | For | For |
| 19 | Authority to Issue Repurchased Shares w/ Preemptive Rights | For | For |
| 20 | Authority to Issue Preference Shares | For | For |
| 21 | Authority to Issue Shares w/o Preemptive Rights | For | For |
| 22 | Authority to Issue Mandatory Convertible Securities w/ Preemptive rights | For | For |
| 23 | Authority to Issue Mandatory Convertible Securities w/o Preemptive rights | For | For |
| 24 | Authority to Repurchase Shares | For | For |
| 25 | Authority to Set General Meeting Notice Period at 14 Days | For | Against |
| | Vote Note: A shortened notice period may not provide non-UK shareholders with sufficient time | | |
| | to adequately review proposals being presented at an extraordinary general meeting. | | |

Publicis Groupe SA Voted — Country of Trade: France — Mix Meeting Agenda 5/29/2019

| Proposal | Proposal Text | Mgmt Rec | Vote Cast |
|----------|--|----------|-----------|
| 1 | Non-Voting Meeting Note | | |
| 2 | Non-Voting Meeting Note | | |
| 3 | Non-Voting Meeting Note | | |
| 4 | Non-Voting Meeting Note | | |
| 5 | Accounts and Reports | For | For |
| 6 | Consolidated Accounts and Reports | For | For |
| 7 | Allocation of Profits/Dividends | For | For |
| 8 | Scrip Dividend | For | For |
| 9 | Severance Agreement (Arthur Sadoun, Management Board Chair) | For | For |
| 10 | Severance Agreement (Jean-Michel Etienne, Management Board Member) | For | For |
| 11 | Severance Agreement (Anne-Gabrielle Heilbronner, Management Board Member) | For | For |
| 12 | Severance Agreement (Steve King, Management Board Member) | For | For |
| 13 | Remuneration of Maurice Lévy, Supervisory Board Chair | For | Against |
| | Vote Note: It is not clear that executive compensation sufficiently ties pay with performance in a manner that aligns executives with the long-term interests of the company. We find it questionable that the waiving of the non-compete agreement should figure in the board's thinking when deciding the remuneration amounts. Moreover, we note that at €2,800,000, Mr Levy's fixed fee, is close to three times what the current CEO receives in fixed compensation. We also note that approximately 39% of shareholders voted against the remuneration policy and 35% voted against the proposal for Mr Levy at last year's AGM. Although the Company is proposing to lower Mr Lévy's fixed remuneration to €1,900,000, remuneration will continue to dwarf that paid to the other non-executive board chairs in the CaC 40. | | |
| 14 | Remuneration of Arthur Sadoun, Management Board Chair | For | Against |
| | Vote Note: It is not clear that executive compensation sufficiently ties pay with performance in a manner that aligns executives with the long-term interests of the company. For example: • The Company's short- and long-term incentive arrangements are based on similar metrics, which allows for a high level of pay-out (or lack thereof) for hitting similar targets. • The company has not disclosed the performance objectives for its short-term compensation plan. • The company's incentive plans do not appear to have a clawback provision that would enable the company to recoup bonus awards in the event of material fraud or misconduct by the recipient of a bonus award. • The company does not require a portion of the annual cash bonus be deferred into shares. Deferral discourages risky or short-sighted strategies. | | |
| 15 | Remuneration of Jean-Michel Etienne, Management Board Member | For | Against |
| | Vote Note: It is not clear that executive compensation sufficiently ties pay with performance in a manner that aligns executives with the long-term interests of the company. For example: • The Company's short- and long-term incentive arrangements are based on similar metrics, which allows for a high level of pay-out (or lack thereof) for hitting similar targets. • The company has not disclosed the performance objectives for its short-term compensation plan. • The company's incentive plans do not appear to have a clawback provision that would enable the company to recoup bonus awards in the event of material fraud or misconduct by the recipient of a bonus award. • The company does not require a portion of the annual cash bonus be deferred into shares. Deferral discourages risky or short-sighted strategies. | | |

| 16 | Remuneration of Anne-Gabrielle Heilbronner, Management Board Member Vote Note: It is not clear that executive compensation sufficiently ties pay with performance in a manner that aligns executives with the long-term interests of the company. For example: • The Company's short- and long-term incentive arrangements are based on similar metrics, which allows for a high level of pay-out (or lack thereof) for hitting similar targets. • The company has not disclosed the performance objectives for its short-term compensation plan. • The company's incentive plans do not appear to have a clawback provision that would enable the company to recoup bonus awards in the event of material fraud or misconduct by the recipient of a bonus award. | For | Against |
|----|---|-----|----------|
| | The company does not require a portion of the annual cash bonus be deferred into shares. Deferral discourages risky or short-sighted strategies. | | |
| 17 | Remuneration of Steve King, Management Board Member | For | Against |
| | Vote Note: It is not clear that executive compensation sufficiently ties pay with performance in a manner that aligns executives with the long-term interests of the company. For example: • The Company's short- and long-term incentive arrangements are based on similar metrics, which allows for a high level of pay-out (or lack thereof) for hitting similar targets. • The company has not disclosed the performance objectives for its short-term compensation plan. • The company's incentive plans do not appear to have a clawback provision that would enable the company to recoup bonus awards in the event of material fraud or misconduct by the recipient of a bonus award. | | |
| | The company does not require a portion of the annual cash bonus be deferred into shares. Deferral discourages risky or short-sighted strategies. | | |
| 18 | Remuneration Policy (Supervisory Board Chair) | For | Against |
| | Vote Note: It is not clear that executive compensation sufficiently ties pay with performance in a manner that aligns executives with the long-term interests of the company. We find it questionable that the waiving of the non-compete agreement should figure in the board's thinking when deciding the remuneration amounts. Moreover, we note that at €2,800,000, Mr Levy's fixed fee, is close to three times what the current CEO receives in fixed compensation. We also note that approximately 39% of shareholders voted against the remuneration policy and 35% voted against the proposal for Mr Levy at last year's AGM. Although the Company is proposing to lower Mr Lévy's fixed remuneration to €1,900,000, remuneration will continue to dwarf that paid to the other non-executive board chairs in the CaC 40. | | rigamisc |
| 19 | Remuneration Policy (Supervisory Board Members) | For | Against |
| | Vote Note: We are concerned by the ability for board members to receive fees for special tasks or missions, which could include professional and consulting services provided to the company. These kinds of transactions carry a significant risk of compromising the objectivity of a supervisory board member. | | |
| 20 | Remuneration Policy (Management Board Chair) | For | Against |
| | Vote Note: It is not clear that executive compensation sufficiently ties pay with performance in a manner that aligns executives with the long-term interests of the company. For example: • The Company's short- and long-term incentive arrangements are based on similar metrics, which allows for a high level of pay-out (or lack thereof) for hitting similar targets. • The company has not disclosed the performance objectives for its short-term compensation plan. • The company's incentive plans do not appear to have a clawback provision that would enable the company to recoup bonus awards in the event of material fraud or misconduct by the recipient of a bonus award. • The company does not require a portion of the annual cash bonus be deferred into shares. Deferral discourages risky or short-sighted strategies. | | |
| 21 | Remuneration Policy (Management Board Members) | For | Against |
| | Vote Note: It is not clear that executive compensation sufficiently ties pay with performance in a manner that aligns executives with the long-term interests of the company. For example: • The Company's short- and long-term incentive arrangements are based on similar metrics, which allows for a high level of pay-out (or lack thereof) for hitting similar targets. • The company has not disclosed the performance objectives for its short-term compensation plan. • The company's incentive plans do not appear to have a clawback provision that would enable the company to recoup bonus awards in the event of material fraud or misconduct by the recipient of a bonus award. • The company does not require a portion of the annual cash bonus be deferred into shares. Deferral discourages risky or short-sighted strategies. | | |
| 22 | Elect Antonella Mei-Pochtler | For | For |
| 23 | Elect Suzan LeVine | For | For |
| 24 | Elect Enrico Letta | For | For |
| 25 | Appointment of Auditor (Ernst & Young) | For | For |
| 26 | Authority to Repurchase and Reissue Shares | For | For |
| 27 | Authority to Cancel Shares and Reduce Capital | For | For |
| 28 | Authority to Increase Capital in Consideration for Contributions In Kind | For | For |
| 29 | Authority to Grant Stock Options | For | For |
| 30 | Employee Stock Purchase Plan (Domestic and Overseas) | For | For |
| 31 | Employment Stock Purchase Plan (Specified Categories) | For | For |
| 32 | Authorisation of Legal Formalities | For | For |

| Proposal | Proposal Text | Mgmt Rec | Vote Cast |
|----------|---|----------|-----------|
| 1 | Non-Voting Agenda Item | | |
| 2 | Non-Voting Agenda Item | | |
| 3 | Non-Voting Agenda Item | | |
| 4 | Non-Voting Agenda Item | | |
| 5 | Accounts and Reports | For | For |
| 6 | Non-Voting Agenda Item | | |
| 7 | Ratification of Management Board Acts | For | For |
| 8 | Ratification of Supervisory Board Acts | For | For |
| 9 | Elect Stéphane Bancel | For | For |
| 10 | Elect Håkan Björklund | For | For |
| 11 | Elect Metin Colpan | For | Against |
| | Vote Note: This director has served on the board for more than 15 years and is no longer considered independent according the best practice recommendations of the Commission of the European Communities and the Dutch Corporate Governance Code. He is also the co-founder and former CEO and managing director (until 2003). He is on the nominating committee. This nominee is on the nominating committee and this committee should be 100% independent. | | |
| 12 | Elect Ross L. Levine | For | For |
| 13 | Elect Elaine Mardis | For | For |
| 14 | Elect Lawrence A. Rosen | For | For |
| 15 | Elect Elizabeth E. Tallett | For | For |
| 16 | Elect Peer M. Schatz | For | For |
| 17 | Elect Roland Sackers | For | For |
| 18 | Appointment of Auditor | For | For |
| 19 | Authority to Issue Shares w/ Preemptive Rights | For | For |
| 20 | Authority to Suppress Preemptive Rights | For | For |
| 21 | Authority to Suppress Preemptive Rights (Mergers and Acquisitions) | For | For |
| 22 | Authority to Repurchase Shares | For | For |
| 23 | Amendments to Articles | For | For |
| 24 | Non-Voting Agenda Item | | |
| 25 | Non-Voting Agenda Item | | |

Rakuten Inc. Voted — Country of Trade: Japan — Annual Meeting Agenda 3/28/2019

| Proposal | Proposal Text | Mgmt Rec | Vote Cast |
|----------|--|----------|-----------|
| 1 | Non-Voting Meeting Note | | |
| 2 | Amendments to Articles | For | For |
| 3 | Elect Hiroshi Mikitani | For | For |
| 4 | Elect Masayuki Hosaka | For | For |
| 5 | Elect Charles B. Baxter | For | For |
| 6 | Elect Ken Kutaragi | For | For |
| 7 | Elect Takashi Mitachi | For | For |
| 8 | Elect Jun Murai | For | For |
| 9 | Elect Sarah J. M. Whitley | For | For |
| 10 | Elect Takeo Hirata as Statutory Auditor | For | For |
| 11 | Equity Compensation Plan | For | Against |
| | Vote Note: It is not clear that the equity compensation plan aligns shareholder interests | | |
| | with executive and director interests. For example: • Given the lack of disclosures, the options to be granted under the proposed plan may not be linked | | |
| | to any performance targets. Also, the exercise price of the options is Y1, a deep discount from the | | |
| | current stock price. While this may be common practice in Japan, the cost of the options to the | | |
| | company could be significant. | _ | |
| 12 | Equity Compensation Plan as Retirement Allowance | For | Against |
| | Vote Note: This proposal is regarding the issuance of share options as retirement compensation stock options to Directors of the Company who serve concurrently as Executive Officers of the Company | | |
| | and Executive Officers of the Company. The exercise price of the options is Y1, a deep discount from | | |
| | the current stock price. While this may be common practice in Japan, the cost of the options to the | | |
| | company could be significant. | | |
| | | | |

Reckitt Benckiser Group Plc Voted — Country of Trade: Great Britain — Annual Meeting Agenda 5/9/2019

| Proposal | Proposal Text Accounts and Reports | Mgmt Rec For | Vote Cast For |
|----------|--|-----------------|-------------------------|
| 2 | Remuneration Policy (Binding) | For | Against |
| _ | Vote Note: It is not clear that executive compensation sufficiently ties pay with performance in a manner that aligns executives with the long-term interests of the company. For example: • The use of absolute metrics for the long-term incentive program may not be appropriate as it may reflect economic or industry factors beyond the control of executives. Performance conditions should include relative targets. • Part of the company's long-term incentive program uses less than three years of performance. Performance conditions should be measured over at least three consecutive years. | 101 | Aguillac |
| 3 | Remuneration Report (Advisory) | For | Against |
| | Vote Note: It is not clear that executive compensation sufficiently ties pay with performance in a manner that aligns executives with the long-term interests of the company. For example: • The use of absolute metrics for the long-term incentive program may not be appropriate as it may reflect economic or industry factors beyond the control of executives. Performance conditions should include relative targets. • Part of the company's long-term incentive program uses less than three years of performance. Performance conditions should be measured over at least three consecutive years. | | |
| 4 | Allocation of Profits/Dividends | For | For |
| 5 | Elect Nicandro Durante | For | For |
| 6 | Elect Mary Harris | For | For |
| 7 | Elect Adrian Hennah | For | For |
| 8 | Elect Rakesh Kapoor | For | Against |
| | Vote Note: This director is an insider as he is the CEO of the Company and sits on the nominating committee. This committee should be 100% independent. | | |
| 9 | Elect Pamela J. Kirby | For | Against |
| | Vote Note: This director nominee appears to have too many commitments to fulfill her duties as a director. She is on a total of 5 public company boards. | | |
| 10 | Elect Christopher A. Sinclair | For | Against |
| | Vote Note: This director is an insider as he is the CEO and President of RB Health. He sits on the remuneration committee and is the chair of the nominating committee, these committee should be 100% independent. | | |
| 11 | Elect Warren G. Tucker | For | For |
| 12 | Elect Andrew RJ Bonfield | For | For |
| 13 | Elect Mehmood Khan | For | For |
| 14 | Elect Elane B. Stock | For | For |
| 15 | Appointment of Auditor | For | For |
| 16 | Authority to Set Auditor's Fees | For | For |
| 17 | Authorisation of Political Donations | For | For |
| 18 | Authority to Issue Shares w/ Preemptive Rights | For | For |
| 19 | Deferred Bonus Plan | For | For |
| 20 | Authority to Issue Shares w/o Preemptive Rights | For | For |
| 21 | Authority to Issue Shares w/o Preemptive Rights (Specified Capital Investment) | For | For |
| 22 | Authority to Repurchase Shares | For | For |
| 23 | Authority to Set General Meeting Notice Period at 14 Days | For | Against |
| | Vote Note: A shortened notice period may not provide non-UK shareholders with sufficient time to adequately review proposals being presented at an extraordinary general meeting. | | |

RELX Plc Voted — Country of Trade: Great Britain — Annual Meeting Agenda 4/25/2019

| Proposal 1 | Proposal Text Accounts and Reports | Mgmt Rec For | Vote Cast For |
|---------------|---|-----------------|-------------------------|
| 2 | Remuneration Report (Advisory) Vote Note: It is not clear that the executive compensation policy sufficiently ties pay with performance in a manner that aligns executives with the long-term interests of the company. For example: • A portion of the company's long-term incentive program, the ROIC element, uses one year of performance. Long-term incentive programs should have performance conditions that are measured over at least three consecutive years. | For | Against |
| 3 | Allocation of Dividends | For | For |

| 4 | Appointment of Auditor Vote Note: The non-audit-related fees are 25.9% of the total fees paid to the auditor. We believe that non-audit-related work could have been performed by a separate auditor so as to not compromise the independence of the auditor and the integrity of the Company's financial statements. | For | Against |
|----|---|-----|---------|
| 5 | Authority to Set Auditor's Fees Vote Note: The non-audit-related fees are 25.9% of the total fees paid to the auditor. We believe that non-audit-related work could have been performed by a separate auditor so as to not compromise the independence of the auditor and the integrity of the Company's financial statements. | For | Against |
| 6 | Elect Andrew J. Sukawaty | For | For |
| 7 | Elect Erik Engstrom | For | For |
| 8 | Elect Anthony Habgood | For | For |
| 9 | Elect Wolfhart Hauser | For | For |
| 10 | Elect Adrian Hennah | For | For |
| 11 | Elect Marike van Lier Lels | For | For |
| 12 | Elect Nicholas Luff | For | For |
| 13 | Elect Robert J. MacLeod | For | For |
| 14 | Elect Linda S. Sanford | For | For |
| 15 | Elect Suzanne Wood | For | For |
| 16 | Authority to Issue Shares w/ Preemptive Rights | For | For |
| 17 | Authority to Issue Shares w/o Preemptive Rights | For | For |
| 18 | Authority to Issue Shares w/o Preemptive Rights (Specified Capital Investment) | For | For |
| 19 | Authority to Repurchase Shares | For | For |
| 20 | Authority to Set General Meeting Notice Period at 14 Days Vote Note: A shortened notice period may not provide non-UK shareholders with sufficient time to adequately review proposals being presented at an extraordinary general meeting. | For | Against |
| 21 | Amendment to Articles (Capitalisation Issue) | For | For |
| 22 | Capitalisation Issue | For | For |
| 23 | Capital Reduction | For | For |
| 24 | Non-Voting Meeting Note | | |

Resmed Inc. Voted — Country of Trade: United States — Annual Meeting Agenda 11/15/2018

| Proposal | Proposal Text | Mgmt Rec | Vote Cast |
|----------|---|----------|-----------|
| 1 | Elect Peter C. Farrell | For | For |
| 2 | Elect Harjit Gill | For | For |
| 3 | Elect Ronald Taylor | For | For |
| 4 | Ratification of Auditor | For | For |
| 5 | Amendment to the 2009 Employee Stock Purchase Plan | For | For |
| 6 | Advisory Vote on Executive Compensation Vote Note: It is not clear that executive compensation sufficiently ties pay with performance in a manner that aligns executives with the long-term interests of the company. For example: • The use of absolute metrics for incentive programs may not be appropriate as it may reflect economic or industry factors beyond the control of executives. Performance conditions should include relative targets. • Some of the company's "long-term" incentive program only uses less than one year of performance. Performance conditions should be measured over at least three consecutive years. • One quarter of the company's "long-term" performance incentive program vests as soon as the total shareholder return exceeds a threshold at the end of a quarter. | For | Against |

Sanofi Voted — Country of Trade: France — Mix Meeting Agenda 4/30/2019

| Proposal | Proposal Text | Mgmt Rec | Vote Cast |
|----------|--|----------|-----------|
| ı | Non-Voting Meeting Note | | |
| 2 | Non-Voting Meeting Note | | |
| 3 | Non-Voting Meeting Note | | |
| 4 | Non-Voting Meeting Note | | |
| 5 | Accounts and Reports; Non-Tax Deductible Expenses | For | For |
| 6 | Consolidated Accounts and Reports | For | For |
| 7 | Allocation of Profits/Dividends | For | For |
| 8 | Elect Serge Weinberg | For | For |
| 9 | Elect Suet-Fern Lee | For | For |
| 10 | Ratification of the Co-option of Christophe Babule | For | For |

| 11 12 | Remuneration Policy (Chair) Remuneration Policy (CEO) Vote Note: It is not clear that executive compensation sufficiently ties pay with performance in a manner that aligns executives with the long-term interests of the company. For example: • The company's incentive plans do not appear to have a clawback provision that would enable the company to recoup bonus awards in the event of material fraud or misconduct by the recipient of a | For For | For Against |
|----------|--|------------|----------------|
| | bonus award.The company does not require a portion of the annual cash bonus be deferred into shares. Deferral | | |
| | discourages risky or short-sighted strategies. | | |
| 13 | Remuneration of Serge Weinberg, Chair | For | For |
| 14 | Remuneration of Olivier Brandicourt, CEO | For | Against |
| | Vote Note: It is not clear that executive compensation sufficiently ties pay with performance in a manner that aligns executives with the long-term interests of the company. For example: • The company's incentive plans do not appear to have a clawback provision that would enable the company to recoup bonus awards in the event of material fraud or misconduct by the recipient of a bonus award. | | |
| | The company does not require a portion of the annual cash bonus be deferred into shares. Deferral discourages risky or short-sighted strategies. Threshold performance for the growth in shareholder value metric is 6th in peer group of ten peers which may not be sufficiently challenging. Executives become eligible to receive 50% of the portion of the award governed by the relative TSR when the Company places 6th out of ten peers. | | |
| 15 | Authority to Repurchase and Reissue Shares | For | For |
| 16 | Authority to Cancel Shares and Reduce Capital | For | For |
| 17 | Authority to Issue Shares and/or Convertible Debt w/ Preemptive Rights | For | For |
| 18 | Authority to Issue Shares and/or Convertible Debt w/o Preemptive Rights | For | For |
| 19 | Authority to Issue Shares and/or Convertible Debt w/o Preemptive Rights | For | For |
| | Through Private Placement | | |
| 20 | Authority to Issue Debt Instruments | For | For |
| 21 | Greenshoe | For | For |
| 22 | Authority to Increase Capital in Consideration for Contributions In Kind | For | For |
| 23 | Authority to Grant Stock Options | For | For |
| 24 | Authority to Issue Performance Shares | For | For |
| 25 | Authority to Increase Capital through Capitalisation | For | For |
| 26 | Employee Stock Purchase Plan | For | For |
| 27 | Authorisation of Legal Formalities | For | For |

$\begin{tabular}{ll} \textbf{Sap SE} & \textbf{Voted} - \textbf{Country of Trade: Germany} - \textbf{Annual Meeting Agenda} & \textbf{5/15/2019} \\ \end{tabular}$

| Proposal | Proposal Text Non-Voting Meeting Note | Mgmt Rec | Vote Cast |
|----------|---|----------|-----------|
| 2 | | | |
| 2 | Non-Voting Meeting Note | | |
| 3 | Non-Voting Meeting Note | | |
| 4 | Non-Voting Agenda Item | _ | _ |
| 5 | Allocation of Profits/Dividends | For | For |
| 6 | Ratification of Management Board Acts | For | For |
| 7 | Ratification of Supervisory Board Acts | For | For |
| 8 | Appointment of Auditor | For | For |
| 9 | Elect Hasso Plattner | For | Against |
| | Vote Note: This director is not independent because he is a former management board member (until December 2016). Provided consultancy services to the Company on behalf of Oswald Consulting GmbH (until 2018). 2. He has also served on the board for more than 15 years. In accordance with best practice recommendations, supervisory board members should no longer be considered independent after serving on the board for 15 years. He is the chair of the compensation and nominating committees which should be 100% independent. | | |
| 10 | Elect Pekka Ala-Pietilä | For | For |
| | Vote Note: This director is not independent because he has served on the board for more than 15 years. In accordance with best practice recommendations, supervisory board members should no longer be considered independent after serving on the board for 15 years. He is on the compensation and nominating committees which should be 100% independent. | | |
| 11 | Elect Aicha Evans | For | For |
| 12 | Elect Diane Greene | For | For |
| 13 | Elect Gesche Joost | For | For |
| 14 | Elect Bernard Liautaud | For | For |
| 15 | Elect Gerhard Oswald | For | For |
| 16 | Elect Friederike Rotsch | For | For |
| 17 | Elect Gunnar Wiedenfels | For | For |

Schneider Electric SE Voted — Country of Trade: France — Mix Meeting Agenda 4/25/2019

| Proposal | Proposal Text | Mgmt Rec | Vote Cast |
|----------|---|----------|-----------|
| 1 | Non-Voting Meeting Note | | |
| 2 | Non-Voting Meeting Note | | |
| 3 | Non-Voting Meeting Note | | |
| 4 | Accounts and Reports | For | For |
| 5 | Consolidated Accounts and Reports | For | For |
| 6 | Allocation of Profits/Dividends | For | For |
| 7 | Special Auditors Report on Regulated Agreements | For | For |
| 8 | Remuneration of Jean-Pascal Tricoire, Chair and CEO | For | Against |
| | Vote Note: It is not clear that executive compensation sufficiently ties pay with performance in a manner that aligns executives with the long-term interests of the company. For example: • The company does not require a portion of the annual cash bonus be deferred into shares. Deferral discourages risky or short-sighted strategies. • The company's incentive plans do not appear to have a clawback provision that would enable the company to recoup bonus awards in the event of material fraud or misconduct by the recipient of a bonus award. | | |
| 9 | Remuneration of Emmanuel Babeau, Deputy CEO | For | Against |
| | Vote Note: It is not clear that executive compensation sufficiently ties pay with performance in a manner that aligns executives with the long-term interests of the company. For example: • The company does not require a portion of the annual cash bonus be deferred into shares. Deferral discourages risky or short-sighted strategies. • The company's incentive plans do not appear to have a clawback provision that would enable the company to recoup bonus awards in the event of material fraud or misconduct by the recipient of a bonus award. | | |
| 10 | Remuneration Policy (Chair and CEO) | For | Against |
| | Vote Note: It is not clear that executive compensation sufficiently ties pay with performance in a manner that aligns executives with the long-term interests of the company. For example: • The company does not require a portion of the annual cash bonus be deferred into shares. Deferral discourages risky or short-sighted strategies. • The company's incentive plans do not appear to have a clawback provision that would enable the company to recoup bonus awards in the event of material fraud or misconduct by the recipient of a | | J |
| 11 | bonus award. Pomunoration Policy (Doputy CEO) | For | Against |
| " | Remuneration Policy (Deputy CEO) Vote Note: It is not clear that executive compensation sufficiently ties pay with performance in a manner that aligns executives with the long-term interests of the company. For example: • The company does not require a portion of the annual cash bonus be deferred into shares. Deferral discourages risky or short-sighted strategies. • The company's incentive plans do not appear to have a clawback provision that would enable the company to recoup bonus awards in the event of material fraud or misconduct by the recipient of a bonus award. | 101 | Against |
| 12 | Elect Gregory M. Spierkel | For | For |
| 13 | Elect Carolina Dybeck Happe | For | For |
| 14 | Elect MA Xuezheng | For | For |
| 15 | Elect Lip-Bu Tan | For | Against |
| | Vote Note: This director nominee appears to have too many commitments to fulfill his duties as a director. He is a public company executive and serves on a total of three public company boards. | | |
| 16 | Directors' Fees | For | For |
| 17 | Authority to Repurchase Shares | For | For |
| 18 | Authority to Issue Shares and Convertible Debt w/ Preemptive Rights | For | For |
| 19 | Authority to Increase Capital Through Capitalisations | For | For |
| 20 | Authority to Issue Shares and Convertible Debt w/o Preemptive Rights | For | For |
| 21 | (Including in Case of Exchange Offer) Greenshoe | For | For |
| 22 | Authority to Increase Capital in Consideration for Contributions In Kind | For | For |
| 23 | Authority to Increase Capital in Consideration for Contributions in Kind Authority to Issue Shares and Convertible Debt Through Private Placement | For | For |
| 23 24 | Authority to Issue Performance Shares | For | For |
| 25 | Employee Stock Purchase Plan | For | For |
| 26 | Employee Stock Purchase Plan for Overseas Employees | For | For |
| 27 | Authority to Cancel Shares and Reduce Capital | For | For |
| 28 | Authorisation of Legal Formalities | For | For |
| 20 | Authorisation of Legat Formatities | 1 01 | 1 01 |

${\color{red}\textbf{Secom Co. Ltd.}} \ \ \textbf{Voted-Country of Trade: Japan-Annual Meeting Agenda 6/26/2019}$

| Proposal | Proposal Text | Mgmt Rec | Vote Cast |
|----------|---------------------------------|----------|-----------|
| 1 | Non-Voting Meeting Note | | |
| 2 | Allocation of Profits/Dividends | For | For |
| 3 | Elect Makoto Iida | For | For |
| 4 | Elect Yasuo Nakayama | For | For |
| 5 | Elect Yasuyuki Yoshida | For | For |
| 6 | Elect Ichiro Ozeki | For | For |
| 7 | Elect Tatsuro Fuse | For | For |
| 8 | Elect Tatsuya Izumida | For | For |
| 9 | Elect Tatsushi Kurihara | For | For |
| 10 | Elect Takaharu Hirose | For | For |
| 11 | Elect Hirobumi Kawano | For | For |
| 12 | Elect Hajime Watanabe | For | For |
| 13 | Elect Takayuki Ito | For | For |
| 14 | Elect Koji Kato | For | For |
| 15 | Elect Hideki Kato | For | For |
| 16 | Elect Makoto Yasuda | For | For |
| 17 | Elect Setsuo Tanaka | For | For |

Shire Plc. Voted — Country of Trade: Jersey — Ordinary Meeting Agenda 12/5/2018

| Proposal | Proposal Text | Mgmt Rec | Vote Cast |
|----------|--|----------|-----------|
| 1 | Giving Effect to Scheme of Arrangement | For | For |

$\begin{tabular}{ll} \textbf{Shire Plc.} & Voted-Country of Trade: Jersey-Court Meeting Agenda 12/5/2018 \\ \end{tabular}$

| Proposal | Proposal Text | Mgmt Rec | Vote Cast |
|----------|-------------------------|----------|-----------|
| 1 | Non-Voting Meeting Note | | |
| 2 | Scheme of Arrangement | For | For |

Smith & Nephew plc Voted — Country of Trade: Great Britain — Annual Meeting Agenda 4/11/2019

| Proposal | Proposal Text | Mgmt Rec | Vote Cast |
|----------|---|----------|-----------|
| 1 | Accounts and Reports | For | For |
| 2 | Remuneration Report (Advisory) | For | Against |
| | Vote Note: It is not clear that executive compensation sufficiently ties pay with performance in a manner that aligns executives with the long-term interests of the company. For example: • The existing remuneration structure provides executives with a larger maximum payout under the annual bonus scheme than the long-term incentive arrangements. We are concerned that this imbalance may ultimately encourage executives to focus on short-term gains, potentially at the expense of long-term growth. • The use of only absolute metrics for the short-term incentive program may not be appropriate as it may reflect economic or industry factors beyond the control of executives. Performance conditions should include relative targets. | | |
| 3 | Allocation of Profits/Dividends | For | For |
| 4 | Elect Graham Baker | For | For |
| 5 | Elect Vinita Bali | For | For |
| 6 | Elect Virginia Bottomley | For | For |
| 7 | Elect Roland Diggelmann | For | For |
| 8 | Elect Erik Engstrom | For | For |
| 9 | Elect Robin Freestone | For | For |
| 10 | Elect Namal Nawana | For | For |
| 11 | Elect Marc Owen | For | For |
| 12 | Elect Angie Risley | For | For |

| 13 | Elect Roberto Quarta | For | For |
|----|---|-----|---------|
| 14 | Appointment of Auditor | For | For |
| 15 | Authority to Set Auditor's Fees | For | For |
| 16 | Authority to Issue Shares w/ Preemptive Rights | For | For |
| 17 | Authority to Issue Shares w/o Preemptive Rights | For | For |
| 18 | Authority to Repurchase Shares | For | For |
| 19 | Authority to Set General Meeting Notice Period at 14 Days | For | Against |
| | Vote Note: A shortened notice period may not provide non-UK shareholders with sufficient time to adequately review proposals being presented at an extraordinary general meeting. | | |
| 20 | Adoption of New Articles | For | For |
| 21 | Non-Voting Meeting Note | | |

Sodexo Voted — Country of Trade: France — Mix Meeting Agenda 1/22/2019

| Proposal | Proposal Text | Mgmt Rec | Vote Cast |
|----------|---|----------|-----------|
| 1 | Non-Voting Meeting Note | | |
| 2 | Non-Voting Meeting Note | | |
| 3 | Non-Voting Meeting Note | | |
| 4 | Non-Voting Meeting Note | | |
| 5 | Accounts and Reports | For | For |
| 6 | Consolidated Accounts and Reports | For | For |
| 7 | Allocation of Profits/Dividends | For | For |
| 8 | Non-Compete Agreement (Denis Machuel, CEO) | For | For |
| 9 | Life Assurance, Health Insurance Agreements and Defined Contribution Pension | For | For |
| | Plan (Denis Machuel, CEO) | | |
| 10 | Supplementary Retirement Benefits (Denis Machuel, CEO) | For | For |
| 11 | Elect Emmanuel Babeau | For | Against |
| | Vote Note: This director nominee appears to have too many commitments to fulfill his duties as a director. He sits on three public company boards while serving as an executive at one of them. | | |
| 12 | Elect Robert Baconnier | For | Against |
| | Vote Note: In accordance with best practice recommendations in France, board members should no longer be considered independent after serving on the board for more than 12 consecutive years. This director is on the audit committee, we believe the audit committee should be 100% independent. | | |
| 13 | Elect Astrid Bellon | For | Against |
| | Vote Note: This director attended less than 75% of the board meetings held by the board during the most recently completed fiscal year. We view this as a failure to fulfill a fundamental responsibility to represent shareholders at such meetings. | | |
| 14 | Elect François-Xavier Bellon | For | Against |
| | Vote Note: In accordance with best practice recommendations in France, board members should no longer be considered independent after serving on the board for more than 12 consecutive years. This director is on the audit committee, we believe the audit committee should be 100% independent. | | |
| 15 | Ratification of the Co-option of Sophie Stabile | For | Against |
| | Vote Note: This director appears to have too many commitments. The director sits on a total for 5 public company boards. | | |
| 16 | Remuneration of Sophie Bellon, Board Chair | For | For |
| 17 | Remuneration of Michel Landel, CEO Until January 23, 2018 | For | Against |
| | Vote Note: It is not clear that executive compensation sufficiently ties pay with performance in a manner that aligns executives with the long-term interests of the company. For example: • The company's incentive plans do not appear to have a clawback provision that would enable the company to recoup bonus awards in the event of material fraud or misconduct by the recipient of a bonus award. | | |
| | The company does not require a portion of the annual cash bonus be deferred into shares. Deferral discourages risky or short-sighted strategies. The company has failed to disclose performance targets for its short-term incentive plan. Threshold performance for TSR is third quartile of the peer group which may not be | | |
| | Threshold performance for risk is time quartice of the peer group which may not be sufficiently challenging. | | |

sufficiently challenging.

| 18 | Remuneration of Denis Machuel, CEO From January 23, 2018 | For | Against |
|----|--|-----|---------|
| | Vote Note: It is not clear that executive compensation sufficiently ties pay with performance in a manner that aligns executives with the long-term interests of the company. For example: • The company's incentive plans do not appear to have a clawback provision that would enable the company to recoup bonus awards in the event of material fraud or misconduct by the recipient of a bonus award. • The company does not require a portion of the annual cash bonus be deferred into shares. Deferral discourages risky or short-sighted strategies. • The company has failed to disclose performance targets for its short-term incentive plan. • Threshold performance for TSR is third quartile of the peer group which may not be sufficiently challenging. | | |
| 19 | Remuneration Policy (Board Chair) | For | For |
| 20 | Remuneration Policy (CEO) | For | Against |
| | Vote Note: The company's incentive plans do not appear to have a clawback provision that would enable the company to recoup bonus awards in the event of material fraud or misconduct by the recipient of a bonus award. • The Company's short- and long-term incentive arrangements are based on similar metrics, which allows for a high level of pay-out (or lack thereof) for hitting similar targets. | | |
| 21 | Authority to Repurchase and Reissue Shares | For | For |
| 22 | Authority to Issue Performance Shares | For | For |
| 23 | Authorisation of Legal Formalities | For | For |

Terumo Corporation Voted — Country of Trade: Japan — Annual Meeting Agenda 6/21/2019

| Proposal | Proposal Text | Mgmt Rec | Vote Cast |
|----------|---|----------|-----------|
| 1 | Non-Voting Meeting Note | | |
| 2 | Allocation of Profits/Dividends | For | For |
| 3 | Elect Takayoshi Mimura | For | For |
| 4 | Elect Shinjiro Sato | For | For |
| 5 | Elect Toshiaki Takagi | For | For |
| 6 | Elect Shoji Hatano | For | For |
| 7 | Elect Kyo Nishikawa | For | For |
| 8 | Elect Ikuo Mori | For | For |
| 9 | Elect Ryuzo Ueda | For | For |
| 10 | Elect Yukiko Kuroda @ Yukiko Matsumoto | For | For |
| 11 | Elect Yoshihiro Kimura | For | Against |
| | Vote Note: This director is classified as an insider by the company. This director is the chair of the audit committee, which should be 100% independent. | | |
| 12 | Elect Masaichi Nakamura | For | For |
| 13 | Elect Soichiro Uno | For | For |
| 14 | Elect Koichi Sakaguchi as Alternate Audit Committee Director | For | For |
| 15 | Adoption of Restricted Stock Plan | For | For |

$\begin{tabular}{ll} WPP\ Plc & Voted-Country\ of\ Trade:\ Jersey-Annual\ Meeting\ Agenda\ 6/12/2019 \end{tabular}$

| Proposal | Proposal Text | Mgmt Rec | Vote Cast |
|----------|--|----------|-----------|
| 1 | Accounts and Reports | For | For |
| 2 | Allocation of Profits/Dividends | For | For |
| 3 | Remuneration Report (Advisory) | For | Against |
| | Vote Note: The Company has stated that Sir Martin will be treated as having retired on leaving the Company and his share awards will be pro-rated in line with the plan rules and will vest over the next five years to the extent performance criteria have been achieved. The board has not accounted for the results of an investigation into allegations of personal misconduct by Sir Martin Sorrell. | | |
| 4 | Elect Mark Read | For | For |
| 5 | Elect Cindy Rose | For | For |
| 6 | Elect Roberto Quarta | For | For |
| 7 | Elect Jacques Aigrain | For | For |
| 8 | Elect Tarek M. N. Farahat | For | For |
| 9 | Elect Sir John Hood | For | For |
| 10 | Elect Daniela Riccardi | For | For |

| 11 | Elect Paul Richardson | For | For |
|----|---|-----|---------|
| 12 | Elect Nicole Seligman | For | For |
| 13 | Elect Sally Susman | For | For |
| 14 | Elect Solomon D. Trujillo | For | For |
| 15 | Appointment of Auditor | For | Against |
| 16 | Vote Note: The non-audit-related fees are 27.7% of the total fees paid to the auditor. We believe that non-audit-related work could have been performed by a separate auditor so as to not compromise the independence of the auditor and the integrity of the Company's financial statements. Authority to Set Auditor's Fees | For | Against |
| | Vote Note: The non-audit-related fees are 27.7% of the total fees paid to the auditor. We believe that non-audit-related work could have been performed by a separate auditor so as to not compromise the independence of the auditor and the integrity of the Company's financial statements. | | |
| 17 | Authority to Issue Shares w/ Preemptive Rights | For | For |
| 18 | Authority to Repurchase Shares | For | For |
| 19 | Authority to Issue Shares w/o Preemptive Rights | For | For |

Addenda Global Equity Pooled Fund

Air Water Inc. Voted — Country of Trade: Japan — Annual Meeting Agenda 6/26/2019

| D | Democral Total | M | V-+- C+ |
|---------------|--|----------|-----------|
| Proposal 1 | Proposal Text Non-Voting Meeting Note | Mgmt Rec | Vote Cast |
| 2 | Amendments to Articles | For | For |
| 3 | Elect Masahiro Toyoda | For | Against |
| 3 | Vote Note: The board does not have a sufficient number of independent directors, which raises serious concerns about its objectivity, independence and ability to perform proper oversight. To voice our concerns, we are voting against this director as he is the CEO and chair and should be held accountable for allowing insufficient independent representation. | 101 | Agamst |
| 4 | Elect Yasuo Imai | For | For |
| 5 | Elect Kikuo Toyoda | For | For |
| 6 | Elect Kiyoshi Shirai | For | For |
| 7 | Elect Yu Karato | For | For |
| 8 | Elect Masato Machida | For | For |
| 9 | Elect Hideo Tsutsumi | For | For |
| 10 | Elect Yoshio Shiomi | For | For |
| 11 | Elect Yasushi Sogabe | For | For |
| 12 | Elect Hirokazu Kawata | For | For |
| 13 | Elect Katsumi Kajiwara | For | For |
| 14 | Elect Atsushi linaga | For | For |
| 15 | Elect Kosuke Komura | For | For |
| 16 | Elect Akihiro Toyonaga | For | For |
| 17 | Elect Ryosuke Matsubayashi | For | For |
| 18 | Elect Masahiro Kanazawa | For | For |
| 19 | Elect Yasunori Kato | For | For |
| 20 | Elect Koji Tanaka | For | For |
| 21 | Elect Yukiko Sakamoto | For | For |
| 22 | Elect Isamu Shimizu | For | For |
| 23 | Adoption of Restricted Stock Plan | For | For |

$\textbf{Bunzl plc} \quad \text{Voted} - \text{Country of Trade: Great Britain} - \text{Annual Meeting Agenda 4/17/2019}$

| Proposal 1 | Proposal Text Accounts and Reports | Mgmt Rec For | Vote Cast For |
|---------------|------------------------------------|-----------------|-------------------------|
| 2 | Allocation of Profits/Dividends | For | For |
| 3 | Elect Philip G. Rogerson | For | For |

| 4 | Elect Frank van Zanten | For | Against |
|----|---|-----|---------|
| | Vote Note: This director is considered an insider by Glass Lewis, and the Company classifies the director as not independent. This director is also on the nominating committee; this committee should be 100% independent. | | |
| 5 | Elect Brian M. May | For | For |
| 6 | Elect Eugenia Ulasewicz | For | For |
| 7 | Elect Vanda Murray | For | For |
| 8 | Elect Lloyd Pitchford | For | For |
| 9 | Elect Stephan Ronald Nanninga | For | Against |
| | Vote Note: This director nominee appears to have too many commitments to fulfill his duties as a director. He is a public company executive and serves on a total of three public company boards. | | |
| 10 | Appointment of Auditor | For | For |
| 11 | Authority to Set Auditor's Fees | For | For |
| 12 | Remuneration Report (Advisory) | For | Against |
| | Vote Note: It is not clear that executive compensation sufficiently ties pay with performance in a manner that aligns executives with the long-term interests of the company. For example: • The short-term and long-term incentive programs are based on similar financial metrics which allows for a high level of pay-out (or lack thereof) for hitting similar targets rather than considering a variety of financial and operational metrics. | | |
| 13 | Authority to Issue Shares w/ Preemptive Rights | For | For |
| 14 | Authority to Issue Shares w/o Preemptive Rights | For | For |
| 15 | Authority to Issue Shares w/o Preemptive Rights (Specified Capital Investment) | For | For |
| 16 | Authority to Repurchase Shares | For | For |
| 17 | Authority to Set General Meeting Notice Period at 14 Days | For | Against |
| | Vote Note: A shortened notice period may not provide non-UK shareholders with sufficient time to adequately review proposals being presented at an extraordinary general meeting. | | |
| 18 | Non-Voting Meeting Note | | |

Compagnie financiere Richemont SA Voted — Country of Trade: Switzerland — Annual Meeting Agenda 9/10/2018

| Proposal | Proposal Text | Mgmt Rec | Vote Cast |
|----------|--|----------|-----------|
| 1 | Accounts and Reports | For | For |
| 2 | Allocation of Profits/Dividends | For | For |
| 3 | Ratification of Board and Management Acts | For | For |
| 4 | Elect Johann Rupert as Board Chair | For | Against |
| | Vote Note: This nominee is not considered independent. This nominee is chair of the company's nominating committee and this committee should be 100% independent. | | |
| 5 | Elect Josua (Dillie) Malherbe | For | For |
| 6 | Elect Nikesh Arora | For | Against |
| | Vote Note: This nominee is not considered independent. This nominee is on the company's nominating committee and this committee should be 100% independent. | | |
| 7 | Elect Nicolas Bos | For | For |
| 8 | Elect Clay Brendish | For | For |
| 9 | Elect Jean-Blaise Eckert | For | Against |
| | Vote Note: This nominee, either personally or through closely-related entities, received material consulting and/or legal fees and/or donations from the Company in the past fiscal year. We believe that such relationships could cause significant conflicts for directors. This nominee is also on the company's audit and nominating committees and these committees should be 100% independent. | | |
| 10 | Elect Burkhart Grund | For | For |
| 11 | Elect Keyu Jin | For | For |
| 12 | Elect Jérôme Lambert | For | For |
| 13 | Elect Ruggero Magnoni | For | Against |
| | Vote Note: This nominee, either personally or through closely-related entities, received material consulting and/or legal fees and/or donations from the Company in the past fiscal year. We believe that such relationships could cause significant conflicts for directors. This nominee is also on the company's audit and nominating committees and these committees should be 100% independent. | | |
| 14 | Elect Jeff Moss | For | For |

| 15 | Elect Vesna Nevistic | For | Against |
|----|--|-----|---------|
| | Vote Note: This nominee is not considered independent. This nominee is on the company's nominating committee and this committee should be 100% independent. | | |
| 16 | Elect Guillaume Pictet | For | For |
| 17 | Elect Alan G. Quasha | For | Against |
| | Vote Note: This nominee is not considered independent. This nominee is on the company's nominating committee and this committee should be 100% independent. | | |
| 18 | Elect Maria Ramos | For | Against |
| 19 | Vote Note: This director nominee appears to have too many commitments to fulfill her duties as a director. She sits on three public company boards while serving as CEO of one of them. | For | Against |
| 19 | Elect Anton Rupert Vote Note: This nominee is not considered independent. This nominee is on the company's nominating | ГОІ | Against |
| | committee and this committee should be 100% independent. | | |
| 20 | Elect Jan Rupert | For | Against |
| | Vote Note: This nominee is not considered independent. This nominee is on the company's nominating committee and this committee should be 100% independent. | _ | |
| 21 | Elect Gary Saag | For | Against |
| | Vote Note: This nominee is not considered independent. This nominee is on the company's nominating committee and this committee should be 100% independent. | | |
| 22 | Elect Cyrille Vigneron | For | For |
| 23 | Elect Sophie Guieysse | For | For |
| 24 | Elect Clay Brendish as Compensation Committee Member | For | For |
| 25 | Elect Guillaume Pictet as Compensation Committee Member | For | For |
| 26 | Elect Maria Ramos as Compensation Committee Member | For | For |
| 27 | Elect Keyu Jin as Compensation Committee Member | For | For |
| 28 | Appointment of Auditor | For | For |
| 29 | Appointment of Independent Proxy | For | For |
| 30 | Board Compensation | For | For |
| 31 | Executive Compensation (Fixed) | For | Against |
| | Vote Note: It is not clear that the executive compensation policy sufficiently ties pay with performance in a manner that aligns executives with the long-term interests of the company. For example: • The company has not disclosed the performance objectives for its short and long-term compensation plan. | | |
| | The use of a single metric for the long-term incentive program may not be appropriate. Performance related compensation should be linked to a variety of specific objective measures | | |
| | of the company's operational and financial performance. The company does not require a portion of the annual cash bonus be deferred into shares. | | |
| | Deferral discourages risky or short-sighted strategies. | | |
| | The company potentially provides accelerated vesting of certain equity awards upon a change in control rather than requiring that an executive also lose their position. | | |
| 32 | Executive Compensation (Variable) | For | Against |
| | Vote Note: It is not clear that the executive compensation policy sufficiently ties pay with performance in a manner that aligns executives with the long-term interests of the company. | | J |
| | For example: • The company has not disclosed the performance objectives for its short and long-term | | |
| | compensation plan. | | |
| | The use of a single metric for the long-term incentive program may not be appropriate. Performance related compensation should be linked to a variety of specific objective measures | | |
| | of the company's operational and financial performance. The company does not require a portion of the annual cash bonus be deferred into shares. | | |
| | Deferral discourages risky or short-sighted strategies. | | |
| | The company potentially provides accelerated vesting of certain equity awards upon a change in control rather than requiring that an executive also lose their position. | | |
| 33 | Non-Voting Meeting Note | | |
| 34 | Non-Voting Meeting Note | | |
| 35 | Non-Voting Meeting Note | | |
| | | | |

Danone Voted — Country of Trade: France — Mix Meeting Agenda 4/25/2019

| Proposal | Proposal Text | Mgmt Rec | Vote Cast |
|----------|-------------------------|----------|-----------|
| 1 | Non-Voting Meeting Note | | |
| 2 | Non-Voting Meeting Note | | |

| 3 | Non-Voting Meeting Note | | |
|----|--|-----|---------|
| 4 | Accounts and Reports | For | For |
| 5 | Consolidated Accounts and Reports | For | For |
| 6 | Allocation of Profits/Dividends | For | For |
| 7 | Elect Franck Riboud | For | For |
| 8 | Elect Emmanuel Faber | For | For |
| 9 | Elect Clara Gaymard | For | For |
| 10 | Special Auditors Report on Regulated Agreements | For | For |
| 11 | Remuneration of Emmanuel Faber, CEO and Chair | For | Against |
| | Vote Note: It is not clear that executive compensation sufficiently ties pay with performance in a manner that aligns executives with the long-term interests of the company. For example: • The company provides accelerated vesting of certain equity awards upon a change in control rather than requiring that an executive also lose their position. • The company does not require a portion of the annual cash bonus be deferred into shares. Deferral discourages risky or short-sighted strategies. • The company's incentive plans do not appear to have a clawback provision that would enable the company to recoup bonus awards in the event of material fraud or misconduct by the recipient of a bonus award. • The use of a single, absolute metric for the short-term incentive program may not be appropriate. Performance related compensation should be linked to a variety of specific objective measures of the company's operational and financial performance. | | |
| 12 | Remuneration Policy (Corporate Officers) | For | Against |
| | Vote Note: • The company does not require a portion of the annual cash bonus be deferred into shares. Deferral discourages risky or short-sighted strategies. • The company's incentive plans do not appear to have a clawback provision that would enable the company to recoup bonus awards in the event of material fraud or misconduct by the recipient of a bonus award. | | |
| 13 | Authority to Repurchase and Reissue Shares | For | For |
| 14 | Authority to Issue Shares and Convertible Debt w/ Preemptive Rights | For | For |
| 15 | Authority to Issue Shares and Convertible Debt w/o Preemptive Rights and w/ Priority Subscription | For | For |
| 16 | Greenshoe | For | For |
| 17 | Authority to Increase Capital in Case of Exchange Offer | For | For |
| 18 | Authority to Increase Capital in Consideration for Contributions in Kind | For | For |
| 19 | Authority to Increase Capital Through Capitalisations | For | For |
| 20 | Employee Stock Purchase Plan | For | For |
| 21 | Stock Purchase Plan for Overseas Employees | For | For |
| 22 | Authority to Issue Performance Shares | For | For |
| 23 | Authority to Cancel Shares and Reduce Capital | For | For |
| 24 | Authorization of Legal Formalities | For | For |
| 25 | Non-Voting Meeting Note | | |
| | | | |

Diageo plc Voted — Country of Trade: Great Britain — Annual Meeting Agenda 9/20/2018

| Proposal | Proposal Text | Mgmt Rec | Vote Cast |
|----------|---|----------|-----------|
| 1 | Accounts and Reports | For | For |
| 2 | Remuneration Report (Advisory) | For | For |
| 3 | Allocation of Profits/Dividends | For | For |
| 4 | Elect Susan Kilsby | For | For |
| 5 | Elect Lord Mervyn Davies | For | For |
| 6 | Elect Javier Ferrán | For | For |
| 7 | Elect HO Kwon Ping | For | Against |
| | Vote Note: This director nominee appears to have too many commitments to fulfill his duties as a director. He sits on a total of four public company boards while serving as executive chairman of one of them and non-executive chairman of two. | | |
| 8 | Elect Nicola Mendelsohn | For | For |
| 9 | Elect Ivan Menezes | For | For |
| 10 | Elect Kathryn A. Mikells | For | For |
| 11 | Elect Alan Stewart | For | For |

| 12 | Appointment of Auditor | For | For |
|----|---|-----|---------|
| 13 | Authority to Set Auditor's Fees | For | For |
| 14 | Authorisation of Political Donations | For | For |
| 15 | Authority to Issue Shares w/ Preemptive Rights | For | For |
| 16 | Authority to Issue Shares w/o Preemptive Rights | For | For |
| 17 | Authority to Repurchase Shares | For | For |
| 18 | Amendments to Articles | For | For |
| 19 | Authority to Set General Meeting Notice Period at 14 Days | For | Against |
| | Vote Note: A shortened notice period may not provide non-UK shareholders with sufficient time to adequately review proposals being presented at an extraordinary general meeting. | | |
| 20 | Non-Voting Meeting Note | | |

Fresenius SE & Co. KGaA Voted — Country of Trade: Germany — Annual Meeting Agenda 5/17/2019

| Proposal | Proposal Text Non-Voting Meeting Note | Mgmt Rec | Vote Cast |
|----------|--|----------|-----------|
| 1 | | | |
| 2 | Non-Voting Meeting Note | | |
| 3 | Non-Voting Meeting Note | | |
| 4 | Accounts and Reports | For | For |
| 5 | Allocation of Profits/Dividends | For | For |
| 6 | Ratification of General Partner Acts | For | For |
| 7 | Ratification of Supervisory Board Acts | For | For |
| 8 | Appointment of Auditor | For | For |

$\textbf{G4S Plc} \quad \text{Voted} - \text{Country of Trade: Great Britain} - \text{Annual Meeting Agenda 5/16/2019}$

| Proposal | Proposal Text | Mgmt Rec | Vote Cast |
|----------|--|----------|-----------|
| 1 | Accounts and Reports | For | For |
| 2 | Remuneration Report (Advisory) | For | For |
| 3 | Allocation of Profits/Dividends | For | For |
| 4 | Elect Elisabeth Fleuriot | For | For |
| 5 | Elect Ashley Almanza | For | For |
| 6 | Elect John P. Connolly | For | For |
| 7 | Elect Winnie Kin Wah Fok | For | For |
| 8 | Elect Steven L. Mogford | For | For |
| 9 | Elect John Ramsay | For | For |
| 10 | Elect Paul Spence | For | For |
| 11 | Elect Barbara Milian Thoralfsson | For | For |
| 12 | Elect Tim Weller | For | For |
| 13 | Appointment of Auditor | For | For |
| 14 | Authority to Set Auditor's Fees | For | For |
| 15 | Authorisation of Political Donations | For | For |
| 16 | Authority to Issue Shares w/ Preemptive Rights | For | For |
| 17 | Authority to Issue Shares w/o Preemptive Rights | For | For |
| 18 | Authority to Issue Shares w/o Preemptive Rights (Specified Capital Investment) | For | For |
| 19 | Authority to Repurchase Shares | For | For |
| 20 | Authority to Set General Meeting Notice Period at 14 Days | For | Against |
| 21 | Vote Note: A shortened notice period may not provide non-UK shareholders with sufficient time to adequately review proposals being presented at an extraordinary general meeting. Non-Voting Meeting Note | | |

| Proposal | Proposal Text | Mgmt Rec | Vote Cast |
|----------|---|----------|-----------|
| 1 | Non-Voting Agenda Item | | |
| 2 | Non-Voting Agenda Item | | |
| 3 | Accounts and Reports | For | For |
| 4 | Non-Voting Agenda Item | | |
| 5 | Allocation of Profits/Dividends | For | For |
| 6 | Ratification of Management Board Acts | For | For |
| 7 | Ratification of Supervisory Board Acts | For | For |
| 8 | Authority to Repurchase Shares | For | For |
| 9 | Authority to Issue Shares w/ Preemptive Rights | For | For |
| 10 | Authority to Suppress Preemptive Rights | For | For |
| 11 | Supervisory Board Fees | For | For |
| 12 | Election of Laurence Debroux to the Management Board | For | For |
| 13 | Election of Michel de Carvalho to the Supervisory Board | For | Against |
| | Vote Note: This director is not independent. This director is on the company's nominating, and remuneration committees and these committees should be 100% independent. | | |
| 14 | Election of Rosemary L. Ripley to the Supervisory Board | For | For |
| 15 | Election of Ingrid-Helen Arnold to the Supervisory Board | For | For |
| 16 | Non-Voting Meeting Note | | |

Ingenico Group Voted — Country of Trade: France — Mix Meeting Agenda 6/11/2019

| Proposal | Proposal Text | Mgmt Rec | Vote Cast |
|----------|---|----------|-----------|
| 1 | Non-Voting Meeting Note | | |
| 2 | Non-Voting Meeting Note | | |
| 3 | Non-Voting Meeting Note | | |
| 4 | Non-Voting Meeting Note | | |
| 5 | Accounts and Reports; Non Tax-Deductible Expenses | For | For |
| 6 | Consolidated Accounts and Reports | For | For |
| 7 | Allocation of Profits/Dividends | For | For |
| 8 | Scrip Dividend | For | For |
| 9 | Special Auditors Report on Regulated Agreements | For | For |
| 10 | Severance Agreement (Nicolas Huss, CEO) | For | For |
| 11 | Ratification of Co-Option of Nicolas Huss | For | For |
| 12 | Elect Nicolas Huss | For | For |
| 13 | Elect Diaa Elyaacoubi | For | For |
| 14 | Elect Sophie Stabile | For | For |
| 15 | Elect Agnès Audier | For | For |
| 16 | Elect Zeynep Nazan Somer Ozelgin | For | For |
| 17 | Elect Michael Stollarz | For | For |
| 18 | Remuneration of Philippe Lazare, Chair and CEO (until November 5, 2018) | For | Against |
| | Vote Note: It is not clear that executive compensation sufficiently ties pay with performance | | |

Vote Note: It is not clear that executive compensation sufficiently ties pay with performance in a manner that aligns executives with the long-term interests of the company. For example:

[•] The company does not require a portion of the annual cash bonus be deferred into shares. Deferral discourages risky or short-sighted strategies.

[•] The company's incentive plans do not appear to have a clawback provision that would enable the company to recoup bonus awards in the event of material fraud or misconduct by the recipient of a bonus award.

 $[\]bullet$ The company has not disclosed the performance objectives for its compensation plans.

| 19 | Remuneration of Nicolas Huss, CEO (from November 5, 2018) Vote Note: It is not clear that executive compensation sufficiently ties pay with performance | For | Against |
|----|--|-----|---------|
| | in a manner that aligns executives with the long-term interests of the company. For example: • The company does not require a portion of the annual cash bonus be deferred into shares. Deferral discourages risky or short-sighted strategies. • The company's incentive plans do not appear to have a clawback provision that would enable | | |
| | the company to recoup bonus awards in the event | | |
| | of material fraud or misconduct by the recipient of a bonus award. • The company has not disclosed the performance objectives for its compensation plans. | | |
| 20 | Remuneration of Bernard Bourigeaud, Chair (from November 5, 2018) | For | For |
| 21 | Remuneration Policy (CEO) | For | Against |
| | Vote Note: It is not clear that executive compensation sufficiently ties pay with performance in a manner that aligns executives with the long-term interests of the company. For example: • The company does not require a portion of the annual cash bonus be deferred into shares. Deferral discourages risky or short-sighted strategies. • The company's incentive plans do not appear to have a clawback provision that would enable the company to recoup bonus awards in the event of material fraud or misconduct by the recipient of a bonus award. | | |
| 22 | The company has not disclosed the performance objectives for its compensation plans. Populary action Policy (Chair) | For | Against |
| 22 | Remuneration Policy (Chair) Vote Note: The Company grants restricted shares to the chair of the board of directors in lieu of fees paid in cash; we are concerned that the Company has not stated whether the vesting of these awards is contingent upon continuous service on the board of directors. Directors locked in by such type of awards could be inhibited from expressing dissenting views at the board and, in extreme cases, taking the ultimate sanction of resigning. In short, we believe that the issue of could create a situation wherein directors are no longer representing the best interests of the shareholders. | FOI | Against |
| 23 | Directors' Fees | For | For |
| 24 | Authority to Repurchase and Reissue Shares | For | For |
| 25 | Authority to Increase Capital Through Capitalisations | For | For |
| 26 | Employee Stock Purchase Plan | For | For |
| 27 | Stock Purchase Plan for Overseas Employees | For | For |
| 28 | Authority to Issue Performance Shares | For | For |
| 29 | Amendments to Articles Regarding Chair Age Limits | For | For |
| 30 | Amendments to Articles Regarding Vice Chair | For | For |
| 31 | Amendments to Articles Regarding Directors' Share Ownership | For | For |
| 32 | Authorisation of Legal Formalities | For | For |

${\color{red}\textbf{|PSOS|}} \ \ \text{Voted}-\text{Country of Trade: France}-\text{Mix Meeting Agenda 5/28/2019}$

| Proposal | Proposal Text | Mgmt Rec | Vote Cast |
|----------|---|----------|-----------|
| 1 | Non-Voting Meeting Note | | |
| 2 | Non-Voting Meeting Note | | |
| 3 | Non-Voting Meeting Note | | |
| 4 | Non-Voting Meeting Note | | |
| 5 | Accounts and Reports | For | For |
| 6 | Consolidated Accounts and Reports | For | For |
| 7 | Allocation of Profits/Dividends | For | For |
| 8 | Special Auditors Report on Regulated Agreements | For | For |
| 9 | Elect Patrick Artus | For | For |
| 10 | Elect Jennifer Hubber | For | For |
| 11 | Elect Neil Janin | For | For |
| 12 | Elect Laurence Stoclet | For | For |
| 13 | Elect Éliane Rouyer-Chevalier | For | For |

14 Remuneration of Didier Truchot, Chair and CEO For Against Vote Note: It is not clear that executive compensation sufficiently ties pay with performance in a manner that aligns executives with the long-term interests of the company. For example: • The use of absolute metrics for incentive programs may not be appropriate as it may reflect economic or industry factors beyond the control of executives. Performance conditions should include relative targets. • The company does not require a portion of the annual cash bonus be deferred into shares. Deferral discourages risky or short-sighted strategies. \bullet The company's incentive plans do not appear to have a clawback provision that would enable the company to recoup bonus awards in the event of material fraud or misconduct by the recipient of a bonus award. • The company has not disclosed the performance objectives for its short-term compensation plan. 15 For Remuneration of Pierre Le Manh, Deputy CEO Against Vote Note: It is not clear that executive compensation sufficiently ties pay with performance in a manner that aligns executives with the long-term interests of the company. For example: • The use of absolute metrics for incentive programs may not be appropriate as it may reflect economic or industry factors beyond the control of executives. Performance conditions should include relative targets. • The company does not require a portion of the annual cash bonus be deferred into shares. Deferral discourages risky or short-sighted strategies. • The company's incentive plans do not appear to have a clawback provision that would enable the company to recoup bonus awards in the event of material fraud or misconduct by the recipient of a bonus award. • The company has not disclosed the performance objectives for its short-term compensation plan. 16 Remuneration of Laurence Stoclet, Deputy CEO For Against Vote Note: It is not clear that executive compensation sufficiently ties pay with performance in a manner that aligns executives with the long-term interests of the company. For example: • The use of absolute metrics for incentive programs may not be appropriate as it may reflect economic or industry factors beyond the control of executives. Performance conditions should include relative targets. • The company does not require a portion of the annual cash bonus be deferred into shares. Deferral discourages risky or short-sighted strategies. · The company's incentive plans do not appear to have a clawback provision that would enable the company to recoup bonus awards in the event of material fraud or misconduct by the recipient of a bonus award. • The company has not disclosed the performance objectives for its short-term compensation plan. 17 Remuneration of Henri Wallard, Deputy CEO For Against Vote Note: It is not clear that executive compensation sufficiently ties pay with performance in a manner that aligns executives with the long-term interests of the company. For example: • The use of absolute metrics for incentive programs may not be appropriate as it may reflect economic or industry factors beyond the control of executives. Performance conditions should include relative targets. • The company does not require a portion of the annual cash bonus be deferred into shares. Deferral discourages risky or short-sighted strategies. \bullet The company's incentive plans do not appear to have a clawback provision that would enable the company to recoup bonus awards in the event of material fraud or misconduct by the recipient of a bonus award. • The company has not disclosed the performance objectives for its short-term compensation plan. 18 For Against Remuneration Policy (Chair and CEO) Vote Note: It is not clear that executive compensation sufficiently ties pay with performance in a manner that aligns executives with the long-term interests of the company. For example: • The use of absolute metrics for incentive programs may not be appropriate as it may reflect economic or industry factors beyond the control of executives. Performance conditions should include relative targets. • The company does not require a portion of the annual cash bonus be deferred into shares. Deferral discourages risky or short-sighted strategies. • The company's incentive plans do not appear to have a clawback provision that would enable the company to recoup bonus awards in the event of material fraud or misconduct by the recipient of a bonus award. • The company has not disclosed the performance objectives for its short-term compensation plan. 19 Remuneration Policy (Deputy CEOs) For Against Vote Note: It is not clear that executive compensation sufficiently ties pay with performance in a manner that aligns executives with the long-term interests of the company. For example: • The use of absolute metrics for incentive programs may not be appropriate as it may reflect economic or industry factors beyond the control of executives. Performance conditions should include relative targets. • The company does not require a portion of the annual cash bonus be deferred into shares. Deferral discourages risky or short-sighted strategies. • The company's incentive plans do not appear to have a clawback provision that would enable the company to recoup bonus awards in the event of material fraud or misconduct by the recipient of a bonus award. • The company has not disclosed the performance objectives for its short-term compensation plan. 20 Authority to Repurchase and Reissue Shares For For

| 21 | Authority to Issue Performance Shares | For | For |
|----|---------------------------------------|-----|-----|
| 22 | Authorisation of Legal Formalities | For | For |

Lvmh Moet Hennessy Vuitton SE Voted — Country of Trade: France — Mix Meeting Agenda 4/18/2019

| Proposal | Proposal Text | Mgmt Rec | Vote Cast |
|----------|---|----------|-----------|
| 1 | Non-Voting Meeting Note | 3 | |
| 2 | Non-Voting Meeting Note | | |
| 3 | Non-Voting Meeting Note | | |
| 4 | Accounts and Reports | For | For |
| 5 | Consolidated Accounts and Reports | For | For |
| 6 | Allocation of Profits/Dividends | For | For |
| 7 | Special Auditors Report on Regulated Agreements | For | Against |
| | Vote Note: The company has been making large annual payments to an entity almost entirely owned by the controlling family, for services that are only vaguely disclosed by the Company. The Company has provided no information on how the value of these fees were determined, how Groupe Arnault functions, and the extent of the services included in the agreement. In addition, a company's decision regarding where to turn for the best professional services may be compromised when doing business with its board members or controlling shareholders. | | J |
| 8 | Ratification of the Co-option of Sophie Chassat | For | For |
| 9 | Elect Bernard Arnault | For | Against |
| | Vote Note: This director nominee appears to have too many commitments to fulfill his duties as a director. He is a public company executive and serves on a total of three public company boards. | | |
| 10 | Elect Sophie Chassat | For | For |
| 11 | Elect Clara Gaymard | For | For |
| 12 | Elect Hubert Védrine | For | For |
| 13 | Elect Iris Knobloch | For | For |
| 14 | Elect Yann Arthus-Bertrand as Censor | For | Against |
| | Vote Note: The practice of appointing non-voting members to the board, who may exercise significant influence over the board's decisions, requires exceptional justification. The board has not provided a compelling rationale for the appointment, nor is the censor serving for a transitional period of two years or less. As such, we find no reason to support the appointment of the proposed censor at this time. | | |
| 15 | Remuneration of Bernard Arnault, Chair and CEO | For | Against |
| | Vote Note: It is not clear that executive compensation sufficiently ties pay with performance in a manner that aligns executives with the long-term interests of the company. For example: • The company's incentive plans do not appear to have a clawback provision that would enable the company to recoup bonus awards in the event of material fraud or misconduct by the recipient of a bonus award. • The company has failed to disclose the performance targets for its short-term incentive plan. | | |
| | The company has failed to disclose the performance period for its long-term incentive plan. The company has failed to disclose the performance metrics for its long-term incentive plan. The company does not require a portion of the annual cash bonus be deferred into shares. Deferral discourages risky or short-sighted strategies. Executives are eligible to receive unlimited long-term incentive payments. This runs contrary to best practices and shareholder interests. | | |
| 16 | Remuneration Report of Antonio Belloni, Deputy CEO | For | Against |
| | Vote Note: It is not clear that executive compensation sufficiently ties pay with performance in a manner that aligns executives with the long-term interests of the company. For example: • The company's incentive plans do not appear to have a clawback provision that would enable the company to recoup bonus awards in the event of material fraud or misconduct by the recipient of a bonus award. • The company has failed to disclose the performance targets for its short-term incentive plan. | | |
| | The company has failed to disclose the performance period for its long-term incentive plan. The company has failed to disclose the performance metrics for its long-term incentive plan. The company does not require a portion of the annual cash bonus be deferred into shares. Deferral discourages risky or short-sighted strategies. Executives are eligible to receive unlimited long-term incentive payments. This runs contrary to best practices and shareholder interests. | | |

| 17 | Remuneration Policy (Chair and CEO) | For | Against |
|----|---|-----|---------|
| | Vote Note: It is not clear that executive compensation sufficiently ties pay with performance in a manner that aligns executives with the long-term interests of the company. For example: • The company's incentive plans do not appear to have a clawback provision that would enable the company to recoup bonus awards in the event of material fraud or misconduct by the recipient of a bonus award. | | |
| | The company has failed to disclose the performance targets for its short-term incentive plan. The company has failed to disclose the performance period for its long-term incentive plan. The company has failed to disclose the performance metrics for its long-term incentive plan. The company does not require a portion of the annual cash bonus be deferred into shares. Deferral discourages risky or short-sighted strategies. Executives are eligible to receive unlimited long-term incentive payments. This runs contrary to best practices and shareholder interests. | | |
| 18 | Remuneration Policy (Deputy CEO) | For | Against |
| | Vote Note: It is not clear that executive compensation sufficiently ties pay with performance in a manner that aligns executives with the long-term interests of the company. For example: • The company's incentive plans do not appear to have a clawback provision that would enable the company to recoup bonus awards in the event of material fraud or misconduct by the recipient of a bonus award. | | J |
| | The company has failed to disclose the performance targets for its short-term incentive plan. The company has failed to disclose the performance period for its long-term incentive plan. The company has failed to disclose the performance metrics for its long-term incentive plan. The company does not require a portion of the annual cash bonus be deferred into shares. Deferral discourages risky or short-sighted strategies. Executives are eligible to receive unlimited long-term incentive payments. This runs contrary to best practices and shareholder interests. | | |
| 19 | Authority to Repurchase and Reissue Shares | For | For |
| 20 | Authority to Cancel Shares and Reduce Capital | For | For |
| 21 | Authority to Increase Capital Through Capitalisations | For | For |
| 22 | Authority to Issue Shares and/or Convertible Debt w/ Preemptive Rights | For | For |
| 23 | Authority to Issue Shares and Convertible Debt w/o Preemptive Rights | For | Against |
| | Vote Note: The potential dilution to current shareholders from capital increases without preemptive rights is excessive. | | |
| 24 | Authority to Issue Shares and/or Convertible Debt Through Private Placement | For | Against |
| | Vote Note: The potential dilution to current shareholders from capital increases without preemptive rights is excessive. | | |
| 25 | Authority to Set Offering Price of Shares | For | For |
| 26 | Greenshoe | For | Against |
| | Vote Note: The potential dilution to current shareholders from capital increases without preemptive rights is excessive. | | |
| 27 | Authority to Increase Capital in Case of Exchange Offers | For | Against |
| | Vote Note: The potential dilution to current shareholders from capital increases without preemptive rights is excessive. | | |
| 28 | Authority to Increase Capital in Consideration for Contributions In Kind | For | Against |
| 20 | Vote Note: The potential dilution to current shareholders from capital increases without preemptive rights is excessive. | _ | |
| 29 | Authority to Issue Stock Options | For | Against |
| | Vote Note: The company has not explicitly tied grants for executives to stringent performance conditions. The company has not disclosed the vesting period that will apply to awards. Best practice advocates a minimum performance/vesting period of three years for long-term incentive plans unless a cogent justification of a shorter vesting period is disclosed. | | |
| 30 | Employee Stock Purchase Plan | For | For |
| 31 | Global Ceiling on Capital Increases | For | For |
| 32 | Non-Voting Meeting Note | | |

$\begin{tabular}{ll} \textbf{Nestle SA} & \textbf{Voted}-\textbf{Country of Trade: Switzerland}-\textbf{Annual Meeting Agenda 4/11/2019} \\ \end{tabular}$

| Proposal | Proposal Text | Mgmt Rec | Vote Cast |
|----------|---|----------|-----------|
| 1 | Non-Voting Meeting Note | | |
| 2 | Accounts and Reports | For | For |
| 3 | Compensation Report | For | Against |
| | Vote Note: It is not clear that executive compensation sufficiently ties pay with performance in a manner that aligns executives with the long-term interests of the company. For example: • Threshold performance for the growth in shareholder value metric is 20% below median which may not be sufficiently challenging. | | |

| 4 | Ratification of Board and Management Acts | For | For |
|----|---|---------|---------|
| 5 | Allocation of Profits/Dividends | For | For |
| 6 | Elect Paul Bulcke as Board Chair | For | Against |
| _ | Vote Note: Having an independent chair can lead to a clearer separation of responsibility between the board and management, reduce conflicts related to executive compensation and succession planning and help with the recruitment of independent directors. An independent director may increase the diversity of information available to the board and promote an independent mindset in the other directors. This director sits on the nominating committee and E&S committee and chairs the governance committee, these committees should be 100% independent. | _ | |
| 7 | Elect Ulf Mark Schneider | For | Against |
| | Vote Note: This director is the CEO of Nestlé. He is on the company's governance committee and the committee should be 100% independent. | | |
| 8 | Elect Henri de Castries | For | For |
| 9 | Elect Beat Hess | For | For |
| 10 | Elect Renato Fassbind | For | For |
| 11 | Elect Ann Veneman | For | For |
| 12 | Elect Eva Cheng | For | For |
| 13 | Elect Patrick Aebischer | For | For |
| 14 | Elect Ursula M. Burns | For | Against |
| | Vote Note: This director nominee appears to have too many commitments to fulfill her duties as a | | |
| 15 | director. She is a public company executive and she sits on a total of three public company boards. Elect Kasper Rorsted | For | For |
| 16 | Elect Pablo Isla | For | For |
| 17 | Elect Kimberly Ross | For | For |
| 18 | Elect Dick Boer | For | For |
| 19 | Elect Dinesh Paliwal | For | For |
| 20 | Elect Beat Hess as Compensation Committee Member | For | For |
| 21 | Elect Patrick Aebischer as Compensation Committee Member | For | For |
| 22 | Elect Ursula M. Burns as Compensation Committee Member | For | For |
| 23 | Elect Pablo Isla as Compensation Committee Member | For | For |
| 24 | Appointment of Auditor | For | For |
| 25 | Appointment of Independent Proxy | For | For |
| 26 | Board Compensation | For | For |
| 27 | Executive Compensation | For | For |
| 28 | Cancellation of Shares and Reduction in Share Capital | For | For |
| 29 | Additional or Amended Shareholder Proposals | Against | Abstain |
| | Vote Note: It is not recommended that shareholders authorise their independent representative to support or vote in accordance with the board of directors on amended or additional shareholder proposals that did not appear in the notice of meeting. In this case, the instructions presented specifically state that a vote against this proposal will be counted as a vote against any new or amended proposals from shareholders presented at the meeting. | | |
| 30 | Non-Voting Meeting Note | | |

Nidec Corporation Voted — Country of Trade: Japan — Annual Meeting Agenda 6/18/2019

| Proposal | Proposal Text | Mgmt Rec | Vote Cast |
|----------|---|----------|-----------|
| 1 | Non-Voting Meeting Note | | |
| 2 | Elect Shigenobu Nagamori | For | For |
| 3 | Elect Hiroyuki Yoshimoto | For | For |
| 4 | Elect Hiroshi Kobe | For | For |
| 5 | Elect Mikio Katayama | For | For |
| 6 | Elect Akira Sato | For | For |
| 7 | Elect Toshihiko Miyabe | For | For |
| 8 | Elect Teiichi Sato | For | For |
| 9 | Elect Osamu Shimizu | For | For |
| 10 | Elect Takeshi Nakane as Statutory Auditor | For | For |

Pernod Ricard Voted — Country of Trade: France — Mix Meeting Agenda 11/21/2018

| Proposal | Proposal Text | Mgmt Rec | Vote Cast |
|----------|---|----------|-----------|
| 1 | Non-Voting Meeting Note | | |
| 2 | Non-Voting Meeting Note | | |
| 3 | Non-Voting Meeting Note | | |
| 4 | Non-Voting Meeting Note | | |
| 5 | Accounts and Reports; Non Tax-Deductible Expenses | For | For |
| 6 | Consolidated Accounts and Reports | For | For |
| 7 | Allocation of Profits/Dividends | For | For |
| 8 | Approval of Related Party Transactions Report | For | For |
| 9 | Elect Martina Gonzalez-Gallarza | For | Against |
| | Vote Note: Board is not sufficiently independent | | |
| 10 | Elect Ian Gallienne | For | For |
| 11 | Elect Gilles Samyn | For | Against |
| | Vote Note: Board is not sufficiently independent | | |
| 12 | Elect Patricia Barbizet | For | For |
| 13 | Directors' Fees | For | For |
| 14 | Remuneration Policy (Chair and CEO) | For | For |
| 15 | Remuneration of Alexandre Ricard, Chair and CEO | For | For |
| 16 | Authority to Repurchase and Reissue Shares | For | For |
| 17 | Employee Stock Purchase Plan | For | For |
| 18 | Stock Purchase Plan for Overseas Employees | For | For |
| 19 | Amendments to Articles Regarding Shareholder Ownership Disclosure | For | Against |
| | Requirements' Notice Period | | |
| | Vote Note: Amendment is not in best interests of shareholders | | |
| 20 | Amendments to Articles Regarding Share Ownership | For | For |
| 21 | Amendments to Articles Regarding Alternate Statutory Auditors | For | For |
| 22 | Authorisation of Legal Formalities | For | For |

Prudential plc Voted — Country of Trade: Great Britain — Annual Meeting Agenda 5/16/2019

| Proposal | Proposal Text | Mgmt Rec | Vote Cast |
|----------|---|----------|-----------|
| 1 | Accounts and Reports | For | For |
| 2 | Remuneration Report (Advisory) | For | For |
| 3 | Elect Fields Wicker-Miurin | For | For |
| 4 | Elect Howard J. Davies | For | For |
| 5 | Elect Mark FitzPatrick | For | For |
| 6 | Elect David Law | For | For |
| 7 | Elect Paul Manduca | For | For |
| 8 | Elect Kaikhushru Nargolwala | For | For |
| 9 | Elect Anthony Nightingale | For | Against |
| | Vote Note: This director nominee appears to have too many commitments to fulfill his duties as a director. He is on a total of ten public company boards. | | |
| 10 | Elect Philip Remnant | For | For |
| 11 | Elect Alice Schroeder | For | For |
| 12 | Elect Stuart James Turner | For | For |
| 13 | Elect Thomas R. Watjen | For | For |
| 14 | Elect Michael A. Wells | For | For |
| 15 | Appointment of Auditor | For | For |
| 16 | Authority to Set Auditor's Fees | For | For |
| 17 | Authorisation of Political Donations | For | For |
| 18 | Authority to Issue Shares w/ Preemptive Rights | For | For |
| 19 | Authority to Issue Repurchased Shares w/ Preemptive Rights | For | For |
| 20 | Authority to Issue Preference Shares | For | For |

| 21 | Authority to Issue Shares w/o Preemptive Rights | For | For |
|----|---|-----|---------|
| 22 | Authority to Issue Mandatory Convertible Securities w/ Preemptive rights | For | For |
| 23 | Authority to Issue Mandatory Convertible Securities w/o Preemptive rights | For | For |
| 24 | Authority to Repurchase Shares | For | For |
| 25 | Authority to Set General Meeting Notice Period at 14 Days | For | Against |
| | Vote Note: A shortened notice period may not provide non-UK shareholders with sufficient time | | |
| | to adequately review proposals being presented at an extraordinary general meeting. | | |

Publicis Groupe SA Voted — Country of Trade: France — Mix Meeting Agenda 5/29/2019

| Proposal | Proposal Text | Mgmt Rec | Vote Cast |
|----------|--|----------|-----------|
| 1 | Non-Voting Meeting Note | | |
| 2 | Non-Voting Meeting Note | | |
| 3 | Non-Voting Meeting Note | | |
| 4 | Non-Voting Meeting Note | _ | - |
| 5 | Accounts and Reports | For | For |
| 6 | Consolidated Accounts and Reports | For | For |
| 7 | Allocation of Profits/Dividends | For | For |
| 8 | Scrip Dividend | For | For |
| 9 | Severance Agreement (Arthur Sadoun, Management Board Chair) | For | For |
| 10 | Severance Agreement (Jean-Michel Etienne, Management Board Member) | For | For |
| 11 | Severance Agreement (Anne-Gabrielle Heilbronner, Management Board Member) | For | For |
| 12 | Severance Agreement (Steve King, Management Board Member) | For | For |
| 13 | Remuneration of Maurice Lévy, Supervisory Board Chair | For | Against |
| | Vote Note: It is not clear that executive compensation sufficiently ties pay with performance in a manner that aligns executives with the long-term interests of the company. We find it questionable that the waiving of the non-compete agreement should figure in the board's thinking when deciding the remuneration amounts. Moreover, we note that at €2,800,000, Mr Levy's fixed fee, is close to three times what the current CEO receives in fixed compensation. We also note that approximately 39% of shareholders voted against the remuneration policy and 35% voted against the proposal for Mr Levy at last year's AGM. Although the Company is proposing to lower Mr Lévy's fixed remuneration to €1,900,000, remuneration will continue to dwarf that paid to the other non-executive board chairs in the CaC 40. | | |
| 14 | Remuneration of Arthur Sadoun, Management Board Chair | For | Against |
| | Vote Note: It is not clear that executive compensation sufficiently ties pay with performance in a manner that aligns executives with the long-term interests of the company. For example: • The Company's short- and long-term incentive arrangements are based on similar metrics, which allows for a high level of pay-out (or lack thereof) for hitting similar targets. • The company has not disclosed the performance objectives for its short-term compensation plan. • The company's incentive plans do not appear to have a clawback provision that would enable the company to recoup bonus awards in the event of material fraud or misconduct by the recipient of a bonus award. • The company does not require a portion of the annual cash bonus be deferred into shares. Deferral discourages risky or short-sighted strategies. | | |
| 15 | Remuneration of Jean-Michel Etienne, Management Board Member | For | Against |
| | Vote Note: It is not clear that executive compensation sufficiently ties pay with performance in a manner that aligns executives with the long-term interests of the company. For example: • The Company's short- and long-term incentive arrangements are based on similar metrics, which allows for a high level of pay-out (or lack thereof) for hitting similar targets. • The company has not disclosed the performance objectives for its short-term compensation plan. • The company's incentive plans do not appear to have a clawback provision that would enable the company to recoup bonus awards in the event of material fraud or misconduct by the recipient of a bonus award. • The company does not require a portion of the annual cash bonus be deferred into shares. Deferral discourages risky or short-sighted strategies. | | |
| 16 | Remuneration of Anne-Gabrielle Heilbronner, Management Board Member | For | Against |
| | Vote Note: It is not clear that executive compensation sufficiently ties pay with performance in a manner that aligns executives with the long-term interests of the company. For example: • The Company's short- and long-term incentive arrangements are based on similar metrics, which allows for a high level of pay-out (or lack thereof) for hitting similar targets. • The company has not disclosed the performance objectives for its short-term compensation plan. • The company's incentive plans do not appear to have a clawback provision that would enable the company to recoup bonus awards in the event of material fraud or misconduct by the recipient of a bonus award. • The company does not require a portion of the annual cash bonus be deferred into shares. Deferral discourages risky or short-sighted strategies. | | |

| 17 | Remuneration of Steve King, Management Board Member | For | Against |
|------------|--|-----|---------|
| | Vote Note: It is not clear that executive compensation sufficiently ties pay with performance in a manner that aligns executives with the long-term interests of the company. For example: | | |
| | The Company's short- and long-term incentive arrangements are based on similar metrics, which allows for a high level of pay-out (or lack thereof) for hitting similar targets. | | |
| | The company has not disclosed the performance objectives for its short-term compensation plan. The company's incentive plans do not appear to have a clawback provision that would enable the company to recoup bonus awards in the event of material fraud or misconduct by the recipient | | |
| | of a bonus award. • The company does not require a portion of the annual cash bonus be deferred into shares. Deferral discourages risky or short-sighted strategies. | | |
| 18 | Remuneration Policy (Supervisory Board Chair) | For | Against |
| | Vote Note: It is not clear that executive compensation sufficiently ties pay with performance in a manner that aligns executives with the long-term interests of the company. We find it questionable that the waiving of the non-compete agreement should figure in the board's thinking when deciding the remuneration amounts. Moreover, we note that at €2,800,000, Mr Levy's fixed fee, is close to three times what the current CEO receives in fixed compensation. We also note that approximately 39% of shareholders voted against the remuneration policy and 35% voted against the proposal for Mr Levy at last year's AGM. Although the Company is proposing to lower Mr Lévy's fixed remuneration to €1,900,000, remuneration will continue to dwarf that paid to the other non-executive board chairs in the CaC 40. | | - |
| 19 | Remuneration Policy (Supervisory Board Members) | For | Against |
| | Vote Note: We are concerned by the ability for board members to receive fees for special tasks or missions, which could include professional and consulting services provided to the company. These kinds of transactions carry a significant risk of compromising the objectivity of a supervisory board member. | | |
| 20 | Remuneration Policy (Management Board Chair) | For | Against |
| | Vote Note: It is not clear that executive compensation sufficiently ties pay with performance in a manner that aligns executives with the long-term interests of the company. For example: • The Company's short- and long-term incentive arrangements are based on similar metrics, | | |
| | which allows for a high level of pay-out (or lack thereof) for hitting similar targets.The company has not disclosed the performance objectives for its short-term compensation plan. | | |
| | The company's incentive plans do not appear to have a clawback provision that would enable the company to recoup bonus awards in the event of material fraud or misconduct by the recipient of a bonus award. | | |
| | The company does not require a portion of the annual cash bonus be deferred into shares. Deferral discourages risky or short-sighted strategies. | | |
| 21 | Remuneration Policy (Management Board Members) | For | Against |
| | Vote Note: It is not clear that executive compensation sufficiently ties pay with performance | | |
| | in a manner that aligns executives with the long-term interests of the company. For example:The Company's short- and long-term incentive arrangements are based on similar metrics, | | |
| | which allows for a high level of pay-out (or lack thereof) for hitting similar targets. | | |
| | The company has not disclosed the performance objectives for its short-term compensation plan. The company's incentive plans do not appear to have a clawback provision that would enable the company to recoup bonus awards in the event of material fraud or misconduct by the recipient of a bonus award. | | |
| | • The company does not require a portion of the annual cash bonus be deferred into shares. | | |
| 22 | Deferral discourages risky or short-sighted strategies. Elect Antonella Mei-Pochtler | For | For |
| 23 | Elect Suzan LeVine | For | For |
| 24 | Elect Enrico Letta | For | For |
| 25 | Appointment of Auditor (Ernst & Young) | For | For |
| 26 | Authority to Repurchase and Reissue Shares | For | For |
| 27 | Authority to Repurchase and Reissue Shares Authority to Cancel Shares and Reduce Capital | For | For |
| 28 | Authority to Cancer Shares and Reduce Capital Authority to Increase Capital in Consideration for Contributions In Kind | For | For |
| 29 | Authority to Grant Stock Options | For | For |
| 30 | Employee Stock Purchase Plan (Domestic and Overseas) | For | For |
| 31 | Employment Stock Purchase Plan (Specified Categories) | For | For |
| 32 | Authorisation of Legal Formalities | For | For |
| 3 <u>-</u> | Addition button of Legaci of markets | 101 | 101 |

Reckitt Benckiser Group Plc Voted — Country of Trade: Great Britain — Annual Meeting Agenda 5/9/2019

| Proposal | Proposal Text | Mgmt Rec | Vote Cast |
|----------|-------------------------------|----------|-----------|
| 1 | Accounts and Reports | For | For |
| 2 | Remuneration Policy (Binding) | For | Against |

Vote Note: It is not clear that executive compensation sufficiently ties pay with performance in a manner that aligns executives with the long-term interests of the company. For example:

• The use of absolute metrics for the long-term incentive program may not be appropriate as it may reflect economic or industry factors beyond the control of executives. Performance conditions should include relative targets.

• Part of the company's long-term incentive program uses less than three years of performance. Performance conditions should be measured over at least three consecutive years.

Remuneration Report (Advisory)

For

Vote Note: It is not clear that executive compensation sufficiently ties pay with performance in a manner that aligns executives with the long-term interests of the company. For example:

• The use of absolute metrics for the long-term incentive program may not be appropriate as it may reflect economic or industry factors beyond the control of executives. Performance conditions should include relative targets.

• Part of the company's long-term incentive program uses less than three years of performance.

3

Performance conditions should be measured over at least three consecutive years. 4 Allocation of Profits/Dividends For For 5 Elect Nicandro Durante For For 6 **Elect Mary Harris** For For 7 Elect Adrian Hennah For For 8 Elect Rakesh Kapoor For Against Vote Note: This director is an insider as he is the CEO of the Company and sits on the nominating committee. This committee should be 100% independent. 9 Elect Pamela J. Kirby For Against Vote Note: This director nominee appears to have too many commitments to fulfill her duties as a director. She is on a total of 5 public company boards. 10 Elect Christopher A. Sinclair For Against Vote Note: This director is an insider as he is the CEO and President of RB Health. He sits on the

remuneration committee and is the chair of the nominating committee, these committee should be 100% independent. Elect Warren G. Tucker For 11 Elect Andrew RJ Bonfield 12 For 13 Elect Mehmood Khan For 14 Elect Elane B. Stock For 15 Appointment of Auditor For Authority to Set Auditor's Fees 16 For

17 Authorisation of Political Donations For 18 Authority to Issue Shares w/ Preemptive Rights For 19 Deferred Bonus Plan For 20 Authority to Issue Shares w/o Preemptive Rights For 21 Authority to Issue Shares w/o Preemptive Rights (Specified Capital Investment) For 22 Authority to Repurchase Shares For 23 Authority to Set General Meeting Notice Period at 14 Days For Vote Note: A shortened notice period may not provide non-UK shareholders with sufficient time to

RELX Plc Voted — Country of Trade: Great Britain — Annual Meeting Agenda 4/25/2019

adequately review proposals being presented at an extraordinary general meeting.

| Proposal 1 | Proposal Text Accounts and Reports | Mgmt Rec For | Vote Cast For |
|---------------|---|-----------------|-------------------------|
| 2 | Remuneration Report (Advisory) | For | Against |
| | Vote Note: It is not clear that the executive compensation policy sufficiently ties pay with performance in a manner that aligns executives with the long-term interests of the company. For example: • A portion of the company's long-term incentive program, the ROIC element, uses one year of performance. Long-term incentive programs should have performance conditions that are measured over at least three consecutive years. | | |
| 3 | Allocation of Dividends | For | For |
| 4 | Appointment of Auditor | For | Against |
| | Vote Note: The non-audit-related fees are 25.9% of the total fees paid to the auditor. We believe that non-audit-related work could have been performed by a separate auditor so as to not compromise the independence of the auditor and the integrity of the Company's financial statements. | | |

Against

For

Against

| 5 | Authority to Set Auditor's Fees | For | Against |
|----|--|-----|---------|
| | Vote Note: The non-audit-related fees are 25.9% of the total fees paid to the auditor. We believe that non-audit-related work could have been performed by a separate auditor so as to not compromise the independence of the auditor and the integrity of the Company's financial statements. | | |
| 6 | Elect Andrew J. Sukawaty | For | For |
| 7 | Elect Erik Engstrom | For | For |
| 8 | Elect Anthony Habgood | For | For |
| 9 | Elect Wolfhart Hauser | For | For |
| 10 | Elect Adrian Hennah | For | For |
| 11 | Elect Marike van Lier Lels | For | For |
| 12 | Elect Nicholas Luff | For | For |
| 13 | Elect Robert J. MacLeod | For | For |
| 14 | Elect Linda S. Sanford | For | For |
| 15 | Elect Suzanne Wood | For | For |
| 16 | Authority to Issue Shares w/ Preemptive Rights | For | For |
| 17 | Authority to Issue Shares w/o Preemptive Rights | For | For |
| 18 | Authority to Issue Shares w/o Preemptive Rights (Specified Capital Investment) | For | For |
| 19 | Authority to Repurchase Shares | For | For |
| 20 | Authority to Set General Meeting Notice Period at 14 Days | For | Against |
| | Vote Note: A shortened notice period may not provide non-UK shareholders with sufficient time to adequately review proposals being presented at an extraordinary general meeting. | | |
| 21 | Amendment to Articles (Capitalisation Issue) | For | For |
| 22 | Capitalisation Issue | For | For |
| 23 | Capital Reduction | For | For |
| 24 | Non-Voting Meeting Note | | |

$\textbf{Resmed Inc.} \quad \textbf{Voted} - \textbf{Country of Trade: United States} - \textbf{Annual Meeting Agenda 11/15/2018}$

| Proposal | Proposal Text | Mgmt Rec | Vote Cast |
|----------|---|----------|-----------|
| 1 | Elect Peter C. Farrell | For | For |
| 2 | Elect Harjit Gill | For | For |
| 3 | Elect Ronald Taylor | For | For |
| 4 | Ratification of Auditor | For | For |
| 5 | Amendment to the 2009 Employee Stock Purchase Plan | For | For |
| 6 | Advisory Vote on Executive Compensation Vote Note: It is not clear that executive compensation sufficiently ties pay with performance in a manner that aligns executives with the long-term interests of the company. For example: • The use of absolute metrics for incentive programs may not be appropriate as it may reflect economic or industry factors beyond the control of executives. Performance conditions should include relative targets. • Some of the company's "long-term" incentive program only uses less than one year of performance. Performance conditions should be measured over at least three consecutive years. • One quarter of the company's "long-term" performance incentive program vests as soon as the total shareholder return exceeds a threshold at the end of a quarter. | For | Against |

Sap SE Voted — Country of Trade: Germany — Annual Meeting Agenda 5/15/2019

| Proposal 1 2 3 | Proposal Text Non-Voting Meeting Note Non-Voting Meeting Note Non-Voting Meeting Note | Mgmt Rec | Vote Cast |
|-------------------------|---|----------|-----------|
| 4 | Non-Voting Agenda Item | | |
| 5 | Allocation of Profits/Dividends | For | For |
| 6 | Ratification of Management Board Acts | For | For |
| 7 | Ratification of Supervisory Board Acts | For | For |
| 8 | Appointment of Auditor | For | For |

| 9 | Elect Hasso Plattner | For | Against |
|----|---|-----|---------|
| | Vote Note: This director is not independent because he is a former management board member (until December 2016). Provided consultancy services to the Company on behalf of Oswald Consulting GmbH (until 2018). 2. He has also served on the board for more than 15 years. In accordance with best practice recommendations, supervisory board members should no longer be considered independent after serving on the board for 15 years. He is the chair of the compensation and nominating committees which should be 100% independent. | | |
| 10 | Elect Pekka Ala-Pietilä | For | Against |
| | Vote Note: This director is not independent because he has served on the board for more than 15 years. In accordance with best practice recommendations, supervisory board members should no longer be considered independent after serving on the board for 15 years. He is on the compensation and nominating committees which should be 100% independent. | | J |
| 11 | Elect Aicha Evans | For | For |
| 12 | Elect Diane Greene | For | For |
| 13 | Elect Gesche Joost | For | For |
| 14 | Elect Bernard Liautaud | For | For |
| 15 | Elect Gerhard Oswald | For | For |
| 16 | Elect Friederike Rotsch | For | For |
| 17 | Elect Gunnar Wiedenfels | For | For |

Sodexo Voted — Country of Trade: France — Mix Meeting Agenda 1/22/2019

| Proposal | Proposal Text | Mgmt Rec | Vote Cast |
|----------|---|----------|-----------|
| 1 | Non-Voting Meeting Note | | |
| 2 | Non-Voting Meeting Note | | |
| 3 | Non-Voting Meeting Note | | |
| 4 | Non-Voting Meeting Note | | |
| 5 | Accounts and Reports | For | For |
| 6 | Consolidated Accounts and Reports | For | For |
| 7 | Allocation of Profits/Dividends | For | For |
| 8 | Non-Compete Agreement (Denis Machuel, CEO) | For | For |
| 9 | Life Assurance, Health Insurance Agreements and Defined Contribution Pension | For | For |
| | Plan (Denis Machuel, CEO) | | |
| 10 | Supplementary Retirement Benefits (Denis Machuel, CEO) | For | For |
| 11 | Elect Emmanuel Babeau | For | Against |
| | Vote Note: This director nominee appears to have too many commitments to fulfill his duties as a director. He sits on three public company boards while serving as an executive at one of them. | | |
| 12 | Elect Robert Baconnier | For | Against |
| | Vote Note: In accordance with best practice recommendations in France, board members should no longer be considered independent after serving on the board for more than 12 consecutive years. This director is on the audit committee, we believe the audit committee should be 100% independent. | | |
| 13 | Elect Astrid Bellon | For | Against |
| | Vote Note: This director attended less than 75% of the board meetings held by the board during the most recently completed fiscal year. We view this as a failure to fulfill a fundamental responsibility to represent shareholders at such meetings. | | |
| 14 | Elect François-Xavier Bellon | For | Against |
| | Vote Note: In accordance with best practice recommendations in France, board members should no longer be considered independent after serving on the board for more than 12 consecutive years. This director is on the audit committee, we believe the audit committee should be 100% independent. | | J |
| 15 | Ratification of the Co-option of Sophie Stabile | For | Against |
| | Vote Note: This director appears to have too many commitments. The director sits on a total for 5 public company boards. | | |
| 16 | Remuneration of Sophie Bellon, Board Chair | For | For |
| 17 | Remuneration of Michel Landel, CEO Until January 23, 2018 | For | Against |
| | Vote Note: It is not clear that executive compensation sufficiently ties pay with performance in a manner that aligns executives with the long-term interests of the company. For example: • The company's incentive plans do not appear to have a clawback provision that would enable the company to recoup bonus awards in the event of material fraud or misconduct by the recipient of a bonus award. | | |
| | The company does not require a portion of the annual cash bonus be deferred into shares. Deferral discourages risky or short-sighted strategies. The company has failed to disclose performance targets for its short-term incentive plan. | | |
| | • Threshold performance for TSR is third quartile of the peer group which may not be sufficiently challenging. | | |

| 18 | Remuneration of Denis Machuel, CEO From January 23, 2018 Vote Note: It is not clear that executive compensation sufficiently ties pay with performance in a manner that aligns executives with the long-term interests of the company. For example: • The company's incentive plans do not appear to have a clawback provision that would enable the company to recoup bonus awards in the event of material fraud or misconduct by the recipient of a bonus award. • The company does not require a portion of the annual cash bonus be deferred into shares. Deferral discourages risky or short-sighted strategies. • The company has failed to disclose performance targets for its short-term incentive plan. • Threshold performance for TSR is third quartile of the peer group which may not be sufficiently challenging. | For | Against |
|----|--|-----|---------|
| 19 | Remuneration Policy (Board Chair) | For | For |
| 20 | Remuneration Policy (CEO) | For | Against |
| | Vote Note: • The company's incentive plans do not appear to have a clawback provision that would enable the company to recoup bonus awards in the event of material fraud or misconduct by the recipient of a bonus award. • The Company's short- and long-term incentive arrangements are based on similar metrics, which allows for a high level of pay-out (or lack thereof) for hitting similar targets. | | |
| 21 | Authority to Repurchase and Reissue Shares | For | For |
| 22 | Authority to Issue Performance Shares | For | For |
| 23 | Authorisation of Legal Formalities | For | For |

Terumo Corporation Voted — Country of Trade: Japan — Annual Meeting Agenda 6/21/2019

| Proposal | Proposal Text | Mgmt Rec | Vote Cast |
|----------|---|----------|-----------|
| 1 | Non-Voting Meeting Note | | |
| 2 | Allocation of Profits/Dividends | For | For |
| 3 | Elect Takayoshi Mimura | For | For |
| 4 | Elect Shinjiro Sato | For | For |
| 5 | Elect Toshiaki Takagi | For | For |
| 6 | Elect Shoji Hatano | For | For |
| 7 | Elect Kyo Nishikawa | For | For |
| 8 | Elect Ikuo Mori | For | For |
| 9 | Elect Ryuzo Ueda | For | For |
| 10 | Elect Yukiko Kuroda @ Yukiko Matsumoto | For | For |
| 11 | Elect Yoshihiro Kimura | For | Against |
| | Vote Note: This director is classified as an insider by the company. This director is the chair of the audit committee, which should be 100% independent. | | |
| 12 | Elect Masaichi Nakamura | For | For |
| 13 | Elect Soichiro Uno | For | For |
| 14 | Elect Koichi Sakaguchi as Alternate Audit Committee Director | For | For |
| 15 | Adoption of Restricted Stock Plan | For | For |

Ball Corp. Voted — Country of Trade: United States — Annual Meeting Agenda 4/24/2019

| Proposal | Proposal Text Election of Directors | Mgmt Rec | Vote Cast |
|----------|--|----------|-----------|
| | 1.1 Elect Daniel J. Heinrich | For | For |
| | 1.2 Elect Georgia R. Nelson | For | For |
| | 1.3 Elect Cynthia A. Niekamp | For | For |
| 2 | Ratification of Auditor | For | For |
| 3 | Advisory Vote on Executive Compensation Vote Note: It is not clear that executive compensation sufficiently ties pay with performance in a manner that aligns executives with the long-term interests of the company. For example: • Threshold performance for the growth in shareholder value metric is 37th percentile versus peers which may not be sufficiently challenging. • The short-term and long-term incentive programs are based on similar financial metrics which allows for a high level of pay-out (or lack thereof) for hitting similar targets rather than considering a variety of financial and operational metrics. • Allowing tax gross-up payments does not serve to link pay with performance in a manner that aligns executives with the long-term interests of the company. • The use of a single absolute metric for the short-term incentive programs may not be appropriate. Performance related compensation should be linked to a variety of specific objective measures of the company's operational and financial performance. | For | Against |

Becton, Dickinson And Co. Voted - Country of Trade: United States - Annual Meeting Agenda 1/22/2019

| Proposal | Proposal Text | Mgmt Rec | Vote Cast |
|----------|---|----------|-----------|
| 1 | Elect Catherine M. Burzik | For | For |
| 2 | Elect R. Andrew Eckert | For | For |
| 3 | Elect Vincent A. Forlenza | For | For |
| 4 | Elect Claire M. Fraser | For | For |
| 5 | Elect Jeffrey W. Henderson | For | For |
| 6 | Elect Christopher Jones | For | For |
| 7 | Elect Marshall O. Larsen | For | For |
| 8 | Elect David F. Melcher | For | For |
| 9 | Elect Claire Pomeroy | For | For |
| 10 | Elect Rebecca W. Rimel | For | For |
| 11 | Elect Timothy M. Ring | For | For |
| 12 | Elect Bertram L. Scott | For | For |
| 13 | Ratification of Auditor | For | For |
| 14 | Advisory Vote on Executive Compensation | For | Against |
| | Vote Note: It is not clear that executive compensation sufficiently ties pay with performance in a manner that aligns executives with the long-term interests of the company. For example: • Threshold performance for the growth in shareholder value metric is 25 th percentile versus peers which may not be sufficiently challenging. • The company provides accelerated vesting of certain equity awards upon a change in control rather than requiring that an executive also lose their position. • Allowing tax gross-up payments does not serve to link pay with performance in a manner that aligns executives with the long-term interests of the company. | | |
| 15 | Elimination of Supermajority Requirement | For | For |

Booking Holdings Inc Voted – Country of Trade: United States – Annual Meeting Agenda 6/6/2019

| Proposal | Proposal Text | Mgmt Rec | Vote Cast |
|----------|--|----------|-----------|
| 1 | Election of Directors | | |
| | 1.1 Elect Timothy M. Armstrong | For | Withhold |
| | Vote Note: This director nominee is not independent because he is the former CEO of Oath, Inc. (until December 2018), a subsidiary of Verizon Communications, Inc., each of which received an undisclosed amount for marketing affiliate relationships and data, phone and web services provided in the ordinary course of business, respectively, from the Company in 2017. He are on the compensation committee, which should be 100% independent. | | |
| | 1.2 Elect Jeffrey H. Boyd | For | For |
| | 1.3 Elect Glenn D. Fogel | For | For |
| | 1.4 Elect Mirian M. Graddick-Weir | For | For |
| | 1.5 Elect James M. Guyette | For | For |
| | 1.6 Elect Wei Hopeman | For | For |
| | 1.7 Elect Robert J. Mylod, Jr. | For | Withhold |
| | Vote Note: This director nominee is not independent because he is the former CFO (until 2009) and employee (until 2011). He is on the compensation committee, which should be 100% independent. | | |
| | 1.8 Elect Charles H. Noski | For | For |
| | 1.9 Elect Nancy B. Peretsman | For | For |
| | 1.10 Elect Nicholas J. Read | For | Withhold |
| | Vote Note: This director nominee is not independent because he is the CEO of Vodafone Group plc, from which the Company purchases services, primarily phone related, in the ordinary course of business. He is on the governance/nominating committee, which should be 100% independent. | | |
| | 1.11 Elect Thomas E. Rothman | For | For |
| | 1.12 Elect Lynn M. Vojvodich | For | For |
| | 1.13 Elect Vanessa A. Wittman | For | For |
| 2 | Ratification of Auditor | For | For |

- 3 Advisory Vote on Executive Compensation For Against Vote Note: It is not clear that executive compensation sufficiently ties pay with performance in a manner that aligns executives with the long-term interests of the company. For example: • The short-term and long-term incentive programs are based on similar financial metrics which allows for a high level of pay-out (or lack thereof) for hitting similar targets rather than considering a variety of financial and operational metrics. • The use of a single absolute metric for the short-term and long-term incentive programs may not be appropriate as it may reflect economic or industry factors beyond the control of executives. Performance conditions should include relative targets. • The company's short-term incentive program uses metrics to determine the size of bonus pool, but the compensation committee determines individual cash bonuses on a discretionary basis. Shareholder Proposal Regarding Proxy Access Bylaw Amendment Against Abstain
- 4 Shareholder Proposal Regarding Proxy Access Bylaw Amendment
 Vote Note: While we agree with the spirit of the proposal, and we agree that lowering
 the re-nominating threshold may be reasonable, we do not agree with completely removing
 the re-nomination threshold.

Cognizant Technology Solutions Corp. Voted - Country of Trade: United States -

Annual Meeting Agenda 6/4/2019

| Proposal | Proposal Text | Mgmt Rec | Vote Cast |
|----------|---|----------|-----------|
| 1 | Elect Zein Abdalla | For | For |
| 2 | Elect Maureen Breakiron-Evans | For | For |
| 3 | Elect Jonathan C. Chadwick | For | For |
| 4 | Elect John M. Dineen | For | For |
| 5 | Elect Francisco D'Souza | For | For |
| 6 | Elect John N. Fox, Jr. | For | For |
| 7 | Elect Brian Humphries | For | For |
| 8 | Elect John E. Klein | For | For |
| 9 | Elect Leo S. Mackay, Jr. | For | For |
| 10 | Elect Michael Patsalos-Fox | For | For |
| 11 | Elect Joseph M. Velli | For | For |
| 12 | Advisory Vote on Executive Compensation | For | Against |
| | Vote Note: It is not clear that executive compensation sufficiently ties pay with performance in a manner that aligns executives with the long-term interests of the company. For example: • The company's long-term incentive program only uses two years of performance. Performance conditions should be measured over at least three consecutive years. • The use of absolute metrics for incentive programs may not be appropriate as it may reflect economic or industry factors beyond the control of executives. Performance conditions should include relative targets. • The short-term and long-term incentive programs are based on similar financial metrics which allows for a high level of pay-out (or lack thereof) for hitting similar targets rather than considering a variety of financial and operational metrics. | | |
| 13 | Ratification of Auditor | For | For |
| 14 | Shareholder Proposal Regarding Political Contributions and Expenditures Report Vote Note: Improved disclosure of political contributions and trade association spending and the company's related policies and practices could help with the evaluation of related risks and opportunities. | Against | For |
| 15 | Shareholder Proposal Regarding Independent Chair Vote Note: Having an independent chair can lead to a clearer separation of responsibility between the board and management, reduce conflicts related to executive compensation and succession planning and help with the recruitment of independent directors. An independent director may increase the diversity of information available to the board and promote an independent mindset in the other directors. The current Chair is independent; however, the company does not have a policy requiring the appointment of an independent chair, so adoption of this proposal would help ensure future Chairs are independent. | Against | For |

Discovery Inc Voted — Country of Trade: United States — Annual Meeting Agenda 5/8/2019

| Proposal | Proposal Text | Mgmt Rec | Vote Cast |
|----------|-------------------------|----------|-----------|
| 1 | Election of Directors | | |
| | 1.1 Elect Paul A. Gould | For | Withhold |

Vote Note: This director was on the compensation committee during the past five fiscal years. At the Company's 2017 annual meeting, the Company's non-binding advisory resolution on executive compensation received support from approximately 69% of the votes cast. The members of the compensation and benefits committee have the responsibility of reviewing all aspects of the compensation program for the Company's executive officers. It appears that this committee may not be effectively serving shareholders in this regard. Given that the say-on-pay proposal received significant opposition from shareholders, we believe the compensation committee should have taken additional steps to identify and address shareholder concerns. Given the absence of a «say on pay» vote, we believe it is appropriate to hold the members of the compensation committee responsible for their insufficient response to the 2017 annual meeting vote results. The other members of this committee are either not standing for election this year, or joined the committee in 2018.

1.2 Elect Kenneth W. Lowe

(S

For

Against

Withhold

Against

Vote Note: This director is not independent because he is the former CEO of Scripps Networks Interactive, which was acquired by the Company in 2018. He is on the compensation committee which should be 100% independent.

1.3 Elect Daniel E. Sanchez

| 2 | Ratification of Auditor |
|---|---|
| 3 | Shareholder Proposal Regarding Simple Majority Vote |
| 4 | Shareholder Proposal Regarding Disclosure of Board Qualifications |

For For For Against Against

Ecolab, Inc. Voted – Country of Trade: United States – Annual Meeting Agenda 5/2/2019

| Proposal | Proposal Text | Mgmt Rec | Vote Cast |
|----------|--|----------|-----------|
| 1 | Elect Douglas M. Baker, Jr. | For | For |
| 2 | Elect Shari L Ballard | For | For |
| 3 | Elect Barbara J. Beck | For | For |
| 4 | Elect Leslie S. Biller | For | For |
| • | | For | For |
| 5 | Elect Jeffrey M. Ettinger | | |
| 6 | Elect Arthur J. Higgins Vote Note: This director nominee appears to have too many commitments to fulfill his duties as a director. He is a public company executive and on a total of three public company boards. | For | Against |
| 7 | Elect Michael Larson | For | For |
| 8 | Elect David W. MacLennan | For | For |
| 9 | Elect Tracy B. McKibben | For | For |
| 10 | Elect Lionel L. Nowell, III | For | For |
| 11 | Elect Victoria J. Reich | For | For |
| 12 | Elect Suzanne M. Vautrinot | For | For |
| 13 | Elect John J. Zillmer | For | For |
| 14 | Ratification of Auditor | For | For |
| 15 | Advisory Vote on Executive Compensation | For | Against |
| | Vote Note: It is not clear that executive compensation sufficiently ties pay with performance in a manner that aligns executives with the long-term interests of the company. For example: • The use of absolute metrics for incentive programs may not be appropriate as it may reflect economic or industry factors beyond the control of executives. Performance conditions should include relative targets. | | |
| | The use of a single metric for each of the short-term and long-term incentive programs may not be appropriate. Performance related compensation should be linked to a variety of specific objective measures of the company's operational and financial performance. | | |
| 16 | Shareholder Proposal Regarding Independent Chair Vote Note: Having an independent chair can lead to a clearer separation of responsibility between the board and management, reduce conflicts related to executive compensation and succession planning and help with the recruitment of independent directors. An independent director may increase the diversity of information available to the board and promote an independent mindset in the other directors. | Against | For |

Fisery, Inc. Voted — Country of Trade: United States — Annual Meeting Agenda 5/22/2019

| Proposal 1 | Proposal Text Election of Directors | Mgmt Rec | Vote Cast |
|---------------|--|----------|-----------|
| | 1.1 Elect Alison Davis | For | For |
| | 1.2 Elect Harry DiSimone | For | For |
| | 1.3 Elect John Y. Kim | For | For |
| | 1.4 Elect Dennis F. Lynch | For | For |

| | 1.5 Elect Denis J. O'Leary | For | For |
|---|---|-----|---------|
| | 1.6 Elect Glenn M. Renwick | For | For |
| | 1.7 Elect Kim M. Robak | For | For |
| | 1.8 Elect J.D. Sherman | For | For |
| | 1.9 Elect Doyle R. Simons | For | For |
| | 1.10 Elect Jeffery W. Yabuki | For | For |
| 2 | Amendment to the 2000 Employee Stock Purchase Plan | For | For |
| 3 | Advisory Vote on Executive Compensation | For | Against |
| | Vote Note: It is not clear that executive compensation sufficiently ties pay with performance in a | | |
| | manner that aligns executives with the long-term interests of the company. For example: | | |
| | • The short-term and long-term incentive programs are based on similar financial metrics which allows | | |
| | for a high level of pay-out (or lack thereof) for hitting similar targets rather than considering a variety | | |
| | of financial and operational metrics. | | |
| | • The use of only absolute metrics for the short-term incentive program may not be appropriate as it | | |
| | may reflect economic or industry factors beyond the control of executives. Performance conditions | | |
| | should include relative targets. | | |
| | The company provides accelerated vesting of certain equity awards upon a change in control rather | | |
| | than requiring that an executive also lose their position. | | |
| | Less than one-third of the target long-term incentive awards are based on performance measures. | | |
| | Threshold performance for the growth in shareholder value metric is 25th percentile versus poers | | |

 \bullet Threshold performance for the growth in shareholder value metric is 25^{th} percentile versus peers which may not be sufficiently challenging.

4 Ratification of Auditor For For Shareholder Proposal Regarding Political Contributions and Expenditures Report Against For

Vote Note: Favor review/limit political spending.Improved disclosure of political contributions and trade association spending and the company's related policies and practices could help with the evaluation of related risks and opportunities.

Fiserv, Inc. Voted — Country of Trade: United States — Special Meeting Agenda 4/18/2019

| Proposal | Proposal Text | Mgmt Rec | Vote Cast |
|----------|-----------------------------------|----------|-----------|
| 1 | Share Issuance Pursuant to Merger | For | For |
| 2 | Right to Adjourn Meeting | For | For |

Henry Schein Inc. Voted — Country of Trade: United States — Annual Meeting Agenda 5/22/2019

| Proposal | Proposal Text | Mgmt Rec | Vote Cast |
|----------|--|----------|-----------|
| 1 | Elect Barry J. Alperin | For | For |
| 2 | Elect Gerald A. Benjamin | For | For |
| 3 | Elect Stanley M. Bergman | For | For |
| 4 | Elect James P. Breslawski | For | For |
| 5 | Elect Paul Brons | For | For |
| 6 | Elect Shira D. Goodman | For | For |
| 7 | Elect Joseph L. Herring | For | For |
| 8 | Elect Kurt P. Kuehn | For | For |
| 9 | Elect Philip A. Laskawy | For | For |
| 10 | Elect Anne H. Margulies | For | For |
| 11 | Elect Mark E. Mlotek | For | For |
| 12 | Elect Steven Paladino | For | Against |
| | Vote Note: This director nominee appears to have too many commitments to fulfill his duties as a director. He is a public company executive and is on a total of three public company boards. | | |
| 13 | Elect Carol Raphael | For | For |
| 14 | Elect E. Dianne Rekow | For | For |
| 15 | Elect Bradley T. Sheares | For | Against |
| | Vote Note: This director attended less than 75% of the board meetings held by the board during the most recently completed fiscal year. We view this as a failure to fulfill a fundamental responsibility to | | |

ADDENDA CAPITAL | Proxy Voting Report — July 1, 2018 to June 30, 2019

represent shareholders at such meetings.

16 Advisory Vote on Executive Compensation

Vote Note: It is not clear that executive compensation sufficiently ties pay with performance in a manner that aligns executives with the long-term interests of the company. For example:

• The use of a single, absolute metric for the long-term incentive programs may not be appropriate. Performance related compensation should be linked to a variety of specific objective measures of the company's operational and financial performance.

For

Against

- The use of only absolute metrics for the short-term incentive program may not be appropriate as it may reflect economic or industry factors beyond the control of executives. Performance conditions should include relative targets.
- The company has not disclosed all of the performance thresholds for its compensation plans.
- The short-term and long-term incentive programs are based on similar financial metrics which allows for a high level of pay-out (or lack thereof) for hitting similar targets rather than considering a variety of financial and operational metrics.

17 Ratification of Auditor For For

International Flavors & Fragrances Inc. Voted – Country of Trade: United States –

Annual Meeting Agenda 5/1/2019

| Proposal | Proposal Text | Mgmt Rec | Vote Cast |
|----------|--|----------|-----------|
| 1 | Elect Marcello V. Bottoli | For | For |
| 2 | Elect Linda B. Buck | For | For |
| 3 | Elect Michael L. Ducker | For | Against |
| | Vote Note: This director is not independent and sits on the compensation committee, this committee should be 100% independent. | | |
| 4 | Elect David R. Epstein | For | For |
| 5 | Elect Roger W. Ferguson, Jr. | For | For |
| 6 | Elect John F. Ferraro | For | For |
| 7 | Elect Andreas Fibig | For | For |
| 8 | Elect Christina A. Gold | For | For |
| 9 | Elect Katherine M. Hudson | For | For |
| 10 | Elect Dale F. Morrison | For | For |
| 11 | Elect Stephen Williamson | For | Against |
| | Vote Note: This director is not independent and sits on the compensation committee, this committee should be 100% independent. | | |
| 12 | Ratification of Auditor | For | For |
| 13 | Advisory Vote on Executive Compensation | For | Against |
| | Vote Note: It is not clear that executive compensation sufficiently ties pay with performance in a manner that aligns executives with the long-term interests of the company. For example: | | |

- Threshold performance for the growth in shareholder value metric is 35th percentile versus peers which may not be sufficiently challenging.
- The use of only absolute metrics for the short-term incentive program may not be appropriate as it may reflect economic or industry factors beyond the control of executives. Performance conditions should include relative targets.
- Part of the company's long-term incentive program uses less than three years of performance. Performance conditions should be measured over at least three consecutive years.

Metlife Inc Voted — Country of Trade: United States — Annual Meeting Agenda 6/18/2019

| Proposal | Proposal Text | Mgmt Rec | Vote Cast |
|----------|----------------------------|----------|-----------|
| 1 | Elect Cheryl W. Grisé | For | For |
| 2 | Elect Carlos M. Gutierrez | For | For |
| 3 | Elect Gerald L. Hassell | For | For |
| 4 | Elect David L. Herzog | For | For |
| 5 | Elect R. Glenn Hubbard | For | For |
| 6 | Elect Edward J. Kelly, III | For | For |
| 7 | Elect William E. Kennard | For | For |
| 8 | Elect Michel A. Khalaf | For | For |
| 9 | Elect James M. Kilts | For | For |
| 10 | Elect Catherine R. Kinney | For | For |
| 11 | Elect Diana McKenzie | For | For |

| 12 | Elect Denise M. Morrison | For | For |
|----|---|-----|---------|
| 13 | Ratification of Auditor | For | For |
| 14 | Advisory Vote on Executive Compensation | For | Against |

Vote Note: It is not clear that executive compensation sufficiently ties pay with performance in a manner that aligns executives with the long-term interests of the company. For example:

- The company's short-term incentive program uses metrics to determine the size of bonus pool, but the compensation committee determines individual cash bonuses on a discretionary basis.
- The use of absolute metrics for the short-term incentive program may not be appropriate as it may reflect economic or industry factors beyond the control of executives. Performance conditions should include relative targets.
- Threshold performance for the growth in shareholder value metric is 25th percentile versus peers which may not be sufficiently challenging.

Microsoft Corporation Voted — Country of Trade: United States — Annual Meeting Agenda 11/28/2018

| Proposal | Proposal Text | Mgmt Rec | Vote Cast |
|----------|---|----------|-----------|
| 1 | Elect William H. Gates III | For | For |
| 2 | Elect Reid G. Hoffman | For | For |
| 3 | Elect Hugh F. Johnston | For | For |
| 4 | Elect Teri L. List-Stoll | For | For |
| 5 | Elect Satya Nadella | For | For |
| 6 | Elect Charles H. Noski | For | For |
| 7 | Elect Helmut G. W. Panke | For | For |
| 8 | Elect Sandra E. Peterson | For | For |
| 9 | Elect Penny S. Pritzker | For | For |
| 10 | Elect Charles W. Scharf | For | For |
| 11 | Elect Arne M. Sorenson | For | For |
| 12 | Elect John W. Stanton | For | For |
| 13 | Elect John W. Thompson | For | For |
| 14 | Elect Padmasree Warrior | For | For |
| 15 | Advisory Vote on Executive Compensation | For | Against |
| | Vote Note: It is not clear that executive compensation sufficiently ties pay with performance in a manner that aligns executives with the long-term interests of the company. For example: • The company's long-term incentive program is evaluated over three one-year periods. Performance conditions should be measured over at least three consecutive years. • The company has not disclosed the performance objectives for its long term compensation plan. | | |
| 16 | Ratification of Auditor | For | For |

Middleby Corp. Voted — Country of Trade: United States — Annual Meeting Agenda 5/29/2019

| Proposal 1 | Proposal Text Election of Directors | Mgmt Rec | Vote Cast |
|---------------|-------------------------------------|----------|-----------|
| | 1.1 Elect Sarah Palisi Chapin | For | For |
| | 1.2 Elect Timothy J. Fitzgerald | For | For |
| | 1.3 Elect Cathy L. McCarthy | For | For |
| | 1.4 Elect John R. Miller III | For | For |
| | 1.5 Elect Gordon O'Brien | For | For |
| | 1.6 Elect Nassem Ziyad | For | For |
| 2 | Ratification of Auditor | For | For |

3 Advisory Vote on Executive Compensation

Vote Note: It is not clear that executive compensation sufficiently ties pay with performance in a manner that aligns executives with the long-term interests of the company. For example:

- The company's incentive plans do not appear to have a sufficiently robust clawback provision that would enable the company to recoup bonus awards in the event of material fraud or misconduct by the recipient of a bonus award.
- The company provides immediate vesting of certain equity awards upon a change in control rather than requiring that an executive also lose their position.
- The short-term and long-term incentive programs are based on similar financial metrics which allows for a high level of pay-out (or lack thereof) for hitting similar targets rather than considering a variety of financial and operational metrics.
- The company's long-term incentive program measures performance over less than three years. Performance conditions should be measured over at least three consecutive years.
- The use of only absolute metrics for the incentive programs may not be appropriate as it may reflect economic or industry factors beyond the control of executives. Performance conditions should include relative targets.

4 Shareholder Proposal Regarding Sustainability Report

Vote Note: Improved disclosure of material environmental and social policies, practices and performance could help with the evaluation of related risks and opportunities. The company currently has a sustainability report but does not disclose targets for reducing GHG emissions.

Against For

Against

For

Nielsen Holdings plc Voted — Country of Trade: United States — Annual Meeting Agenda 5/21/2019

| Proposal | Proposal Text | Mgmt Rec | Vote Cast |
|----------|--|----------|-----------|
| 1 | Elect James A. Attwood, Jr. | For | For |
| 2 | Elect Guerrino De Luca | For | For |
| 3 | Elect Karen M. Hoguet | For | For |
| 4 | Elect David W. Kenny | For | For |
| 5 | Elect Harish Manwani | For | For |
| 6 | Elect Robert C. Pozen | For | For |
| 7 | Elect David Rawlinson | For | For |
| 8 | Elect Javier G. Teruel | For | For |
| 9 | Elect Lauren Zalaznick | For | For |
| 10 | Ratification of Auditor | For | For |
| 11 | Appointment of Statutory Auditor | For | For |
| 12 | Authority to Set Auditor's Fees | For | For |
| 13 | Advisory Vote on Executive Compensation | For | Against |
| | Vote Note: It is not clear that executive compensation sufficiently ties pay with performance in a manner that aligns executives with the long-term interests of the company. For example: • Threshold performance for the growth in shareholder value metric is 30th percentile versus peers which may not be sufficiently challenging. • The company's short-term incentive program uses metrics to determine the size of bonus pool, but the compensation committee determines individual cash bonuses on a discretionary basis. • Executives were granted supplemental awards outside the normal incentive plan, which may undermine the regular plan or indicate it is poorly designed. | | |
| 14 | Remuneration Report (Advisory) | For | Against |
| | Vote Note: It is not clear that executive compensation sufficiently ties pay with performance in a manner that aligns executives with the long-term interests of the company. For example: • Threshold performance for the growth in shareholder value metric is 30th percentile versus peers which may not be sufficiently challenging. • The company's short-term incentive program uses metrics to determine the size of bonus pool, but the compensation committee determines individual cash bonuses on a discretionary basis. • Executives were granted supplemental awards outside the normal incentive plan, which may undermine the regular plan or indicate it is poorly designed. | | |
| 15 | Approval of 2019 Stock Incentive Plan Vote Note: We oppose the use of stock options to compensate directors. | For | Against |
| | Company of the compan | | |

Nike, Inc. Voted — Country of Trade: United States — Annual Meeting Agenda 9/20/2018

| Proposal 1 | Proposal Text Election of Directors | Mgmt Rec | Vote Cast |
|---------------|--|------------|------------|
| | 1.1 Elect Alan B. Graf, Jr. 1.2 Elect John C. Lechleiter | For For | For For |
| | 1.3 Elect Michelle Peluso | For | For |

| 2 | Advisory Vote on Executive Compensation | For | Against |
|---|--|---------|---------|
| | Vote Note: It is not clear that executive compensation sufficiently ties pay with performance in a manner that aligns executives with the long-term interests of the company. For example: | | |
| | • The use of absolute metrics for incentive programs may not be appropriate as it may reflect | | |
| | economic or industry factors beyond the control of executives. Performance conditions should include relative targets. | | |
| | • The use of a single metric for the short-term incentive program may not be appropriate. Performance related compensation should be linked to a variety of specific objective measures of the company's operational and financial performance. | | |
| 3 | Shareholder Proposal Regarding Political Contributions and Expenditures Report Vote Note: Improved disclosure of political contributions, lobbying expenditures and trade association spending and the company's related policies and practices could help with the evaluation of related risks and opportunities. | Against | For |
| 4 | Ratification of Auditor | For | For |

Oracle Corp. Voted — Country of Trade: United States — Annual Meeting Agenda 11/14/2018

| Proposal | Proposal Text | Mgmt Rec | Vote Cast |
|----------|--|----------|-----------|
| 1 | Election of Directors | | |
| | 1.1 Elect Jeffrey S. Berg | For | For |
| | 1.2 Elect Michael J. Boskin | For | For |
| | 1.3 Elect Safra A. Catz | For | For |
| | 1.4 Elect Bruce R. Chizen | For | For |
| | 1.5 Elect George H. Conrades | For | Withhold |
| | Vote Note: Mr Conrades, Ms Seligman and Mr Panetta and were on the compensation committee during the past few fiscal years. The compensation committee made some, but not many, changes to the executive compensation plan despite only 47% of votes in favour of compensation last year and 45%, 48%, 46% and 43% prior years. | | |
| | 1.6 Elect Lawrence J. Ellison | For | For |
| | 1.7 Elect Hector Garcia-Molina | For | For |
| | 1.8 Elect Jeffrey O. Henley | For | For |
| | 1.9 Elect Mark V. Hurd | For | For |
| | 1.10 Elect Renée J. James | For | For |
| | 1.11 Elect Charles W. Moorman, IV | For | For |
| | 1.12 Elect Leon E. Panetta | For | Withhold |
| | Vote Note: Mr Conrades, Ms Seligman and Mr Panetta and were on the compensation committee during the past few fiscal years. The compensation committee made some, but not many, changes to the executive compensation plan despite only 47% of votes in favour of compensation last year and 45%, 48%, 46% and 43% prior years. | | |
| | 1.13 Elect William G. Parrett | For | For |
| | 1.14 Elect Naomi O. Seligman | For | Withhold |
| | Vote Note: Mr Conrades, Ms Seligman and Mr Panetta and were on the compensation committee during the past few fiscal years. The compensation committee made some, but not many, changes to the executive compensation plan despite only 47% of votes in favour of compensation last year and 45%, 48%, 46% and 43% prior years. | | |
| 2 | Advisory Vote on Executive Compensation | For | Against |
| | Vote Note: It is not clear that the executive compensation program sufficiently ties pay with performance in a manner that aligns executives with the interests of long-term shareholders. For example: • The use of a single absolute metric for the short-term incentive program may not be appropriate as it may reflect economic or industry factors beyond the control of executives. Performance conditions should include relative targets. • Under the 2018 long-term incentive plan, six of the seven tranches are measured annually over a five-year period and one of the seven tranches measures the Company's average stock price for a | | |
| | rolling period of only 30 calendar days over the five-year period. • Executives were granted supplemental awards outside the normal incentive plan, which may undermine the regular plan or indicate it is poorly designed. | | |
| 3 | Ratification of Auditor | For | For |
| 4 | Shareholder Proposal Regarding Gender Pay Equity Report | Against | For |
| | Vote Note: Not only can inequitable compensation cause workplace dissatisfaction, lost productivity and high turnover, pay inequity can result in expensive and time-consuming lawsuits for the company. Moreover, issues related to gender pay equity can create significant competitive concerns, as those companies who are able to demonstrate and who have taken steps to narrow the gender pay gap are better situated to both retain and attract employees. | | |
| 5 | Shareholder Proposal Regarding Political Contributions and Expenditures Report Vote Note:Improved disclosure of political contributions and trade association spending and the company's related policies and practices could help with the evaluation of related risks and opportunities. | Against | For |

| 6 | Shareholder Proposal Regarding Lobbying Report | Against | For |
|---|--|---------|-----|
| | Vote Note: Improved disclosure of lobbying expenditures and trade association spending and the company's related policies and practices could help with the evaluation of related risks and opportunities. | | |
| 7 | Shareholder Proposal Regarding Independent Board Chair | Against | For |
| | Vote Note: Having an independent chair can lead to a clearer separation of responsibility between the board and management, reduce conflicts related to executive compensation and succession planning and help with the recruitment of independent directors. An independent director may increase the diversity of information available to the board and promote an independent mindset in the other directors. | | |

Pepsico Inc. Voted — Country of Trade: United States — Annual Meeting Agenda 5/1/2019

| Proposal | Proposal Text | Mgmt Rec | Vote Cast |
|----------|---|----------|-----------|
| 1 | Elect Shona L. Brown | For | For |
| 2 | Elect Cesar Conde | For | For |
| 3 | Elect Ian M. Cook | For | For |
| 4 | Elect Dina Dublon | For | For |
| 5 | Elect Richard W. Fisher | For | For |
| 6 | Elect Michelle D. Gass | For | For |
| 7 | Elect William R. Johnson | For | For |
| 8 | Elect Ramon L. Laguarta | For | For |
| 9 | Elect David C. Page | For | For |
| 10 | Elect Robert C. Pohlad | For | Against |
| | Vote Note: This director is not independent because he is the former chair and CEO of PepsiAmericas, Inc., until its acquisition by the Company in 2010, and he is on the governance and nominating committees, which should be 100% independent. | | |
| 11 | Elect Daniel L. Vasella | For | For |
| 12 | Elect Darren Walker | For | For |
| 13 | Elect Alberto Weisser | For | For |
| 14 | Ratification of Auditor | For | For |
| 15 | Advisory Vote on Executive Compensation | For | Against |
| | Vote Note: It is not clear that executive compensation sufficiently ties pay with performance in a manner that aligns executives with the long-term interests of the company. For example: • The company has not disclosed the performance objectives for its long-term compensation plan. • The short-term and long-term incentive programs are based on similar financial metrics which allows for a high level of pay-out (or lack thereof) for hitting similar targets rather than considering a variety of financial and operational metrics. • Threshold performance for the growth in shareholder value metric is 25th percentile versus peers which may not be sufficiently challenging. | | |
| 16 | Elimination of Supermajority Requirement | For | For |
| 17 | Shareholder Proposal Regarding Independent Chair | Against | For |
| | Vote Note: Having an independent chair can lead to a clearer separation of responsibility between the board and management, reduce conflicts related to executive compensation and succession planning and help with the recruitment of independent directors. An independent director may increase the diversity of information available to the board and promote an independent mindset in the other directors. | | |
| 18 | Shareholder Proposal Regarding Pesticide Reporting Vote Note: The Company's Quaker Oats brand has been in the media spotlight recently in connection with the controversial pesticide ingredient glyphosate. Glyphosate is classified as a probable human carcinogen by the World Health Organization ("WHO") and a known carcinogen by California. Research links glyphosate-based herbicides to chronic toxic effects, such as kidney damage and endocrine disruption, even at low levels. Use of glyphosate as a desiccant has become especially commonplace for cereal grains like oats, which leads to higher levels of glyphosate residue on final consumer products. The Company's reliance on glyphosate-based weed-killers and other toxic chemicals creates legal, reputational, and regulatory risks for the Company. | Against | For |

Royal Caribbean Cruises Ltd. Voted – Country of Trade: United States – Annual Meeting Agenda 5/30/2019

| Proposal | Proposal Text | Mgmt Rec | Vote Cast |
|----------|-----------------------|----------|-----------|
| 1 | Elect John F. Brock | For | For |
| 2 | Elect Richard D. Fain | For | For |

| 3 | Elect Stephen R. Howe, Jr | For | Against |
|----|--|---------|---------|
| | Vote Note: This director nominee is not independent because they served as U.S. chair and managing partner and Americas Area managing partners of Ernst & Young and was a member of Ernst & Young's global executive board until his retirement on December 1, 2018. Ernst & Young provided consulting services to the Company totaling approximately \$52 million from January 1, 2018 to December 1, 2018, the date of his retirement, and approximately \$18 million for fiscal year 2017. They are on the audit committee, which should be 100% independent. | | |
| 4 | Elect William L. Kimsey | For | For |
| 5 | Elect Maritza Gomez Montiel | For | For |
| 6 | Elect Ann S. Moore | For | For |
| 7 | Elect Eyal M. Ofer | For | For |
| 8 | Elect Thomas J. Pritzker | For | For |
| 9 | Elect William K. Reilly | For | For |
| 10 | Elect Vagn Sørensen | For | For |
| 11 | Elect Donald Thompson | For | For |
| 12 | Elect Arne Alexander Wilhelmsen | For | For |
| 13 | Advisory Vote on Executive Compensation | For | Against |
| | Vote Note: It is not clear that executive compensation sufficiently ties pay with performance in a manner that aligns executives with the long-term interests of the company. For example: • The use of only absolute metrics for the incentive programs may not be appropriate as it may reflect economic or industry factors beyond the control of executives. Performance conditions should include relative targets. • The company's long-term incentive program measures performance over less than three years. Performance conditions should be measured over at least three consecutive years. • The company has not disclosed all of the performance thresholds for its short-term compensation plan. | | |
| | The Company's short- and long-term incentive arrangements are based on similar metrics, which allows for a high level of pay-out (or lack thereof) for hitting similar targets. | | |
| 14 | Ratification of Auditor | For | Against |
| | Vote Note: The non-audit-related fees are 28% of the total fees paid to the auditor. We believe that non-audit-related work could have been performed by a separate auditor so as to not compromise the independence of the auditor and the integrity of the Company's financial statements. | | 7.5450 |
| 15 | Shareholder Proposal Regarding Political Contributions and Expenditures Report Vote Note: Improved disclosure of political contributions and trade association spending and the company's related policies and practices could help with the evaluation of related risks and opportunities. | Against | For |

Shire Plc Voted — Country of Trade: United States — Special Meeting Agenda 12/5/2018

| Proposal | Proposal Text | Mgmt Rec | Vote Cast |
|----------|--|----------|------------------|
| 1 | Scheme of Arrangement | For | For |
| 2 | Giving Effect to Scheme of Arrangement | For | For |

State Street Corp. Voted — Country of Trade: United States — Annual Meeting Agenda 5/15/2019

| Proposal 1 2 3 | Proposal Text Elect Kennett F. Burnes Elect Patrick de Saint-Aignan Elect Lynn A. Dugle | Mgmt Rec For For | Vote Cast For For |
|-------------------------|---|------------------------|-------------------------|
| 4 | Elect Amelia C. Fawcett | For | For |
| 5 | Elect William C. Freda | For | For |
| 6 | Elect Joseph L. Hooley | For | For |
| 7 | Elect Sara Mathew | For | For |
| 8 | Elect William L. Meaney | For | For |
| 9 | Elect Ronald. P. O'Hanley | For | For |
| 10 | Elect Sean O'Sullivan | For | For |
| 11 | Elect Richard P. Sergel | For | For |
| 12 | Elect Gregory L. Summe | For | For |

- Advisory Vote on Executive Compensation

 Vote Note: It is not clear that executive compensation sufficiently ties pay with performance in a manner that aligns executives with the long-term interests of the company. For example:

 The company's short-term incentive program does not use any performance metrics for individual compensation.

 The use of absolute metrics for incentive programs may not be appropriate as it may reflect economic or industry factors beyond the control of executives. Performance conditions should include relative targets.

 The company granted NEOs discretionary awards outside of its normal incentive plans of approx.
- 14 Ratification of Auditor For For

Steris Plc Voted — Country of Trade: United States — Annual Meeting Agenda 7/31/2018

\$2 M each.

| Proposal | Proposal Text | Mgmt Rec | Vote Cast |
|----------|--|----------|-----------|
| 1 | Elect Richard C. Breeden | For | For |
| 2 | Elect Cynthia Feldmann | For | For |
| 3 | Elect Jacqueline B. Kosecoff | For | For |
| 4 | Elect David B. Lewis | For | For |
| 5 | Elect Sir Duncan K. Nichol | For | For |
| 6 | Elect Walter M. Rosebrough, Jr. | For | For |
| 7 | Elect Nirav R. Shah | For | For |
| 8 | Elect Mohsen M. Sohi | For | For |
| 9 | Elect Richard M. Steeves | For | For |
| 10 | Elect Loyal W. Wilson | For | For |
| 11 | Elect Michael B. Wood | For | For |
| 12 | Ratification of Auditor | For | Against |
| | Vote Note: The non-audit-related fees are 29% of the total fees paid to the auditor. We believe that non-audit-related work could have been performed by a separate auditor so as to not compromise the independence of the auditor and the integrity of the Company's financial statements. | | |
| 13 | Appointment of Statutory Auditor | For | Against |
| | Vote Note: The non-audit-related fees are 29% of the total fees paid to the auditor. We believe that non-audit-related work could have been performed by a separate auditor so as to not compromise the independence of the auditor and the integrity of the Company's financial statements. | | |
| 14 | Authority to Set Auditor's Fees | For | Against |
| | Vote Note: The non-audit-related fees are 29% of the total fees paid to the auditor. We believe that non-audit-related work could have been performed by a separate auditor so as to not compromise the independence of the auditor and the integrity of the Company's financial statements. | | |
| 15 | Advisory Vote on Executive Compensation | For | Against |
| | Vote Note: It is not clear that executive compensation sufficiently ties pay with performance in a manner that aligns executives with the long-term interests of the company. For example: • The company's long-term incentive program does not use any performance metrics. | | |
| 16 | Remuneration Report (Advisory) | For | Against |
| | Vote Note: It is not clear that executive compensation sufficiently ties pay with performance in a manner that aligns executives with the long-term interests of the company. For example: • The company's long-term incentive program does not use any performance metrics. | | |

$\textbf{Steris Plc} \quad \text{Voted} - \text{Country of Trade: United States} - \text{Annual Meeting Agenda 2/28/2019}$

| Proposal | Proposal Text | Mgmt Rec | Vote Cast |
|----------|---|----------|------------------|
| 1 | Approve the Re-Domiciliation of the Company | For | For |
| 2 | Approve the Creation of Distributable Profits | For | For |

Thermo Fisher Scientific Inc. Voted — Country of Trade: United States — Annual Meeting Agenda 5/22/2019

| Proposal 1 | Proposal Text Elect Marc N. Casper | Mgmt Rec For | Vote Cast For |
|---------------|------------------------------------|-----------------|-------------------------|
| 2 | Elect Nelson J. Chai | For | For |
| 3 | Elect C. Martin Harris | For | For |

| 4 | Elect Tyler Jacks | For | For |
|----|--|-----|---------|
| 5 | Elect Judy C. Lewent | For | For |
| 6 | Elect Thomas J. Lynch | For | For |
| 7 | Elect Jim P. Manzi | For | For |
| 8 | Elect James C. Mullen | For | For |
| 9 | Elect Lars Rebien Sørensen | For | For |
| 10 | Elect Scott M. Sperling | For | For |
| 11 | Elect Elaine S. Ullian | For | For |
| 12 | Elect Dion J. Weisler | For | For |
| 13 | Advisory Vote on Executive Compensation | For | Against |
| | Vote Note: It is not clear that executive compensation sufficiently ties pay with performance in a | | |

manner that aligns executives with the long-term interests of the company. For example:

- The short-term and long-term incentive programs are based on similar financial metrics which allows for a high level of pay-out (or lack thereof) for hitting similar targets rather than considering a variety of financial and operational metrics.
- A portion of the company's long-term incentive program only uses one year of performance. Performance conditions should be measured over at least three consecutive years.
- The use of absolute metrics for the incentive programs may not be appropriate as it may reflect economic or industry factors beyond the control of executives. Performance conditions should include relative targets.

14 Ratification of Auditor

> Vote Note: The non-audit-related fees are 33.7% of the total fees paid to the auditor. We believe that non-audit-related work could have been performed by a separate auditor so as to not compromise the independence of the auditor and the integrity of the Company's financial statements.

United Parcel Service, Inc. Voted - Country of Trade: United States - Annual Meeting Agenda 5/9/2019

For

Against

| Proposal | Proposal Text | Mgmt Rec | Vote Cast |
|----------|---|----------|-----------|
| 1 | Elect David P. Abney | For | For |
| 2 | Elect Rodney C. Adkins | For | For |
| 3 | Elect Michael J. Burns | For | For |
| 4 | Elect William R. Johnson | For | For |
| 5 | Elect Ann M. Livermore | For | For |
| 6 | Elect Rudy H.P. Markham | For | For |
| 7 | Elect Franck J. Moison | For | For |
| 8 | Elect Clark T. Randt, Jr. | For | For |
| 9 | Elect Christiana Smith Shi | For | For |
| 10 | Elect John T. Stankey | For | For |
| 11 | Elect Carol B. Tomé | For | For |
| 12 | Elect Kevin M. Warsh | For | For |
| 13 | Ratification of Auditor | For | For |
| 14 | Shareholder Proposal Regarding Lobbying Report | Against | Against |
| 15 | Shareholder Proposal Regarding Recapitalization | Against | For |
| | Vote Note: Dual-class voting structures are typically not in the best interests of common shareholders. Allowing one vote per share generally operates as a safeguard for common shareholders by ensuring that those who hold a significant minority of shares are able to weigh in on issues set forth by the board. | | |
| 16 | Shareholder Proposal Regarding Linking Executive Pay to Sustainability Vote Note: Linking sustainability metrics to executive compensation could reduce risks related to sustainability underperformance, incent employees to meet sustainability goals and achieve resultant benefits, and increase accountability. | Against | For |

United Technologies Corp. Voted - Country of Trade: United States - Annual Meeting Agenda 4/29/2019

| Proposal | Proposal Text | Mgmt Rec | Vote Cast |
|----------|--------------------------|----------|-----------|
| 1 | Elect Lloyd J Austin III | For | For |
| 2 | Elect Diane M. Bryant | For | For |
| 3 | Elect John V. Faraci | For | For |

| Elect Jean-Pierre Garnier | For | For |
|---|---|--|
| Elect Gregory J. Hayes | For | For |
| Elect Christopher J. Kearney | For | For |
| Elect Ellen J. Kullman | For | For |
| Elect Marshall O. Larsen | For | For |
| Elect Harold W. McGraw III | For | For |
| Elect Margaret L. O'Sullivan | For | For |
| Elect Denise L. Ramos | For | For |
| Elect Fredric G. Reynolds | For | For |
| Elect Brian C. Rogers | For | For |
| Advisory Vote on Executive Compensation | For | Against |
| Vote Note: It is not clear that executive compensation sufficiently ties pay with performance in a manner that aligns executives with the long-term interests of the company. For example: • The use of absolute metrics for the short-term incentive program may not be appropriate as it may reflect economic or industry factors beyond the control of executives. Performance conditions should include relative targets. • Threshold performance for the growth in shareholder value metric is 25th percentile versus peers which may not be sufficiently challenging. | | |
| Ratification of Auditor | For | Against |
| Vote Note: The non-audit-related fees are 28.5% of the total fees paid to the auditor. We believe that non-audit-related work could have been performed by a separate auditor so as to not compromise the independence of the auditor and the integrity of the Company's financial statements. | | |
| Elimination of Supermajority Requirement | For | For |
| Ratification of Ownership Threshold for Shareholders to Call a Special Meeting | For | For |
| | Elect Gregory J. Hayes Elect Christopher J. Kearney Elect Ellen J. Kullman Elect Marshall O. Larsen Elect Harold W. McGraw III Elect Margaret L. O'Sullivan Elect Denise L. Ramos Elect Fredric G. Reynolds Elect Brian C. Rogers Advisory Vote on Executive Compensation Vote Note: It is not clear that executive compensation sufficiently ties pay with performance in a manner that aligns executives with the long-term interests of the company. For example: • The use of absolute metrics for the short-term incentive program may not be appropriate as it may reflect economic or industry factors beyond the control of executives. Performance conditions should include relative targets. • Threshold performance for the growth in shareholder value metric is 25th percentile versus peers which may not be sufficiently challenging. Ratification of Auditor Vote Note: The non-audit-related fees are 28.5% of the total fees paid to the auditor. We believe that non-audit-related work could have been performed by a separate auditor so as to not compromise the independence of the auditor and the integrity of the Company's financial statements. Elimination of Supermajority Requirement | Elect Gregory J. Hayes Elect Christopher J. Kearney For Elect Ellen J. Kullman For Elect Marshall O. Larsen For Elect Harold W. McGraw III For Elect Denise L. Ramos For Elect Fredric G. Reynolds For Elect Brian C. Rogers Advisory Vote on Executive Compensation Vote Note: It is not clear that executive compensation sufficiently ties pay with performance in a manner that aligns executives with the long-term interests of the company. For example: The use of absolute metrics for the short-term incentive program may not be appropriate as it may reflect economic or industry factors beyond the control of executives. Performance conditions should include relative targets. Threshold performance for the growth in shareholder value metric is 25th percentile versus peers which may not be sufficiently challenging. Ratification of Auditor For Vote Note: The non-audit-related fees are 28.5% of the total fees paid to the auditor. We believe that non-audit-related work could have been performed by a separate auditor so as to not compromise the independence of the auditor and the integrity of the Company's financial statements. Elimination of Supermajority Requirement For |

Unitedhealth Group Inc Voted — Country of Trade: United States — Annual Meeting Agenda 6/3/2019

| Proposal | Proposal Text | Mgmt Rec | Vote Cas |
|----------|---|----------|----------|
| 1 | Elect William C. Ballard, Jr. | For | Against |
| | Vote Note: This nominee is among those nominees that served on the audit committee while backdating of options occurred or the company restated its financial statements. According to the Company's Form 10-K for fiscal year 2006, the majority of options granted between 1994 and 2002 had incorrect measurement dates. In addition, this nominee has been a director for 26 years and may no longer be considered independent. | | |
| 2 | Elect Richard T. Burke | For | Against |
| | Vote Note: This nominee is among those nominees that served on the audit committee while backdating of options occurred or the company restated its financial statements. According to the Company's Form 10-K for fiscal year 2006, the majority of options granted between 1994 and 2002 had incorrect measurement dates. This director is the owner of Rainy Partners, LLC, which paid the Company approximately \$398,600 in health insurance premiums in fiscal year 2018. In addition, this nominee has been a director for 42 years and may no longer be considered independent. | | |
| 3 | Elect Timothy P. Flynn | For | For |
| 4 | Elect Stephen J. Hemsley | For | For |
| 5 | Elect Michele J. Hooper | For | For |
| 6 | Elect F. William McNabb, III | For | For |
| 7 | Elect Valerie C. Montgomery Rice | For | For |
| 8 | Elect John H. Noseworthy | For | For |
| 9 | Elect Glenn M. Renwick | For | For |
| 10 | Elect David S. Wichmann | For | For |
| 11 | Elect Gail R. Wilensky | For | Against |
| | Vote Note: This nominee is among those nominees that served on the audit committee while backdating of options occurred or the company restated its financial statements. According to the Company's Form 10-K for fiscal year 2006, the majority of options granted between 1994 and 2002 had incorrect measurement dates. This director is a senior fellow of Project HOPE, which paid the Company approximately \$1.3 million in health insurance premiums and received \$354,000 in network provider services, \$150,000 in sponsorship fees and \$190,000 in donations from the Company during 2016. In addition, this nominee has been a director for 26 years and may no longer be considered independent. | | |

| 12 | Advisory Vote on Executive Compensation Vote Note: It is not clear that executive compensation sufficiently ties pay with performance in a manner that aligns executives with the long-term interests of the company. For example: • The company's short-term incentive program uses metrics to determine the size of bonus pool, but the compensation committee determines individual cash bonuses on a discretionary basis. • The use of absolute metrics for incentive programs may not be appropriate as it may reflect economic or industry factors beyond the control of executives. Performance conditions should include relative targets. • The company has not disclosed the performance thresholds or targets for its long-term compensation plan. | For | Against |
|----|---|---------|---------|
| 13 | Ratification of Auditor | For | For |
| 14 | Shareholder Proposal Regarding Proxy Access Bylaw Amendment | Against | For |
| | Vote Note: Proxy access is an important shareholder right that reinforces the board's accountability to minority shareholders. This proposal suggests amending the existing proxy access bylaw to remove the 20 shareholder limit for achieving the ownership threshold of 3% common stock ownership held for three years. Even if the 20 largest public pension funds were able to aggregate their shares, they would not meet the current 3% criteria for a continuous three years at most companies according to the Council of Institutional Investors. | | |

Visa Inc Voted — Country of Trade: United States — Annual Meeting Agenda 1/29/2019

| Proposal | Proposal Text | Mgmt Rec | Vote Cast |
|----------|---|----------|-----------|
| 1 | Elect Lloyd A. Carney | For | Against |
| | Vote Note: This director nominee appears to have too many commitments to fulfill his duties as a director. He sits on three public company boards while serving as an executive at one of them. | | |
| 2 | Elect Mary B. Cranston | For | For |
| 3 | Elect Francisco Javier Fernández-Carbajal | For | For |
| 4 | Elect Alfred F. Kelly, Jr. | For | For |
| 5 | Elect John F. Lundgren | For | For |
| 6 | Elect Robert W. Matschullat | For | For |
| 7 | Elect Denise M. Morrison | For | For |
| 8 | Elect Suzanne Nora Johnson | For | For |
| 9 | Elect John A.C. Swainson | For | For |
| 10 | Elect Maynard G. Webb, Jr. | For | For |
| 11 | Advisory Vote on Executive Compensation | For | Against |
| | Vote Note: It is not clear that executive compensation sufficiently ties pay with performance in a manner that aligns executives with the long-term interests of the company. For example: • The company's long-term incentive program is evaluated over three one-year periods. Performance conditions should be measured over at least three consecutive years. • Threshold performance for the growth in shareholder value metric is 25th percentile versus peers which may not be sufficiently challenging. | | |
| 12 | Ratification of Auditor | For | For |

Walt Disney Co Voted — Country of Trade: United States — Annual Meeting Agenda 3/7/2019

| Proposal 1 | Proposal Text Elect Susan E. Arnold | Mgmt Rec For | Vote Cast For |
|---------------|--|-----------------|-------------------------|
| 2 | Elect Mary T. Barra | For | For |
| 3 | Elect Safra A. Catz | For | For |
| 4 | Elect Francis deSouza | For | For |
| 5 | Elect Michael Froman | For | For |
| 6 | Elect Robert A. Iger | For | For |
| 7 | Elect Maria Elena Lagomasino | For | For |
| 8 | Elect Mark G. Parker | For | For |
| 9 | Elect Derica W. Rice | For | For |
| 10 | Ratification of Auditor | For | For |

| 11 | Advisory Vote on Executive Compensation | For | Against |
|----|---|---------|---------|
| | Vote Note: It is not clear that executive compensation sufficiently ties pay with performance in a manner that aligns executives with the long-term interests of the company. For example: • Threshold performance for the growth in shareholder value metric is 25th percentile versus the S&P500 which may not be the appropriate peer group or be sufficiently challenging. • The total compensation of the CEO is quite high relative to the other named executive officers which may indicate there are problems with succession planning or effective structuring of pay. | | |
| 12 | Shareholder Proposal Regarding Lobbying Report | Against | For |
| | Vote Note: Improved disclosure of lobbying expenditures and trade association spending and the company's related policies and practices could help with the evaluation of related risks and opportunities. | | |
| 13 | Shareholder Proposal Regarding Linking Executive Pay to Cybersecurity | Against | For |
| | Vote Note: The proposal asks that the Board "publish a report (at reasonable expense, within a reasonable time, and omitting confidential or propriety information) assessing the feasibility of integrating additional cyber security and data privacy metrics into the performance measures of senior executives under Disney's compensation incentive plans." We think this is a reasonable request and we think the exercise of determining how cybersecurity could be linked to executive pay will cause the company to review their risk management and governance of cybersercurity. | | |

Walt Disney Co Voted — Country of Trade: United States — Special Meeting Agenda 7/27/2018

| Proposal | Proposal Text | Mgmt Rec | Vote Cast |
|----------|--------------------------|----------|-----------|
| 1 | Fox Merger | For | For |
| 2 | Right to Adjourn Meeting | For | For |

Wells Fargo & Co. Voted — Country of Trade: United States — Annual Meeting Agenda 4/23/2019

| Proposal | Proposal Text | Mgmt Rec | Vote Cast |
|----------|--|----------|-----------|
| 1 | Elect John D. Baker II | For | For |
| 2 | Elect Celeste A. Clark | For | For |
| 3 | Elect Theodore F. Craver, Jr. | For | For |
| 4 | Elect Elizabeth A. Duke | For | For |
| 5 | Elect Wayne M. Hewett | For | For |
| 6 | Elect Donald M. James | For | For |
| 7 | Elect Maria R. Morris | For | For |
| 8 | Elect Juan A. Pujadas | For | For |
| 9 | Elect James H. Quigley | For | For |
| 10 | Elect Ronald L. Sargent | For | For |
| 11 | Elect C. Allen Parker | For | For |
| 12 | Elect Suzanne M. Vautrinot | For | For |
| 13 | Advisory Vote on Executive Compensation Vote Note: It is not clear that executive compensation sufficiently ties pay with performance in a manner that aligns executives with the long-term interests of the company. For example: • Threshold performance for the growth in shareholder value metric is bottom quartile ranking versus peers which may not be sufficiently challenging. • The company's short-term incentive program uses metrics to determine the size of bonus pool, but the compensation committee determines individual cash bonuses on a discretionary basis. | For | Against |
| 14 | Amendment to the Long-Term Incentive Compensation Plan Vote Note: We oppose the use of stock options to compensate directors. | For | Against |
| 15 | Ratification of Auditor | For | For |
| 16 | Shareholder Proposal Regarding Incentive Compensation Report | Against | Against |
| 17 | Shareholder Proposal Regarding Median Gender Pay Equity Report Vote Note: Not only can inequitable compensation cause workplace dissatisfaction, lost productivity and high turnover, pay inequity can result in expensive and time-consuming lawsuits for the company. Moreover, issues related to gender pay equity can create significant competitive concerns, as those companies who are able to demonstrate and who have taken steps to narrow the gender pay gap are better situated to both retain and attract employees. | Against | For |

Addenda US Equity Pooled Fund CAD

${\bf 3M~Co.}~~{\tt Voted-Country~of~Trade:~United~States-Annual~Meeting~Agenda~5/14/2019}$

| Proposal | Proposal Text | Mgmt Rec | Vote Cast |
|----------|--|----------|-----------|
| 1 | Elect Thomas K. Brown | For | For |
| 2 | Elect Pamela J. Craig | For | For |
| 3 | Elect David B. Dillon | For | For |
| 4 | Elect Michael L. Eskew | For | For |
| 5 | Elect Herbert L. Henkel | For | For |
| 6 | Elect Amy E. Hood | For | For |
| 7 | Elect Muhtar Kent | For | For |
| 8 | Elect Edward M. Liddy | For | For |
| 9 | Elect Dambisa F. Moyo | For | For |
| 10 | Elect Gregory R. Page | For | For |
| 11 | Elect Michael F. Roman | For | For |
| 12 | Elect Patricia A. Woertz | For | For |
| 13 | Ratification of Auditor | For | For |
| 14 | Advisory Vote on Executive Compensation | For | Against |
| | Vote Note: It is not clear that executive compensation sufficiently ties pay with performance in a | | |
| | manner that aligns executives with the long-term interests of the company. For example: • The use of absolute metrics for the short-term incentive program may not be appropriate as it may | | |
| | reflect economic or industry factors beyond the control of executives. Performance conditions should | | |
| | include relative targets. | | |
| | The company has not disclosed the threshold and maximum goals for its short-term compensation | | |
| | plan. • The company's long-term incentive program is evaluated over three one-year periods. Performance | | |
| | conditions should be measured over at least three consecutive years. | | |
| 15 | Shareholder Proposal Regarding Employee Salary Considerations When Setting | Against | For |
| | Executive Compensation | | |
| | Vote Note: To ensure that the Company's CEO compensation is reasonable relative to the Company's | | |
| | overall employee pay philosophy and structure, the compensation committee should consider the pay grades and/or salary ranges of Company employees when setting CEO compensation target amounts. | | |
| | High pay disparities between CEOs and other senior executives may undermine collaboration and | | |
| | teamwork. | | |

Adobe Inc Voted — Country of Trade: United States — Annual Meeting Agenda 4/11/2019

| Proposal | Proposal Text | Mgmt Rec | Vote Cast |
|----------|--|----------|-----------|
| 1 | Elect Amy L. Banse | For | For |
| 2 | Elect Frank A. Calderoni | For | Against |
| | Vote Note: This director nominee appears to have too many commitments to fulfill his duties as a director. He is a public company executive and serves on a total of three public company boards. | | |
| 3 | Elect James E. Daley | For | For |
| 4 | Elect Laura B. Desmond | For | For |
| 5 | Elect Charles M. Geschke | For | For |
| 6 | Elect Shantanu Narayen | For | For |
| 7 | Elect Kathleen Oberg | For | For |
| 8 | Elect Dheeraj Pandey | For | For |
| 9 | Elect David A. Ricks | For | Against |
| | Vote Note: This director nominee appears to have too many commitments to fulfill his duties as a director. He is a public company executive and serves on a total of three public company boards. | | |
| 10 | Elect Daniel Rosensweig | For | For |
| 11 | Elect John E. Warnock | For | For |
| 12 | 2019 Equity Incentive Plan | For | Against |
| | Vote Note: The proposed incentive plan does not meet our guidelines because the equity awards currently outstanding coupled with those they are seeking approval for could result in dilution in excess of 10%. We also oppose the use of stock options to compensate directors. | | |
| 13 | Ratification of Auditor | For | For |

14 Advisory Vote on Executive Compensation

Vote Note: It is not clear that executive compensation sufficiently ties pay with performance in a manner that aligns executives with the long-term interests of the company. For example:

• The use of a single metric for the long-term incentive program may not be appropriate. Performance related compensation should be linked to a variety of specific objective measures of the company's operational and financial performance.

For

Against

Against

For

 \bullet Threshold performance for the growth in shareholder value metric is 25^{th} percentile versus peers which may not be sufficiently challenging.

15 Shareholder Proposal Regarding Median Gender Pay Equity Report

Vote Note: Not only can inequitable compensation cause workplace dissatisfaction, lost productivity and high turnover, pay inequity can result in expensive and time-consuming lawsuits for the company. Moreover, issues related to gender pay equity can create significant competitive concerns, as those companies who are able to demonstrate and who have taken steps to narrow the gender pay gap are better situated to both retain and attract employees. The company already published median pay gap information for its UK operations, but has not published this information for its global operations. Statistically adjusted pay information fails to consider how discrimination affects differences in opportunity. Median pay gap disclosures address the structural bias that affects the jobs women hold, particularly when men hold most high paying jobs in a company.

Akamai Technologies Inc Voted - Country of Trade: United States - Annual Meeting Agenda 5/15/2019

| Proposal | Proposal Text Elect Peter Tom Killalea | Mgmt Rec For | Vote Cast For |
|----------|--|-----------------|------------------|
| - | | | |
| 2 | Elect F. Thomson Leighton | For | For |
| 3 | Elect Jonathan F. Miller | For | For |
| 4 | Amendment to the 2013 Stock Incentive Plan Vote Note: We oppose the use of stock options to compensate directors. | For | Against |
| 5 | Advisory Vote on Executive Compensation Vote Note: It is not clear that executive compensation sufficiently ties pay with performance in a manner that aligns executives with the long-term interests of the company. For example: • The short-term and long-term incentive programs are based on similar financial metrics which allows for a high level of pay-out (or lack thereof) for hitting similar targets rather than considering a variety of financial and operational metrics. • Part of the company's long-term incentive program measures performance over less than three years. Performance conditions should be measured over at least three consecutive years. • The company has not provided all of the performance objectives for its short or long-term compensation plans. | For | Against |
| 6 | Ratification of Auditor | For | For |

Amerisource Bergen Corp. Voted — Country of Trade: United States — Annual Meeting Agenda 2/28/2019

| Droposal | Dranacal Toyt | Marmt Bos | Vote Cast |
|----------|--|-----------|-----------|
| Proposal | Proposal Text | Mgmt Rec | |
| 1 | Elect Ornella Barra | For | For |
| 2 | Elect Steven H. Collis | For | For |
| 3 | Elect D. Mark Durcan | For | For |
| 4 | Elect Richard W. Gochnauer | For | For |
| 5 | Elect Lon R. Greenberg | For | For |
| 6 | Elect Jane E. Henney | For | For |
| 7 | Elect Kathleen Hyle | For | For |
| 8 | Elect Michael J. Long | For | For |
| 9 | Elect Henry W. McGee | For | For |
| 10 | Ratification of Auditor | For | For |
| 11 | Advisory Vote on Executive Compensation | For | Against |
| | Vote Note: It is not clear that executive compensation sufficiently ties pay with performance in a | | |
| | manner that aligns executives with the long-term interests of the company. For example: | | |
| | The use of absolute metrics for incentive programs may not be appropriate as it may reflect | | |
| | economic or industry factors beyond the control of executives. Performance conditions should include relative targets. | | |
| | The short-term and long-term incentive programs are based on similar financial metrics which allows | | |
| | for a high level of pay-out (or lack thereof) for hitting similar targets rather than considering a variety | | |
| | of financial and operational metrics. | | |
| | • The company has not provided the performance objectives for its long term compensation plan. | | |
| 12 | Shareholder Proposal Regarding Right to Act by Written Consent | Against | For |
| | Vote Note: Taking action by written consent in place of a meeting is a means shareholders can use to | | |
| | raise important matters outside the normal annual meeting cycle. | | |

13 Shareholder Proposal Regarding Excluding Compliance Costs for the Purposes of Executive Compensation

Vote Note: • Executives should not be insulated from instances of investigations, litigation, or enforcement action related to drug distribution for the purposes of executive compensation; and

Against

For

• As described in its most recent proxy statement, the Company currently excludes certain legal and compliance costs from its non-GAAP metrics for purposes of calculating executive compensation.

• This is especially relevant in light of the opioid epidemic and the Company's potential attendant litigation costs. Further, excluding these costs may not sufficiently encourage executives to ensure that proper oversight is maintained over product safety and the Company's associated liability exposure if executives are protected from the negative consequences of this improper oversight on shareholder value. Glass Lewis believes that this practice may serve to insulate executives to the detriment of shareholders, and thus believe that support for this measure is warranted.

Amphenol Corp. Voted — Country of Trade: United States — Annual Meeting Agenda 5/22/2019

| Proposal | Proposal Text | Mgmt Rec | Vote Cast |
|----------|--|----------|-----------|
| 1 | Elect Stanley L. Clark | For | For |
| 2 | Elect John D. Craig | For | For |
| 3 | Elect David P. Falck | For | For |
| 4 | Elect Edward G. Jepsen | For | Against |
| | Vote Note: This director nominee is not independent because he is the former CFO of the company. He is the chair of the audit committee and on the governance and nominating committee, these committees should be 100% independent. | | |
| 5 | Elect Robert A. Livingston | For | For |
| 6 | Elect Martin H. Loeffler | For | For |
| 7 | Elect R. Adam Norwitt | For | For |
| 8 | Elect Diana G. Reardon | For | For |
| 9 | Elect Anne C. Wolff | For | For |
| 10 | Ratification of Auditor | For | For |
| 11 | Advisory Vote on Executive Compensation | For | Against |
| 42 | Vote Note: It is not clear that executive compensation sufficiently ties pay with performance in a manner that aligns executives with the long-term interests of the company. For example: • The company's long-term incentive program does not use any performance metrics. Long-term incentive programs should have performance conditions that are measured over at least three consecutive years. • The company's incentive plans do not appear to have a clawback provision that would enable the company to recoup bonus awards in the event of material fraud or misconduct by the recipient of a bonus award. • The use of only absolute metrics for the short-term incentive program may not be appropriate as it may reflect economic or industry factors beyond the control of executives. Performance conditions should include relative targets. | Acciont | Fau |
| 12 | Shareholder Proposal Regarding Right to Call Special Meetings Vote Note: The right to call a special meeting should be a basic shareholder right and lowering the aggregate required ownership to 10% to call a meeting is reasonable. Calling a special meeting allows shareholders to raise important matters outside the normal annual meeting cycle. Any given item voted on at a special meeting would be subject to the same approval thresholds as it would be at annual meeting. | Against | For |
| 13 | Shareholder Proposal Regarding Report on Human Rights Risks Vote Note: The Company has implemented a supplier screening process in one of its business divisions, and it plans to standardize a similar system Company-wide. The Company intends to issue an updated sustainability report later this year and annually thereafter. We believe we would benefit from enhanced human rights-related disclosure which could be included in the Company's sustainability reporting. More information about the Company's supplier audit process would allow us to better gauge the Company's human rights-related risks. | Against | For |

Apache Corp. Voted — Country of Trade: United States — Annual Meeting Agenda 5/23/2019

| Proposal | Proposal Text | Mgmt Rec For | Vote Cast For |
|----------|-----------------------------|-----------------|-------------------------|
| ı | Elect Annell R. Bay | FUI | FUI |
| 2 | Elect John J. Christmann IV | For | For |
| 3 | Elect Juliet S. Ellis | For | For |
| 4 | Elect Chansoo Joung | For | For |
| 5 | Elect Rene R. Joyce | For | For |
| 6 | Elect John E. Lowe | For | For |
| 7 | Elect William C. Montgomery | For | For |
| 8 | Elect Amy H. Nelson | For | For |

| 9 | Elect Daniel W. Rabun | For | For |
|----|---|-----|---------|
| 10 | Elect Peter A. Ragauss | For | For |
| 11 | Ratification of Auditor | For | For |
| 12 | Advisory Vote on Executive Compensation | For | Against |

Vote Note: It is not clear that executive compensation sufficiently ties pay with performance in a manner that aligns executives with the long-term interests of the company. For example:

- Part of the company's long-term incentive program is evaluated over three one-year periods. Performance conditions should be measured over at least three consecutive years.
- The use of only absolute metrics for the short-term incentive program may not be appropriate as it may reflect economic or industry factors beyond the control of executives. Performance conditions should include relative targets.
- Threshold performance for the growth in shareholder value metric is 9th out of 12 versus peers which may not be sufficiently challenging.

Apple Inc Voted — Country of Trade: United States — Annual Meeting Agenda 3/1/2019

| Proposal | Proposal Text | Mgmt Rec | Vote Cast |
|----------|--|----------|-----------|
| 1 | Elect James A. Bell | For | For |
| 2 | Elect Timothy D. Cook | For | For |
| 3 | Elect Albert A. Gore | For | For |
| 4 | Elect Robert A. Iger | For | For |
| 5 | Elect Andrea Jung | For | For |
| 6 | Elect Arthur D. Levinson | For | For |
| 7 | Elect Ronald D. Sugar | For | For |
| 8 | Elect Susan L. Wagner | For | For |
| 9 | Ratification of Auditor | For | For |
| 10 | Advisory Vote on Executive Compensation | For | Against |
| | Vote Note: It is not clear that executive compensation sufficiently ties pay with performance in a manner that aligns executives with the long-term interests of the company. For example: • The use of absolute metrics for short-term incentive programs may not be appropriate as it may reflect economic or industry factors beyond the control of executives. Performance conditions should include relative targets. • The company's long-term incentive program has only one simple performance metric. Long-term incentive programs should be linked to a variety of specific objective measures of the company's operational and financial performance. • Threshold performance for the growth in shareholder value metric is 25th percentile versus the S&P500 which may not be the appropriate peer group or be sufficiently challenging. | | |
| 11 | Shareholder Proposal Regarding Proxy Access Bylaw Amendment Vote Note: Proxy access is an important shareholder right that reinforces the board's accountability to minority shareholders. This proposal suggests amending the existing proxy access bylaw to remove the 20 shareholder limit for achieving the ownership threshold of 3% common stock ownership held for three years. Even if the 20 largest public pension funds were able to aggregate their shares, they would not meet the current 3% criteria for a continuous three years at most companies according to the Council of Institutional Investors. This proposal also requests changing the number of "Shareholder Nominees" eligible to appear in proxy materials to 25% of the directors than serving, or 2, whichever is greater. The current proxy access bylaws restrict Shareholder Nominees to 20% of directors, or 1 member nomination as the board has 8 members. | Against | For |
| 12 | Shareholder Proposal Regarding Disclosure of Board Qualifications | Against | Against |

Berkshire Hathaway Inc. Voted - Country of Trade: United States - Annual Meeting Agenda 5/4/2019

| Proposal 1 | Proposal Text Election of Directors | Mgmt Rec | Vote Cast |
|---------------|---|----------|-----------|
| | 1.1 Elect Warren E. Buffett | For | For |
| | 1.2 Elect Charles T. Munger Vote Note: This director nominee appears to have too many commitments to fulfill his duties as a director. He is the company's executive vice chairman and sits on a total of three public company boards. | For | Withhold |
| | 1.3 Elect Gregory E. Abel | For | For |
| | 1.4 Elect Howard G. Buffett | For | For |
| | 1.5 Elect Stephen B. Burke | For | For |
| | 1.6 Elect Susan L. Decker | For | For |
| | 1.7 Elect William H. Gates III | For | For |
| | 1.8 Elect David S. Gottesman | For | For |
| | 1.9 Elect Charlotte Guyman | For | For |

| 1.10 | Elect Ajit Jain | For | For |
|------|-------------------------|-----|-----|
| 1.11 | Elect Thomas S. Murphy | For | For |
| 1.12 | Elect Ronald L. Olson | For | For |
| 1.13 | Elect Walter Scott, Jr. | For | For |
| 1.14 | Elect Meryl B. Witmer | For | For |

Booking Holdings Inc Voted - Country of Trade: United States - Annual Meeting Agenda 6/6/2019

| Proposal | Proposal Text Election of Directors | Mgmt Rec | Vote Cast |
|----------|--|----------|-----------|
| • | 1.1 Elect Timothy M. Armstrong Vote Note: This director nominee is not independent because they former CEO of Oath, Inc. (until December 2018), a subsidiary of Verizon Communications, Inc., each of which received an undisclosed amount for marketing affiliate relationships and data, phone and web services provided in the ordinary course of business, respectively, from the Company in 2017. He is the compensation committee, which should be 100% independent. | For | Withhold |
| | 1.2 Elect Jeffrey H. Boyd | For | For |
| | 1.3 Elect Glenn D. Fogel | For | For |
| | 1.4 Elect Mirian M. Graddick-Weir | For | For |
| | 1.5 Elect James M. Guyette | For | For |
| | 1.6 Elect Wei Hopeman | For | For |
| | 1.7 Elect Robert J. Mylod, Jr. | For | Withhold |
| | Vote Note: This director nominee is not independent because he is the former CFO (until 2009) and employee (until 2011). He is on the compensation committee, which should be 100% independent. | | |
| | 1.8 Elect Charles H. Noski | For | For |
| | 1.9 Elect Nancy B. Peretsman | For | For |
| | 1.10 Elect Nicholas J. Read | For | Withhold |
| | Vote Note: This director nominee is not independent because he is the CEO of Vodafone Group plc, from which the Company purchases services, primarily phone related, in the ordinary course of business. He is on the governance/nominating committee, which should be 100% independent. | | |
| | 1.11 Elect Thomas E. Rothman | For | For |
| | 1.12 Elect Lynn M. Vojvodich | For | For |
| | 1.13 Elect Vanessa A. Wittman | For | For |
| 2 | Ratification of Auditor | For | For |
| 3 | Advisory Vote on Executive Compensation | For | Against |
| | Vote Note: It is not clear that executive compensation sufficiently ties pay with performance in a manner that aligns executives with the long-term interests of the company. For example: • The short-term and long-term incentive programs are based on similar financial metrics which allows for a high level of pay-out (or lack thereof) for hitting similar targets rather than considering a variety of financial and operational metrics. • The use of a single absolute metric for the short-term and long-term incentive programs may not be appropriate as it may reflect economic or industry factors beyond the control of executives. Performance conditions should include relative targets. • The company's short-term incentive program uses metrics to determine the size of bonus pool, but the compensation committee determines individual cash bonuses on a discretionary basis. | | J |
| 4 | Shareholder Proposal Regarding Proxy Access Bylaw Amendment Vote Note: While we agree with the spirit of the proposal, and we agree that lowering the re-nominating threshold may be reasonable, we do not agree with completely removing the re-nomination threshold. | Against | Abstain |

Broadcom Inc Voted — Country of Trade: United States — Annual Meeting Agenda 4/1/2019

| Proposal 1 | Proposal Text Elect Hock E. Tan | Mgmt Rec For | Vote Cast For |
|---------------|---|-----------------|-------------------------|
| 2 | Elect Dr. Henry S. Samueli | For | For |
| 3 | Elect Eddy W. Hartenstein | For | For |
| 4 | Elect Diane M. Bryant | For | For |
| 5 | Elect Gayla J. Delly | For | For |
| 6 | Elect Check Kian Low | For | For |
| 7 | Elect Peter J. Marks | For | For |
| 8 | Elect Harry L. You | For | For |
| 9 | Ratification of Auditor | For | For |
| 10 | Amendment to the Employee Share Purchase Plan | For | For |

11 Advisory Vote on Executive Compensation

Vote Note: It is not clear that executive compensation sufficiently ties pay with performance in a manner that aligns executives with the long-term interests of the company. For example:

- \bullet Threshold performance for the growth in shareholder value metric is 25^{th} percentile versus peers which may not be sufficiently challenging.
- The use of a single metric for the long-term incentive program may not be appropriate. Performance related compensation should be linked to a variety of specific objective measures of the company's operational and financial performance.
- The company's incentive plans do not appear to have a clawback provision that would enable the company to recoup bonus awards in the event of material fraud or misconduct by the recipient of a bonus award.

Celgene Corp. Voted - Country of Trade: United States - Special Meeting Agenda 4/12/2019

| Proposal | Proposal Text | Mgmt Rec | Vote Cast |
|----------|--|----------|-----------|
| 1 | Bristol-Myers Transaction | For | For |
| 2 | Right to Adjourn Meeting | For | For |
| 3 | Advisory Vote on Golden Parachutes | For | Against |
| | Vote Note: This provision provides executives with cash payments for vested and unvested equity upon a change in control of the company. We question the need for payments on unvested equity. Further, allowing tax gross-up payments does not serve to link pay with performance in a manner that aligns executives with the long-term interests of the company. | | |

For

Against

Charles Schwab Corp. Voted — Country of Trade: United States — Annual Meeting Agenda 5/15/2019

| Proposal | Proposal Text | Mgmt Rec | Vote Cast |
|----------|--|----------|-----------|
| 1 | Elect John K. Adams, Jr. | For | For |
| 2 | Elect Stephen A. Ellis | For | For |
| 3 | Elect Arun Sarin | For | For |
| 4 | Elect Charles R. Schwab | For | For |
| 5 | Elect Paula A. Sneed | For | For |
| 6 | Ratification of Auditor | For | For |
| 7 | Advisory Vote on Executive Compensation | For | Against |
| | Vote Note: It is not clear that executive compensation sufficiently ties pay with performance in a manner that aligns executives with the long-term interests of the company. For example: • The use of a single metric for the incentive programs may not be appropriate. Performance related compensation should be linked to a variety of specific objective measures of the company's operational and financial performance. • The use of absolute metrics for incentive programs may not be appropriate as it may reflect economic or industry factors beyond the control of executives. Performance conditions should include relative targets. • The company provides accelerated vesting of certain equity awards upon a change in control rather than requiring that an executive also lose their position. • The company has not disclosed the maximum performance for the metric under its long-term compensation plan. | | |
| 8 | Shareholder Proposal Regarding Diversity Reporting Vote Note: Disclosure of the breakdown of the company's workforce with respect to gender or ethnicity would allow shareholders to gauge how the company is managing this issue and track progress the company is making and help with the evaluation of related risks and opportunities. | Against | For |

Church & Dwight Co., Inc. Voted — Country of Trade: United States — Annual Meeting Agenda 5/2/2019

| Proposal 1 2 3 4 | Proposal Text Elect Bradley C. Irwin Elect Penry W. Price Elect Arthur B. Winkleblack Advisory Vote on Executive Compensation Vote Note: It is not clear that executive compensation sufficiently ties pay with performance in a | Mgmt Rec For For For For | Vote Cast For For For Against |
|------------------|--|--------------------------------------|---|
| 5 | manner that aligns executives with the long-term interests of the company. For example: • The company's long-term incentive program does not use any performance metrics. Long-term incentive programs should have performance conditions that are measured over at least three consecutive years. Ratification of Auditor | For | For |

| Proposal | Proposal Text | Mgmt Rec | Vote Cast |
|----------|---|----------|-----------|
| 1 | Elect David M. Cordani | For | For |
| 2 | Elect William J. DeLaney | For | For |
| 3 | Elect Eric J. Foss | For | For |
| 4 | Elect Elder Granger | For | For |
| 5 | Elect Isaiah Harris, Jr. | For | For |
| 6 | Elect Roman Martinez IV | For | For |
| 7 | Elect Kathleen M. Mazzarella | For | For |
| 8 | Elect Mark B. McClellan | For | For |
| 9 | Elect John M. Partridge | For | For |
| 10 | Elect William L. Roper | For | For |
| 11 | Elect Eric C. Wiseman | For | For |
| 12 | Elect Donna F. Zarcone | For | For |
| 13 | Elect William D. Zollars | For | For |
| 14 | Advisory Vote on Executive Compensation | For | Against |
| | Vote Note: It is not clear that executive compensation sufficiently ties pay with performance in a manner that aligns executives with the long-term interests of the company. For example: • The short-term and long-term incentive programs are based on similar financial metrics which allows for a high level of pay-out (or lack thereof) for hitting similar targets rather than considering a variety of financial and operational metrics. • The company's short-term incentive program uses metrics to determine the size of bonus pool, but the compensation committee determines individual cash bonuses on a discretionary basis. • The company has not disclosed the performance objectives for its long-term compensation plan. • The use of only absolute metrics for the short-term incentive program may not be appropriate as it may reflect economic or industry factors beyond the control of executives. Performance conditions should include relative targets. | | |
| 15 | Ratification of Auditor | For | For |
| 16 | Shareholder Proposal Regarding Right to Act by Written Consent Vote Note: Taking action by written consent in place of a meeting is a means shareholders can use to raise important matters outside the normal annual meeting cycle. | Against | For |
| 17 | Shareholder Proposal Regarding Cyber Risk Report Vote Note: While we agree with the spirit of the proposal, we find the demands of the resolution to be overly specific, there are risks associated with disclosing some of this information. | Against | Abstain |
| 18 | Shareholder Proposal Regarding Gender Pay Equity Report Vote Note: Not only can inequitable compensation cause workplace dissatisfaction, lost productivity and high turnover, pay inequity can result in expensive and time-consuming lawsuits for the company. Moreover, issues related to gender pay equity can create significant competitive concerns, as those companies who are able to demonstrate and who have taken steps to narrow the gender pay gap are better situated to both retain and attract employees. | Against | For |

Cognizant Technology Solutions Corp. Voted — Country of Trade: United States — Annual Meeting Agenda 6/4/2019

| Proposal 1 | Proposal Text Elect Zein Abdalla | Mgmt Rec For | Vote Cast For |
|---------------|-------------------------------------|-----------------|-------------------------|
| 2 | Elect Maureen Breakiron-Evans | For | For |
| 3 | Elect Jonathan C. Chadwick | For | For |
| 4 | Elect John M. Dineen | For | For |
| 5 | Elect Francisco D'Souza | For | For |
| 6 | Elect John N. Fox, Jr. | For | For |
| 7 | Elect Brian Humphries | For | For |
| 8 | Elect John E. Klein | For | For |
| 9 | Elect Leo S. Mackay, Jr. | For | For |
| 10 | Elect Michael Patsalos-Fox | For | For |
| 11 | Elect Joseph M. Velli | For | For |

| 12 | Advisory Vote on Executive Compensation | For | Against |
|----|---|---------|---------|
| | Vote Note: It is not clear that executive compensation sufficiently ties pay with performance | | |
| | in a manner that aligns executives with the long-term interests of the company. For example: | | |
| | The company's long-term incentive program only uses two years of performance. Performance | | |
| | conditions should be measured over at least three consecutive years. | | |
| | The use of absolute metrics for incentive programs may not be appropriate as it may reflect | | |
| | economic or industry factors beyond the control of executives. Performance conditions should include relative targets. | | |
| | • The short-term and long-term incentive programs are based on similar financial metrics which allows | | |
| | for a high level of pay-out (or lack thereof) for hitting similar targets rather than considering a variety of financial and operational metrics. | | |
| 13 | Ratification of Auditor | For | For |
| 14 | Shareholder Proposal Regarding Political Contributions and Expenditures Report | Against | For |
| | Vote Note: Improved disclosure of political contributions and trade association spending and the company's related policies and practices could help with the evaluation of related risks | | |
| | and opportunities. | | |
| 15 | Shareholder Proposal Regarding Independent Chair | Against | For |
| | Vote Note: Having an independent chair can lead to a clearer separation of responsibility between the board and management, reduce conflicts related to executive compensation and succession planning and help with the recruitment of independent directors. An independent director may increase the diversity of information available to the board and promote an independent mindset in the other | | |
| | directors. The current Chair is independent; however, the company does not have a policy requiring the appointment of an independent chair, so adoption of this proposal would help ensure future Chairs | | |
| | are independent. | | |

Colgate-Palmolive Co. Voted — Country of Trade: United States — Annual Meeting Agenda 5/10/2019

| Proposal | Proposal Text | Mgmt Rec | Vote Ca |
|----------|---|----------|---------|
| 1 | Elect Charles A. Bancroft | For | For |
| 2 | Elect John P. Bilbrey | For | For |
| 3 | Elect John T. Cahill | For | For |
| 4 | Elect Ian M. Cook | For | For |
| 5 | Elect Lisa M. Edwards | For | For |
| 5 | Elect Helene D. Gayle | For | For |
| 7 | Elect C. Martin Harris | For | For |
| 3 | Elect Lorrie M. Norrington | For | For |
|) | Elect Michael B. Polk | For | For |
| 10 | Elect Stephen I. Sadove | For | For |
| 11 | Elect Noel R. Wallace | For | For |
| 12 | Ratification of Auditor | For | For |
| 13 | Advisory Vote on Executive Compensation Vote Note: It is not clear that executive compensation sufficiently ties pay with performance in a manner that aligns executives with the long-term interests of the company. For example: • The short-term and long-term incentive programs are based on similar financial metrics which allows for a high level of pay-out (or lack thereof) for hitting similar targets rather than considering a variety of financial and operational metrics. • The company has not disclosed the performance objectives for its 2018-2020 long-term compensation plan. | For | Against |
| 4 | Approval of the 2019 Incentive Compensation Plan Vote Note: We oppose the use of stock options to compensate directors. | For | Against |
| 5 | Shareholder Proposal Regarding Independent Board Chair Vote Note: Having an independent chair can lead to a clearer separation of responsibility between the board and management, reduce conflicts related to executive compensation and succession planning and help with the recruitment of independent directors. An independent director may increase the diversity of information available to the board and promote an independent mindset in the other directors. | Against | For |

Comcast Corp Voted — Country of Trade: United States — Annual Meeting Agenda 6/5/2019

| Proposal 1 | Proposal Text Election of Directors | Mgmt Rec | Vote Cast |
|---------------|--|------------|-----------------|
| | 1.1 Elect Kenneth J. Bacon 1.2 Elect Madeline S. Bell Vote Note: This director is affiliated as her son-in-law is a writer for content created by DreamWorks Animation, which the Company acquired in August 2016. In 2018, he received approximately \$189,000 in compensation. She is on the audit, governance and nominating committees. These committees should be 100% independent. | For For | For Withhold |

1.3 Elect Sheldon M. Bonovitz

.4 Elect Edward D. Breen

Vote Note: The above nominees served as members of the compensation committee during the past three fiscal years. There are significant concerns regarding the structure of the Company's incentive plans, particularly as all performance-based awards vest based upon achievement of annual performance goals under a single, absolute metric. Following the results of the 2014 advisory vote on executive compensation, the committee determined that its policies and decisions are consistent with the company's compensation philosophy and objectives. We believe the concerns regarding the company's pay practices and programs are severe enough to warrant withholding votes from all members compensation committee.

1.5 Elect Gerald L. Hassell

Vote Note: The above nominees served as members of the compensation committee during the past three fiscal years. There are significant concerns regarding the structure of the Company's incentive plans, particularly as all performance-based awards vest based upon achievement of annual performance goals under a single, absolute metric. Following the results of the 2014 advisory vote on executive compensation, the committee determined that its policies and decisions are consistent with the company's compensation philosophy and objectives. We believe the concerns regarding the company's pay practices and programs are severe enough to warrant withholding votes from all members compensation committee.

| 1.6 | Elect Jeffrey A. Honickman | For | For |
|-----|-----------------------------|-----|----------|
| 1.7 | Elect Maritza Gomez Montiel | For | For |
| 1.8 | Elect Asuka Nakahara | For | For |
| 1.9 | Elect David C. Novak | For | Withhold |

For

For

For

Against

Against

For

For

For

Withhold

Withhold

Vote Note: The above nominees served as members of the compensation committee during the past three fiscal years. There are significant concerns regarding the structure of the Company's incentive plans, particularly as all performance-based awards vest based upon achievement of annual performance goals under a single, absolute metric. Following the results of the 2014 advisory vote on executive compensation, the committee determined that its policies and decisions are consistent with the company's compensation philosophy and objectives. We believe the concerns regarding the company's pay practices and programs are severe enough to warrant withholding votes from all members compensation committee.

1.10 Elect Brian L. Roberts For For 2 Ratification of Auditor For For 3 Approval of the 2019 Omnibus Sharesave Plan For For 4 Advisory vote on executive compensation For Against

Vote Note: It is not clear that executive compensation sufficiently ties pay with performance in a manner that aligns executives with the long-term interests of the company. For example:

- The company's long-term incentive program uses less than three years of performance. Performance conditions should be measured over at least three consecutive years.
- The use of a single metric for the long-term incentive program may not be appropriate. Performance related compensation should be linked to a variety of specific objective measures of the company's operational and financial performance.
- The use of absolute metrics for incentive programs may not be appropriate as it may reflect economic or industry factors beyond the control of executives. Performance conditions should include relative targets.

5 Shareholder Proposal Regarding Independent Chair

Vote Note: Having an independent chair can lead to a clearer separation of responsibility between the board and management, reduce conflicts related to executive compensation and succession planning and help with the recruitment of independent directors. An independent director may increase the diversity of information available to the board and promote an independent mindset in the other directors.

6 Shareholder Proposal Regarding Lobbying Report

Vote Note: Improved disclosure of political contributions, lobbying expenditures and trade association spending and the company's related policies and practices could help with the evaluation of related risks and opportunities.

CVS Health Corp Voted — Country of Trade: United States — Annual Meeting Agenda 5/16/2019

| Proposal | Proposal Text | Mgmt Rec | Vote Cast |
|----------|-----------------------------|----------|-----------|
| 1 | Elect Fernando Aguirre | For | For |
| 2 | Elect Mark T. Bertolini | For | For |
| 3 | Elect Richard M. Bracken | For | For |
| 4 | Elect C. David Brown II | For | For |
| 5 | Elect Alecia A. DeCoudreaux | For | For |
| 6 | Elect Nancy-Ann M. DeParle | For | For |
| 7 | Elect David W. Dorman | For | For |
| 8 | Elect Roger N. Farah | For | For |
| 9 | Elect Anne M. Finucane | For | For |
| 10 | Elect Edward J. Ludwig | For | For |

| 11 | Elect Larry J. Merlo | For | For |
|----|--|---------|---------|
| 12 | Elect Jean-Pierre Millon | For | For |
| 13 | Elect Mary L. Schapiro | For | For |
| 14 | Elect Richard J. Swift | For | For |
| 15 | Elect William C. Weldon | For | For |
| 16 | Elect Tony L. White | For | For |
| 17 | Ratification of Auditor | For | For |
| 18 | Advisory Vote on Executive Compensation | For | Against |
| | Vote Note: It is not clear that executive compensation sufficiently ties pay with performance in a manner that aligns executives with the long-term interests of the company. For example: • The company has not disclosed the performance thresholds for its long-term compensation plan. • Threshold performance for the growth in shareholder value metric is 25th percentile versus peers which may not be sufficiently challenging. • The use of absolute metrics for the short-term incentive program may not be appropriate as it may reflect economic or industry factors beyond the control of executives. Performance conditions should include relative targets. | | |
| 19 | Shareholder Proposal Regarding Including Legal Costs in Executive Compensation Vote Note: Executives should not be insulated from instances of investigations, litigation, or enforcement action related to drug distribution for the purposes of executive compensation. As described in its most recent proxy statement, the Company currently excludes certain legal and compliance costs from its non-GAAP metrics for purposes of calculating executive compensation. | Against | For |

Danaher Corp. Voted — Country of Trade: United States — Annual Meeting Agenda 5/7/2019

| Proposal | Proposal Text | Mgmt Rec | Vote Cast |
|----------|--|----------|-----------|
| 1 | Elect Donald J. Ehrlich | For | For |
| 2 | Elect Linda P. Hefner Filler | For | For |
| 3 | Elect Thomas P. Joyce, Jr. | For | For |
| 4 | Elect Teri List-Stoll | For | For |
| 5 | Elect Walter G. Lohr, Jr. | For | For |
| 6 | Elect Mitchell P. Rales | For | Against |
| | Vote Note: This director nominee appears to have too many commitments to fulfill his duties as a director. He is the company's executive chair and sits on a total of three public company boards. | | |
| 7 | Elect Steven M. Rales | For | For |
| 8 | Elect John T. Schwieters | For | For |
| 9 | Elect Alan G. Spoon | For | Against |
| | Vote Note: This director nominee appears to have too many commitments to fulfill his duties as a director. He is sits on a total of five public company boards. | | |
| 10 | Elect Raymond C. Stevens | For | For |
| 11 | Elect Elias A. Zerhouni | For | For |
| 12 | Ratification of Auditor | For | For |
| 13 | Advisory Vote on Executive Compensation | For | Against |
| | Vote Note: It is not clear that executive compensation sufficiently ties pay with performance in a manner that aligns executives with the long-term interests of the company. For example: • The use of absolute metrics for the short-term incentive program may not be appropriate as it may reflect economic or industry factors beyond the control of executives. Performance conditions should include relative targets. • Threshold performance for the growth in shareholder value metric is 35th percentile versus a broad | | |
| 4.4 | index which may not be sufficiently challenging. | A | F |
| 14 | Shareholder Proposal Regarding Independent Board Chair Vote Note: Having an independent chair can lead to a clearer separation of responsibility between the board and management, reduce conflicts related to executive compensation and succession planning and help with the recruitment of independent directors. An independent director may increase the diversity of information available to the board and promote an independent mindset in the other directors. | Against | For |

Discovery Inc Voted – Country of Trade: United States – Annual Meeting Agenda 5/8/2019

| Proposal | Proposal Text | Mgmt Rec | Vote Cast |
|----------|-------------------------|----------|-----------|
| 1 | Election of Directors | | |
| | 1.1 Elect Paul A. Gould | For | Withhold |

Vote Note: This director was on the compensation committee during the past five fiscal years. At the Company's 2017 annual meeting, the Company's non-binding advisory resolution on executive compensation received support from approximately 69% of the votes cast. The members of the compensation and benefits committee have the responsibility of reviewing all aspects of the compensation program for the Company's executive officers. It appears that this committee may not be effectively serving shareholders in this regard. Given that the say-on-pay proposal received significant opposition from shareholders, we believe the compensation committee should have taken additional steps to identify and address shareholder concerns. Given the absence of a «say on pay» vote, we believe it is appropriate to hold the members of the compensation committee responsible for their insufficient response to the 2017 annual meeting vote results. The other members of this committee are either not standing for election this year, or joined the committee in 2018.

Withhold Elect Kenneth W. Lowe For Vote Note: This director is not independent because he is the former CEO of Scripps Networks Interactive, which was acquired by the Company in 2018. He is on the compensation committee which should be 100% independent. 1.3 Elect Daniel E. Sanchez For For 2 Ratification of Auditor For For 3 Shareholder Proposal Regarding Simple Majority Vote Against Against

Against

Against

F5 Networks, Inc. Voted — Country of Trade: United States — Annual Meeting Agenda 3/14/2019

Shareholder Proposal Regarding Disclosure of Board Qualifications

| Proposal | Proposal Text | Mgmt Rec | Vote Cast |
|----------|--|----------|-----------|
| 1 | Elect A. Gary Ames | For | For |
| 2 | Elect Sandra E. Bergeron | For | For |
| 3 | Elect Deborah L. Bevier | For | For |
| 4 | Elect Michel Combes | For | For |
| 5 | Elect Michael Dreyer | For | For |
| 6 | Elect Alan J. Higginson | For | For |
| 7 | Elect Peter Klein | For | For |
| 8 | Elect Francois Lochoh-Donou | For | For |
| 9 | Elect John McAdam | For | For |
| 10 | Elect Nikhil Mehta | For | For |
| 11 | Elect Marie Myers | For | For |
| 12 | Amendment to the 2014 Incentive Plan | For | Against |
| | Vote Note: We oppose the use of stock options to compensate directors. | | |
| 13 | Amendment to the 2011 Employee Stock Purchase Plan | For | For |
| 14 | Ratification of Auditor | For | For |
| 15 | Advisory Vote on Executive Compensation | For | Against |
| | Vote Note: It is not clear that executive compensation sufficiently ties pay with performance in a manner that aligns executives with the long-term interests of the company. For example: | | |

- The short-term and long-term incentive programs are based on similar financial metrics which allows for a high level of pay-out (or lack thereof) for hitting similar targets rather than considering a variety of financial and operational metrics.
- The use of absolute metrics for the short-term incentive program may not be appropriate as it may reflect economic or industry factors beyond the control of executives. Performance conditions should include relative targets.
- The company's long-term incentive program uses performance metrics measured over less than three years.
- Threshold performance for the growth in shareholder value metric is 25th percentile versus peers which may not be sufficiently challenging.

Fortive Corp Voted — Country of Trade: United States — Annual Meeting Agenda 6/4/2019

| Proposal 1 | Proposal Text Elect Mitchell P. Rales | Mgmt Rec For | Vote Cast Against |
|---------------|---|-----------------|-----------------------------|
| | Vote Note: This director nominee appears to have too many commitments to fulfill his duties as a director. He is a public company executive and sits on a total of three public company boards. | | |
| 2 | Elect Steven M. Rales | For | For |
| 3 | Elect Jeannine Sargent | For | For |
| 4 | Elect Alan G. Spoon Vote Note: This director nominee appears to have too many commitments to fulfill his duties as a director. He sits on a total of five public company boards. | For | Against |
| 5 | Ratification of Auditor | For | For |

6 Advisory Vote on Executive Compensation

Vote Note: It is not clear that executive compensation sufficiently ties pay with performance in a manner that aligns executives with the long-term interests of the company. For example:

• The use of absolute metrics for the short-term incentive program may not be appropriate as it may reflect economic or industry factors beyond the control of executives. Performance conditions should include relative targets.

For

For

Against

For

- Threshold performance for the growth in shareholder value metric is 35th percentile versus peers which may not be sufficiently challenging.
- The short-term and long-term incentive programs are based on similar financial metrics which allows for a high level of pay-out (or lack thereof) for hitting similar targets rather than considering a variety of financial and operational metrics.

7 Elimination of Supermajority Requirement

Vote Note: Empirical evidence suggests that certain entrenchment provisions, including supermajority vote standards, are negatively correlated with firm value. Supermajority vote requirements can act as impediments to takeover proposals and impede shareholders' ability to approve ballot items that are in their interests. In addition, a supermajority vote requirement can enable a small group of shareholders to overrule the will of the majority shareholders.

Gilead Sciences, Inc. Voted – Country of Trade: United States – Annual Meeting Agenda 5/8/2019

| Proposal | Proposal Text | Mgmt Rec | Vote Cast |
|----------|---|----------|-----------|
| 1 | Elect Jacqueline K. Barton | For | For |
| 2 | Elect John F. Cogan | For | For |
| 3 | Elect Kelly A. Kramer | For | For |
| 4 | Elect Kevin E. Lofton | For | For |
| 5 | Elect Harish M. Manwani | For | For |
| 6 | Elect Daniel O'Day | For | For |
| 7 | Elect Richard J. Whitley | For | For |
| 8 | Elect Gayle E. Wilson | For | For |
| 9 | Elect Per Wold-Olsen | For | For |
| 10 | Ratification of Auditor | For | For |
| 11 | Permit Shareholders to Act by Written Consent | For | For |
| 12 | Advisory Vote on Executive Compensation | For | Against |
| | Vote Note: It is not clear that executive compensation sufficiently ties pay with performance in a manner that aligns executives with the long-term interests of the company. For example: • The company's long-term incentive program is evaluated over three one-year periods. Performance conditions should be measured over at least three consecutive years. • The company has not disclosed the performance objectives for its short-term compensation plan. • Threshold performance for the growth in shareholder value metric is 20 th percentile versus peers which may not be sufficiently challenging. | | |
| 13 | Shareholder Proposal Regarding Independent Chair Vote Note: Having an independent chair can lead to a clearer separation of responsibility between the board and management, reduce conflicts related to executive compensation and succession planning and help with the recruitment of independent directors. An independent director may increase the diversity of information available to the board and promote an independent mindset in the other directors. | Against | For |
| 14 | Shareholder Proposal Regarding Report on Tax Savings as a Result of the Tax Cut and Jobs Act | Against | Against |

Honeywell International Inc. Voted — Country of Trade: United States — Annual Meeting Agenda 4/29/2019

| Proposal 1 | Proposal Text Elect Darius Adamczyk | Mgmt Rec For | Vote Cast For |
|---------------|--|-----------------|-------------------------|
| 2 | Elect Duncan B. Angove | For | For |
| 3 | Elect William S. Ayer | For | For |
| 4 | Elect Kevin Burke | For | For |
| 5 | Elect Jaime Chico Pardo | For | For |
| 6 | Elect D. Scott Davis | For | For |
| 7 | Elect Linnet F. Deily | For | For |
| 8 | Elect Judd Gregg | For | For |
| 9 | Elect Clive Hollick | For | For |
| 10 | Elect Grace D. Lieblein | For | For |
| 11 | Elect George Paz | For | For |
| 12 | Elect Robin L. Washington | For | For |

| 13 | Advisory Vote on Executive Compensation | For | Against |
|----|---|---------|---------|
| | Vote Note: It is not clear that executive compensation sufficiently ties pay with performance in a manner that aligns executives with the long-term interests of the company. For example: | | |
| | The use of absolute metrics for the short-term incentive program may not be appropriate as it may | | |
| | reflect economic or industry factors beyond the control of executives. Performance conditions should | | |
| | include relative targets. | | |
| | • Allowing tax gross-up payments does not serve to link pay with performance in a manner that aligns | | |
| | executives with the long-term interests of the company. | | |
| 14 | Ratification of Auditor | For | For |
| 15 | Shareholder Proposal Regarding Right to Act By Written Consent | Against | For |
| | Vote Note: Taking action by written consent in place of a meeting is a means shareholders can use to | | |
| | raise important matters outside the normal annual meeting cycle. | | |
| 16 | Shareholder Proposal Regarding Lobbying Report | Against | For |
| | Vote Note: Improved disclosure of political contributions, lobbying expenditures and trade association spending and the company's related policies and practices could help with the evaluation of related risks and opportunities. | | |
| | | | |

Johnson & Johnson Voted — Country of Trade: United States — Annual Meeting Agenda 4/25/2019

| Proposal | Proposal Text | Mgmt Rec | Vote Cast |
|----------|--|----------|-----------|
| 1 | Elect Mary C. Beckerle | For | For |
| 2 | Elect D. Scott Davis | For | For |
| 3 | Elect Ian E.L. Davis | For | For |
| 4 | Elect Jennifer A. Doudna | For | For |
| 5 | Elect Alex Gorsky | For | For |
| 6 | Elect Marillyn A. Hewson | For | For |
| 7 | Elect Mark B. McClellan | For | For |
| 8 | Elect Anne M. Mulcahy | For | For |
| 9 | Elect William D. Perez | For | For |
| 10 | Elect Charles Prince | For | Against |
| | Vote Note: Nominee Prince serves as the chair of the Company's regulatory compliance committee. The Company has faced significant litigation and controversy in the past year, especially regarding the Company's signature talcum powder products. Considering the expansion of lawsuits and mounting controversy regarding the safety of the Company's talcum body powders, we believe shareholders should hold the chair of the regulatory compliance committee, Mr. Prince, responsible for the board and committee's inadequate response to this issue. | | |
| 11 | Elect A. Eugene Washington | For | For |
| 12 | Elect Ronald A. Williams | For | For |
| 13 | Advisory Vote on Executive Compensation Vote Note: It is not clear that executive compensation sufficiently ties pay with performance in a manner that aligns executives with the long-term interests of the company. For example: • The company's short-term incentive program does not use any performance metrics. Rather, the compensation committee determines annual; cash bonuses on a purely discretionary basis. • The company has not disclosed most of the performance objectives for its long-term compensation plan. • Part of the company's long-term incentive program only uses less than three years of performance. Performance conditions should be measured over at least three consecutive years. | For | Against |
| 14 | Ratification of Auditor | For | For |
| 15 | Shareholder Proposal Regarding Recoupment Report Vote Note: Given the size of the various settlements the Company has entered into, we believe that increased disclosure of how the Company is enforcing its recoupment policies would benefit shareholders. The Company has established a clawback policy but the policy is only meaningful and effective when used. Increased disclosure on how the Company is enforcing its policy would benefit shareholders and the proposal is crafted to ensure that the Company is not required to disclose sensitive or competitively harmful information. | Against | For |
| 16 | Shareholder Proposal Regarding Report on Linking Executive Compensation to Drug Pricing Vote Note: A key risk facing pharmaceutical companies is a potential backlash against high drug prices. The Company uses sales growth and earnings per share («EPS») as metrics for the annual bonus and EPS as a metric for performance share awards, although increasing revenues, either by increasing volumes or raising prices (or some combination), can boost both sales growth and earnings. Excessive dependence on drug price increases is a risky and unsustainable strategy, especially when price hikes drive large senior executive payouts. | Against | For |

| Proposal | Proposal Text | Mgmt Rec | Vote Cast |
|----------|---|----------|-----------|
| 1 | Elect Linda B. Bammann | For | For |
| 2 | Elect James A. Bell | For | For |
| 3 | Elect Stephen B. Burke | For | For |
| 4 | Elect Todd A. Combs | For | For |
| 5 | Elect James S. Crown | For | For |
| 6 | Elect James Dimon | For | For |
| 7 | Elect Timothy P. Flynn | For | For |
| 8 | Elect Mellody Hobson | For | For |
| 9 | Elect Laban P. Jackson, Jr. | For | For |
| 10 | Elect Michael A. Neal | For | For |
| 11 | Elect Lee R. Raymond | For | For |
| 12 | Advisory Vote on Executive Compensation | For | Against |
| | Vote Note: It is not clear that executive compensation sufficiently ties pay with performance in a manner that aligns executives with the long-term interests of the company. For example: • Executives are eligible to receive unlimited short-term incentive payments. This runs contrary to best practices and shareholder interests. • The company's short-term incentive program does not use any performance metrics. The compensation committee determines cash bonuses on a purely discretionary basis. • The use of a single metric for the long-term incentive program may not be appropriate. Performance related compensation should be linked to a variety of specific objective measures of the company's operational and financial performance. • Threshold performance for the growth in shareholder value metric is 4th quartile versus peers which may not be sufficiently challenging. • The company's long-term incentive program is evaluated over three one-year periods. Performance conditions should be measured over at least three consecutive years. | | |
| 13 | Ratification of Auditor | For | For |
| 14 | Shareholder Proposal Regarding Median Gender Pay Equity Report Vote Note: Not only can inequitable compensation cause workplace dissatisfaction, lost productivity and high turnover, pay inequity can result in expensive and time-consuming lawsuits for the company. Moreover, issues related to gender pay equity can create significant competitive concerns, as those companies who are able to demonstrate and who have taken steps to narrow the gender pay gap are better situated to both retain and attract employees. Statistically adjusted pay information fails to consider how discrimination affects differences in opportunity. Median pay gap disclosures address the structural bias that affects the jobs women hold, particularly when men hold most high paying jobs in a company. | Against | For |
| 15 | Shareholder Proposal Regarding Proxy Access Bylaw Amendment Vote Note: While we agree with the spirit of the proposal, and we agree that lowering the re-nominating threshold may be reasonable, we do not agree with completely removing the re-nomination threshold. | Against | Abstain |
| 16 | Shareholder Proposal Regarding Cumulative Voting | Against | Against |
| | | | |

Lowe`s Cos., Inc. Voted — Country of Trade: United States — Annual Meeting Agenda 5/31/2019

| Proposal | Proposal Tex | t | Mgmt Rec | Vote Cast |
|----------|---------------|--|----------|-----------|
| 1 | Election of D | irectors | | |
| | 1.1 Elect Ra | alph Alvarez | For | For |
| | 1.2 Elect Da | avid H. Batchelder | For | For |
| | 1.3 Elect Ai | ngela F. Braly | For | For |
| | 1.4 Elect Sa | andra B. Cochran | For | Withhold |
| | | director nominee appears to have too many commitments to fulfill her duties as a public company executive and sits on a total of three public company boards. | | |
| | 1.5 Elect La | aurie Z. Douglas | For | For |
| | 1.6 Elect Ri | ichard W. Dreiling | For | For |
| | 1.7 Elect M | arvin R. Ellison | For | For |
| | 1.8 Elect Ja | ames H. Morgan | For | For |
| | 1.9 Elect Br | rian C. Rogers | For | For |
| | 1.10 Elect E | Bertram L. Scott | For | For |
| | 1.11 Elect L | isa W. Wardell | For | For |
| | 1.12 Elect E | ric C. Wiseman | For | For |

2 Advisory Vote on Executive Compensation

Vote Note: It is not clear that executive compensation sufficiently ties pay with performance in a manner that aligns executives with the long-term interests of the company. For example:

- The company has not provided all of the performance objectives for its short or long-term compensation plans.
- Threshold performance for the growth in shareholder value metric is 20% below the index which may not be sufficiently challenging.
- The use of only absolute metrics for the short-term incentive program may not be appropriate as it may reflect economic or industry factors beyond the control of executives. Performance conditions should include relative targets.

3 Ratification of Auditor

For For

Against

For

Mondelez International Inc. Voted — Country of Trade: United States — Annual Meeting Agenda 5/15/2019

| Proposal | Proposal Text | Mgmt Rec | Vote Cast |
|----------|---|----------|-----------|
| 1 | Elect Lewis W.K. Booth | For | For |
| 2 | Elect Charles E. Bunch | For | For |
| 3 | Elect Debra A. Crew | For | For |
| 4 | Elect Lois D. Juliber | For | For |
| 5 | Elect Mark D. Ketchum | For | For |
| 6 | Elect Peter W. May | For | For |
| 7 | Elect Jorge S. Mesquita | For | For |
| 8 | Elect Joseph Neubauer | For | For |
| 9 | Elect Fredric G. Reynolds | For | For |
| 10 | Elect Christiana Smith Shi | For | For |
| 11 | Elect Patrick T. Siewert | For | For |
| 12 | Elect Jean-François M. L. van Boxmeer | For | For |
| | Vote Note: Nominee van Boxmeer serves as chair of the executive board and CEO of Heineken N.V., a public company, while serving on the board of the Company and the shareholders' committee of Henkel AG & Co. KGaA («Henkel»). However, Henkel's corporate form is such that the role of the shareholders' committee is substantially less than that of a typical supervisory board in Germany. | | |
| 13 | Elect Dirk Van de Put | For | For |
| 14 | Advisory Vote on Executive Compensation | For | Against |
| | Vote Note: It is not clear that executive compensation sufficiently ties pay with performance in a manner that aligns executives with the long-term interests of the company. For example: • The short-term and long-term incentive programs are based on similar financial metrics which allows for a high level of pay-out (or lack thereof) for hitting similar targets rather than considering a variety of financial and operational metrics. • The company has not disclosed the performance objectives for some metrics under its long-term compensation plan. • Threshold performance for the growth in shareholder value metric is 25th percentile versus peers which may not be sufficiently challenging. • The use of only absolute metrics for the short-term incentive program may not be appropriate as it may reflect economic or industry factors beyond the control of executives. Performance conditions should include relative targets. | | |
| 15 | Ratification of Auditor | For | For |
| 16 | Shareholder Proposal Regarding Deforestation in Cocoa Supply Chain Vote Note: The Company uses cocoa in a number of its brand products, and its subsidiary Cadbury is the second largest confectionery company in the world. Although the company has an action plan which commits to map 100% of the farms in its supply chain by year-end 2019 and plant over 2.7 million trees by 2020, the company does not appear to report annually on how it is curtailing the impact on the Earth's climate caused by deforestation in Modelez' cocoa supply chain. | Against | For |
| 17 | Shareholder Proposal Regarding Employee Salary Considerations When Setting Executive Compensation Vote Note: To ensure that the Company's CEO compensation is reasonable relative to the Company's overall employee pay philosophy and structure, the compensation committee should consider the pay grades and/or salary ranges of Company employees when setting CEO compensation target amounts. | Against | For |

Moody`s Corp. Voted — Country of Trade: United States — Annual Meeting Agenda 4/16/2019

| 3 Elect Therese Esperdy For For 4 Elect Vincent A. Forlenza For For 5 Elect Kathryn M. Hill For For For | Proposal 1 2 3 4 5 | Elect Vincent A. Forlenza | For | For |
|---|--------------------|---------------------------|-----|-----|
|---|--------------------|---------------------------|-----|-----|

| 6 | Elect Raymond W. McDaniel, Jr. | For | For |
|----|---|-----|---------|
| 7 | Elect Henry A. McKinnell, Jr. | For | For |
| 8 | Elect Leslie F. Seidman | For | For |
| 9 | Elect Bruce Van Saun | For | For |
| 10 | Elect Gerrit Zalm | For | For |
| 11 | Ratification of Auditor | For | For |
| 12 | Advisory Vote on Executive Compensation | For | Against |

Vote Note: It is not clear that executive compensation sufficiently ties pay with performance in a manner that aligns executives with the long-term interests of the company. For example:

- The use of absolute metrics for incentive programs may not be appropriate as it may reflect economic or industry factors beyond the control of executives. Performance conditions should include relative targets.
- The company has failed to disclose performance targets for its long-term incentive plan.

Nielsen Holdings plc Voted — Country of Trade: United States — Annual Meeting Agenda 5/21/2019

| Proposal | Proposal Text | Mgmt Rec | Vote Cast |
|----------|---|----------|-----------|
| 1 | Elect James A. Attwood, Jr. | For | For |
| 2 | Elect Guerrino De Luca | For | For |
| 3 | Elect Karen M. Hoguet | For | For |
| 4 | Elect David W. Kenny | For | For |
| 5 | Elect Harish Manwani | For | For |
| 6 | Elect Robert C. Pozen | For | For |
| 7 | Elect David Rawlinson | For | For |
| 8 | Elect Javier G. Teruel | For | For |
| 9 | Elect Lauren Zalaznick | For | For |
| 10 | Ratification of Auditor | For | For |
| 11 | Appointment of Statutory Auditor | For | For |
| 12 | Authority to Set Auditor's Fees | For | For |
| 13 | Advisory Vote on Executive Compensation | For | Against |
| | Vote Note: It is not clear that executive compensation sufficiently ties pay with performance in a manner that aligns executives with the long-term interests of the company. For example: • Threshold performance for the growth in shareholder value metric is 30th percentile versus peers which may not be sufficiently challenging. • The company's short-term incentive program uses metrics to determine the size of bonus pool, but the compensation committee determines individual cash bonuses on a discretionary basis. • Executives were granted supplemental awards outside the normal incentive plan, which may undermine the regular plan or indicate it is poorly designed. | | |
| 14 | Remuneration Report (Advisory) Vote Note: It is not clear that executive compensation sufficiently ties pay with performance in a manner that aligns executives with the long-term interests of the company. For example: • Threshold performance for the growth in shareholder value metric is 30th percentile versus peers which may not be sufficiently challenging. • The company's short-term incentive program uses metrics to determine the size of bonus pool, but the compensation committee determines individual cash bonuses on a discretionary basis. • Executives were granted supplemental awards outside the normal incentive plan, which may undermine the regular plan or indicate it is poorly designed. | For | Against |
| 15 | Approval of 2019 Stock Incentive Plan Vote Note: We oppose the use of stock options to compensate directors. | For | Against |

Pepsico Inc. Voted — Country of Trade: United States — Annual Meeting Agenda 5/1/2019

| Proposal 1 | Proposal Text Elect Shona L. Brown | Mgmt Rec For | Vote Cast For |
|---------------|---------------------------------------|-----------------|-------------------------|
| 2 | Elect Cesar Conde | For | For |
| 3 | Elect Ian M. Cook | For | For |
| 4 | Elect Dina Dublon | For | For |
| 5 | Elect Richard W. Fisher | For | For |
| 6 | Elect Michelle D. Gass | For | For |
| 7 | Elect William R. Johnson | For | For |
| 8 | Elect Ramon L. Laguarta | For | For |
| 9 | Elect David C. Page | For | For |

| 10 | Elect Robert C. Pohlad Vote Note: This director is not independent because he is the former chair and CEO of PepsiAmericas, Inc., until its acquisition by the Company in 2010, and he is on the governance and nominating committees, which should be 100% independent. | For | Against |
|----|---|---------|---------|
| 11 | Elect Daniel L. Vasella | For | For |
| 12 | Elect Darren Walker | For | For |
| 13 | Elect Alberto Weisser | For | For |
| 14 | Ratification of Auditor | For | For |
| 15 | Advisory Vote on Executive Compensation Vote Note: It is not clear that executive compensation sufficiently ties pay with performance in a manner that aligns executives with the long-term interests of the company. For example: • The company has not disclosed the performance objectives for its long-term compensation plan. • The short-term and long-term incentive programs are based on similar financial metrics which allows for a high level of pay-out (or lack thereof) for hitting similar targets rather than considering a variety of financial and operational metrics. • Threshold performance for the growth in shareholder value metric is 25th percentile versus peers which may not be sufficiently challenging. | For | Against |
| 16 | Elimination of Supermajority Requirement | For | For |
| 17 | Shareholder Proposal Regarding Independent Chair | Against | For |
| | Vote Note: Having an independent chair can lead to a clearer separation of responsibility between the board and management, reduce conflicts related to executive compensation and succession planning and help with the recruitment of independent directors. An independent director may increase the diversity of information available to the board and promote an independent mindset in the other directors. | | |
| 18 | Shareholder Proposal Regarding Pesticide Reporting Vote Note: The Company's Quaker Oats brand has been in the media spotlight recently in connection with the controversial pesticide ingredient glyphosate. Glyphosate is classified as a probable human carcinogen by the World Health Organization ("WHO") and a known carcinogen by California. Research links glyphosate-based herbicides to chronic toxic effects, such as kidney damage and endocrine disruption, even at low levels. Use of glyphosate as a desiccant has become especially commonplace for cereal grains like oats, which leads to higher levels of glyphosate residue on final consumer products. The Company's reliance on glyphosate-based weed-killers and other toxic chemicals creates legal, reputational, and regulatory risks for the Company. | Against | For |

PNC Financial Services Group Voted — Country of Trade: United States — Annual Meeting Agenda 4/23/2019

| Proposal | Proposal Text | Mgmt Rec | Vote Cast |
|----------|---|----------|-----------|
| 1 | Elect Joseph Alvarado | For | For |
| 2 | Elect Charles E. Bunch | For | For |
| 3 | Elect Debra A. Cafaro | For | For |
| 4 | Elect Marjorie Rodgers Cheshire | For | For |
| 5 | Elect William S. Demchak | For | For |
| 5 | Elect Andrew T. Feldstein | For | For |
| 7 | Elect Richard J. Harshman | For | Against |
| | Vote Note: This director nominee appears to have too many commitments to fulfill his duties as a director. He is a public company executive and serves on a total of three public company boards. | | |
| 3 | Elect Daniel R. Hesse | For | For |
|) | Elect Richard B. Kelson | For | For |
| 10 | Elect Linda R. Medler | For | For |
| 11 | Elect Martin Pfinsgraff | For | For |
| 12 | Elect Toni Townes-Whitley | For | For |
| 13 | Elect Michael J. Ward | For | For |
| 14 | Ratification of Auditor | For | For |
| 15 | Advisory Vote on Executive Compensation | For | Against |
| | Vote Note: It is not clear that executive compensation sufficiently ties pay with performance in a manner that aligns executives with the long-term interests of the company. For example: | | |
| | Certain awards under the long-term incentive plan are based on one-year performance results. Performance and divine about the processor of the performance results. | | |
| | Performance conditions should be measured over at least three consecutive years. • The company's short-term incentive program does not use any performance metrics. Rather, the | | |
| | compensation committee determines annual; cash bonuses on a purely discretionary basis. | | |
| | • Threshold performance for the growth in shareholder value metric is 25th percentile which may not | | |
| | be sufficiently challenging. | | |

| Proposal | Proposal Text | Mgmt Rec | Vote Cast |
|----------|--|----------|-----------|
| 1 | Elect John F. Brock | For | For |
| 2 | Elect Richard D. Fain | For | For |
| 3 | Elect Stephen R. Howe, Jr | For | Against |
| | Vote Note: This director nominee is not independent because he is serving as U.S. chair and managing partner and Americas Area managing partners of Ernst & Young and was a member of Ernst & Young's global executive board until his retirement on December 1, 2018. Ernst & Young provided consulting services to the Company totaling approximately \$52 million from January 1, 2018 to December 1, 2018, the date of his retirement, and approximately \$18 million for fiscal year 2017. He is on the audit committee, which should be 100% independent. | | |
| 4 | Elect William L. Kimsey | For | For |
| 5 | Elect Maritza Gomez Montiel | For | For |
| 6 | Elect Ann S. Moore | For | For |
| 7 | Elect Eyal M. Ofer | For | For |
| 8 | Elect Thomas J. Pritzker | For | For |
| 9 | Elect William K. Reilly | For | For |
| 10 | Elect Vagn Sørensen | For | For |
| 11 | Elect Donald Thompson | For | For |
| 12 | Elect Arne Alexander Wilhelmsen | For | For |
| 13 | Advisory Vote on Executive Compensation | For | Against |
| | Vote Note: It is not clear that executive compensation sufficiently ties pay with performance in a manner that aligns executives with the long-term interests of the company. For example: • The use of only absolute metrics for the incentive programs may not be appropriate as it may reflect economic or industry factors beyond the control of executives. Performance conditions should include relative targets. • The company's long-term incentive program measures performance over less than three years. Performance conditions should be measured over at least three consecutive years. • The company has not disclosed all of the performance thresholds for its short-term compensation plan. • The Company's short- and long-term incentive arrangements are based on similar metrics, which allows for a high level of pay-out (or lack thereof) for hitting similar targets. | | |
| 14 | Ratification of Auditor Vote Note: The non-audit-related fees are 28% of the total fees paid to the auditor. We believe that non-audit-related work could have been performed by a separate auditor so as to not compromise the independence of the auditor and the integrity of the Company's financial statements. | For | Against |
| 15 | Shareholder Proposal Regarding Political Contributions and Expenditures Report Vote Note: Improved disclosure of political contributions and trade association spending and the company's related policies and practices could help with the evaluation of related risks and opportunities. | Against | For |

Schlumberger Ltd. Voted — Country of Trade: United States — Annual Meeting Agenda 4/3/2019

| Proposal | Proposal Text | Mgmt Rec | Vote Cast |
|----------|--|----------|-----------|
| 1 | Elect Peter L.S. Currie | For | For |
| 2 | Elect Miguel M. Galuccio | For | For |
| 3 | Elect Paal Kibsgaard | For | For |
| 4 | Elect Nikolay Kudryavtsev | For | For |
| 5 | Elect Tatyana A. Mitrova | For | For |
| 6 | Elect Indra K. Nooyi | For | For |
| 7 | Elect Lubna S. Olayan | For | For |
| 8 | Elect Mark G. Papa | For | For |
| 9 | Elect Leo Rafael Reif | For | For |
| 10 | Elect Henri Seydoux | For | For |
| 11 | Advisory Vote on Executive Compensation Vote Note: It is not clear that executive compensation sufficiently ties pay with performance in a manner that aligns executives with the long-term interests of the company. For example: • Some of the performance-based awards granted under the company's long-term incentive program only use two years of performance. Performance conditions should be measured over at least three consecutive years. • Threshold performance for ROCE is 600 bps below peer group average which may not be sufficiently challenging. | For | Against |
| 12 | Approval of Financial Statements/Dividends | For | For |

| 13 | Ratification of Auditor | For | For |
|----|--|-----|-----|
| 14 | Amendment to the 2004 Stock and Deferral Plan for Non-Employee Directors | For | For |

State Street Corp. Voted — Country of Trade: United States — Annual Meeting Agenda 5/15/2019

| Proposal | Proposal Text | Mgmt Rec | Vote Cast |
|----------|---|----------|-----------|
| 1 | Elect Kennett F. Burnes | For | For |
| 2 | Elect Patrick de Saint-Aignan | For | For |
| 3 | Elect Lynn A. Dugle | For | For |
| 4 | Elect Amelia C. Fawcett | For | For |
| 5 | Elect William C. Freda | For | For |
| 6 | Elect Joseph L. Hooley | For | For |
| 7 | Elect Sara Mathew | For | For |
| 8 | Elect William L. Meaney | For | For |
| 9 | Elect Ronald. P. O'Hanley | For | For |
| 10 | Elect Sean O'Sullivan | For | For |
| 11 | Elect Richard P. Sergel | For | For |
| 12 | Elect Gregory L. Summe | For | For |
| 13 | Advisory Vote on Executive Compensation | For | Against |
| | Vote Note: It is not clear that executive compensation sufficiently ties pay with performance | | |
| | in a manner that aligns executives with the long-term interests of the company. For example: | | |
| | The company's short-term incentive program does not use any performance metrics for individual compensation. | | |
| | The use of absolute metrics for incentive programs may not be appropriate as it may reflect | | |
| | economic or industry factors beyond the control of executives. Performance conditions should include | | |
| | relative targets. | | |
| | The company granted NEOs discretionary awards outside of its normal incentive plans of approx. \$2 M each. | | |
| 14 | Ratification of Auditor | For | For |

Stryker Corp. Voted — Country of Trade: United States — Annual Meeting Agenda 5/1/2019

| Proposal | Proposal Text | Mgmt Rec | Vote Cast |
|----------|--|----------|-----------|
| 1 | Elect Mary K. Brainerd | For | For |
| 2 | Elect Srikant M. Datar | For | For |
| 3 | Elect Roch Doliveux | For | For |
| 4 | Elect Louise L. Francesconi | For | For |
| 5 | Elect Allan C. Golston | For | For |
| 6 | Elect Kevin A. Lobo | For | For |
| 7 | Elect Sherilyn S. McCoy | For | For |
| 8 | Elect Andrew K. Silvernail | For | Against |
| | Vote Note: This director is not independent because he is the Chair and CEO of IDEX Corp. In 2018 the Company purchased equipment and components used in the development and manufacturing of products at an aggregate cost of \$1,777,000. He is the chair of the audit committee, which should be 100% independent. | | |
| 9 | Elect Ronda E. Stryker | For | Against |
| | Vote Note: This director is not independent because she is the granddaughter of the Company's founder and daughter of the former president (until July 1976) of the Company. And her husband is 100% owner of Greenleaf Hospitality, which received \$819,000 from the Company for functions and meetings in fiscal year 2018. She is on the governance and nominating committees, which should be 100% independent. | | |
| 10 | Elect Rajeev Suri | For | For |
| 11 | Ratification of Auditor | For | Against |
| | Vote Note: The non-audit-related fees are 47.6% of the total fees paid to the auditor. We believe that non-audit-related work could have been performed by a separate auditor so as to not compromise the independence of the auditor and the integrity of the Company's financial statements. | | |
| 12 | Advisory Vote on Executive Compensation | For | Against |
| | Vote Note: It is not clear that executive compensation sufficiently ties pay with performance in a manner that aligns executives with the long-term interests of the company. For example: • The company has not disclosed the performance objectives for its long-term compensation plan. • The short-term and long-term incentive programs are based on similar financial metrics which allows for a high level of pay-out (or lack thereof) for hitting similar targets rather than considering a variety of financial and operational metrics. | | |

| Proposal | Proposal Text | Mgmt Rec | Vote Cast |
|----------|---|----------|-----------|
| 1 | Elect Marc N. Casper | For | For |
| 2 | Elect Nelson J. Chai | For | For |
| 3 | Elect C. Martin Harris | For | For |
| 4 | Elect Tyler Jacks | For | For |
| 5 | Elect Judy C. Lewent | For | For |
| 6 | Elect Thomas J. Lynch | For | For |
| 7 | Elect Jim P. Manzi | For | For |
| 8 | Elect James C. Mullen | For | For |
| 9 | Elect Lars Rebien Sørensen | For | For |
| 10 | Elect Scott M. Sperling | For | For |
| 11 | Elect Elaine S. Ullian | For | For |
| 12 | Elect Dion J. Weisler | For | For |
| 13 | Advisory Vote on Executive Compensation | For | Against |
| | Vote Note: It is not clear that executive compensation sufficiently ties pay with performance in a manner that aligns executives with the long-term interests of the company. For example: • The short-term and long-term incentive programs are based on similar financial metrics which allows for a high level of pay-out (or lack thereof) for hitting similar targets rather than considering a variety of financial and operational metrics. • A portion of the company's long-term incentive program only uses one year of performance. Performance conditions should be measured over at least three consecutive years. • The use of absolute metrics for the incentive programs may not be appropriate as it may reflect economic or industry factors beyond the control of executives. Performance conditions should include relative targets. | | |
| 14 | Ratification of Auditor Vote Note: The non-audit-related fees are 33.7% of the total fees paid to the auditor. We believe that non-audit-related work could have been performed by a separate auditor so as to not compromise the independence of the auditor and the integrity of the Company's financial statements. | For | Against |

TJX Companies, Inc. Voted – Country of Trade: United States – Annual Meeting Agenda 6/4/2019

| Proposal | Proposal Text | Mgmt Rec | Vote Cast |
|----------|--|----------|-----------|
| 1 | Elect Zein Abdalla | For | For |
| 2 | Elect Alan M. Bennett | For | For |
| 3 | Elect Rosemary T. Berkery | For | For |
| 4 | Elect David T. Ching | For | For |
| 5 | Elect Ernie Herrman | For | For |
| 6 | Elect Michael F. Hines | For | For |
| 7 | Elect Amy B. Lane | For | For |
| 8 | Elect Carol Meyrowitz | For | For |
| 9 | Elect Jackwyn L. Nemerov | For | For |
| 10 | Elect John F. O'Brien | For | For |
| 11 | Elect Willow B. Shire | For | For |
| 12 | Ratification of Auditor | For | For |
| 13 | Advisory Vote on Executive Compensation Vote Note: It is not clear that executive compensation sufficiently ties pay with performance in a manner that aligns executives with the long-term interests of the company. For example: • The short-term and long-term incentive programs are based on similar financial metrics which allows for a high level of pay-out (or lack thereof) for hitting similar targets rather than considering a variety of financial and operational metrics. • The use of absolute metrics for incentive programs may not be appropriate as it may reflect economic or industry factors beyond the control of executives. Performance conditions should include relative targets. | For | Against |
| 14 | The company has not disclosed the performance targets for its long-term compensation plan. Shareholder Proposal Regarding Gender and Ethnicity Pay Equity Report | Against | For |
| | Vote Note: Not only can inequitable compensation cause workplace dissatisfaction, lost productivity and high turnover, pay inequity can result in expensive and time-consuming lawsuits for the company. Moreover, issues related to pay equity can create significant competitive concerns, as those companies who are able to demonstrate and who have taken steps to narrow the gender/ethnicity pay gap are better situated to both retain and attract employees. | ,,5450 | . 5. |

| 15 | Shareholder Proposal Regarding Prison Labor Report | Against | For |
|----|---|---------|-----|
| | Vote Note: The use of prison labor in the supply chain can present significant reputational risks for | | |
| | companies. For example, in 2015 Whole Foods Market faced consumer backlash over its sale of goat | | |
| | cheese produced by inmates in Colorado. In response, the grocer committed to stopping sourcing | | |
| | foods produced using prison labor by April 2016 (Allison Aubrey. «Whole Foods Says It Will Stop Selling | | |
| | Foods Made with Prison Labor.» NPR. September 30, 2015). | | |
| 16 | Shareholder Proposal Regarding Report on Human Rights Risks | Against | For |
| | Vote Note: In recent years, there has been a growing focus on companies' supply chains. While companies, themselves, may not be implicated in certain human rights-related controversies, companies within their supply chains may have problematic practices. As has been seen at other companies, not establishing processes to monitor and take corrective action when such issues arise at suppliers can expose a company to significant reputational and direct risks. A report on the Company's | | |
| | process for identifying and analyzing potential and actual human rights risks of operations and its | | |
| | supply chain could help with the evaluation of related risks. | | |

US Bancorp Voted — Country of Trade: United States — Annual Meeting Agenda 4/16/2019

| Proposal | Proposal Text | Mgmt Rec | Vote Cast |
|----------|---|----------|-----------|
| 1 | Elect Warner L. Baxter | For | For |
| 2 | Elect Dorothy J. Bridges | For | For |
| 3 | Elect Elizabeth Buse | For | For |
| 4 | Elect Marc N. Casper | For | For |
| 5 | Elect Andrew Cecere | For | For |
| 6 | Elect Arthur D. Collins, Jr. | For | For |
| 7 | Elect Kimberly J. Harris | For | For |
| 8 | Elect Roland Hernandez | For | For |
| 9 | Elect Doreen Woo Ho | For | For |
| 10 | Elect Olivia F. Kirtley | For | For |
| 11 | Elect Karen S. Lynch | For | For |
| 12 | Elect Richard P. McKenney | For | For |
| 13 | Elect Yusuf I. Mehdi | For | For |
| 14 | Elect David B. O'Maley | For | For |
| 15 | Elect O'dell M. Owens | For | For |
| 16 | Elect Craig D. Schnuck | For | For |
| 17 | Elect Scott W. Wine | For | Against |
| | Vote Note: This director nominee appears to have too many commitments to fulfill his duties as a director. He serves as chair and CEO of Polaris Industries Inc and sits on a total of three public company boards. | | |
| 18 | Ratification of Auditor | For | Against |
| | Vote Note: The non-audit-related fees are 28.3% of the total fees paid to the auditor. We believe that non-audit-related work could have been performed by a separate auditor so as to not compromise the independence of the auditor and the integrity of the Company's financial statements. | | |
| 19 | Advisory Vote on Executive Compensation Vote Note: It is not clear that executive compensation sufficiently ties pay with performance in a manner that aligns executives with the long-term interests of the company. For example: • Threshold performance for the ROE metric is 25th percentile versus peers which may not be sufficiently challenging. • The use of a single metric for the long-term incentive program may not be appropriate. Performance related compensation should be linked to a variety of specific objective measures of the company's operational and financial performance. • The use of only absolute metrics for the short-term incentive program may not be appropriate as it may reflect economic or industry factors beyond the control of executives. Performance conditions should include relative targets. | For | Against |

$\textbf{Union Pacific Corp.} \ \ \text{Voted}-\text{Country of Trade: United States}-\text{Annual Meeting Agenda 5/16/2019}$

| Proposal 1 2 3 4 5 | Proposal Text Elect Andrew H. Card, Jr. Elect Erroll B. Davis, Jr. Elect William J. DeLaney Elect David B. Dillon Elect Lance M. Fritz | Mgmt Rec For For For For | Vote Cast For For For For |
|--------------------|---|--------------------------------------|---------------------------------------|
| 6 | Elect Lance M. Fritz Elect Deborah C. Hopkins Elect Jane H. Lute Elect Michael R. McCarthy | For | For |
| 7 | | For | For |
| 8 | | For | For |

| 9 | Elect Thomas F. McLarty III | For | For |
|----|---|---------|---------|
| 10 | Elect Bhavesh V. Patel | For | Against |
| | Vote Note: This director is not independent because he is on the Chair of the Management Board and CEO of LyondellBasell Industries, N.V., which paid the Company \$112 million and \$115 million for transportation services in fiscal year 2017 and 2018, respectively. He is on the compensation and audit committees. These committees should be 100% independent. | | |
| 11 | Elect Jose H. Villarreal | For | For |
| 12 | Ratification of Auditor | For | For |
| 13 | Advisory Vote on Executive Compensation | For | Against |
| | Vote Note: It is not clear that executive compensation sufficiently ties pay with performance in a manner that aligns executives with the long-term interests of the company. For example: • The use of only absolute metrics for the short-term incentive program may not be appropriate as it may reflect economic or industry factors beyond the control of executives. Performance conditions should include relative targets. • The company has not disclosed the performance objectives for some metrics under its long-term compensation plan. | | |
| 14 | Shareholder Proposal Regarding Independent Chair | Against | For |
| | Vote Note: Having an independent chair can lead to a clearer separation of responsibility between the board and management, reduce conflicts related to executive compensation and succession planning and help with the recruitment of independent directors. An independent director may increase the diversity of information available to the board and promote an independent mindset in the other directors. | | |

United Parcel Service, Inc. Voted — Country of Trade: United States — Annual Meeting Agenda 5/9/2019

| Proposal | Proposal Text | Mgmt Rec | Vote Cast |
|-----------------|---|----------|-----------|
| 1 1 0 p 0 3 d t | Elect David P. Abney | For | For |
| 2 | • | | |
| 2 | Elect Rodney C. Adkins | For | For |
| 3 | Elect Michael J. Burns | For | For |
| 4 | Elect William R. Johnson | For | For |
| 5 | Elect Ann M. Livermore | For | For |
| 6 | Elect Rudy H.P. Markham | For | For |
| 7 | Elect Franck J. Moison | For | For |
| 8 | Elect Clark T. Randt, Jr. | For | For |
| 9 | Elect Christiana Smith Shi | For | For |
| 10 | Elect John T. Stankey | For | For |
| 11 | Elect Carol B. Tomé | For | For |
| 12 | Elect Kevin M. Warsh | For | For |
| 13 | Ratification of Auditor | For | For |
| 14 | Shareholder Proposal Regarding Lobbying Report | Against | Against |
| 15 | Shareholder Proposal Regarding Recapitalization | Against | For |
| | Vote Note: Dual-class voting structures are typically not in the best interests of common shareholders. Allowing one vote per share generally operates as a safeguard for common shareholders by ensuring that those who hold a significant minority of shares are able to weigh in on issues set forth by the board. | | |
| 16 | Shareholder Proposal Regarding Linking Executive Pay to Sustainability Vote Note: Linking sustainability metrics to executive compensation could reduce risks related to sustainability underperformance, incent employees to meet sustainability goals and achieve resultant benefits, and increase accountability. | Against | For |

Unitedhealth Group Inc Voted — Country of Trade: United States — Annual Meeting Agenda 6/3/2019

| Proposal 1 | Proposal Text Elect William C. Ballard, Jr. | Mgmt Rec For | Vote Cast Against |
|---------------|---|-----------------|-----------------------------|
| | Vote Note: This nominee is among those nominees that served on the audit committee while backdating of options occurred or the company restated its financial statements. According to the Company's Form 10-K for fiscal year 2006, the majority of options granted between 1994 and 2002 had incorrect measurement dates. In addition, this nominee has been a director for 26 years and may no longer be considered independent. | | |
| 2 | Elect Richard T. Burke Vote Note: This nominee is among those nominees that served on the audit committee while backdating of options occurred or the company restated its financial statements. According to the Company's Form 10-K for fiscal year 2006, the majority of options granted between 1994 and 2002 had incorrect measurement dates. This director is the owner of Rainy Partners, LLC, which paid the Company approximately \$398,600 in health insurance premiums in fiscal year 2018. In addition, this nominee has been a director for 42 years and may no longer be considered independent. | For | Against |

| 3 | Elect Timothy P. Flynn | For | For |
|----|--|---------|----------|
| 4 | Elect Stephen J. Hemsley | For | For |
| 5 | Elect Michele J. Hooper | For | For |
| 6 | Elect F. William McNabb, III | For | For |
| 7 | Elect Valerie C. Montgomery Rice | For | For |
| 8 | Elect John H. Noseworthy | For | For |
| 9 | Elect Glenn M. Renwick | For | For |
| 10 | Elect David S. Wichmann | For | For |
| 11 | Elect Gail R. Wilensky | For | Against |
| | Vote Note: This nominee is among those nominees that served on the audit committee while backdating of options occurred or the company restated its financial statements. According to the Company's Form 10-K for fiscal year 2006, the majority of options granted between 1994 and 2002 had incorrect measurement dates. This director is a senior fellow of Project HOPE, which paid the Company approximately \$1.3 million in health insurance premiums and received \$354,000 in network provider services, \$150,000 in sponsorship fees and \$190,000 in donations from the Company during 2016. In addition, this nominee has been a director for 26 years and may no longer be considered independent. | | |
| 12 | Advisory Vote on Executive Compensation | For | Against |
| | Vote Note: It is not clear that executive compensation sufficiently ties pay with performance in a manner that aligns executives with the long-term interests of the company. For example: • The company's short-term incentive program uses metrics to determine the size of bonus pool, but the compensation committee determines individual cash bonuses on a discretionary basis. • The use of absolute metrics for incentive programs may not be appropriate as it may reflect economic or industry factors beyond the control of executives. Performance conditions should include relative targets. • The company has not disclosed the performance thresholds or targets for its long-term compensation plan. | | 3 |
| 13 | Ratification of Auditor | For | For |
| 14 | Shareholder Proposal Regarding Proxy Access Bylaw Amendment Vote Note: Proxy access is an important shareholder right that reinforces the board's accountability to minority shareholders. This proposal suggests amending the existing proxy access bylaw to remove the 20 shareholder limit for achieving the ownership threshold of 3% common stock ownership held for three years. Even if the 20 largest public pension funds were able to aggregate their shares, they would not meet the current 3% criteria for a continuous three years at most companies according to the Council of Institutional Investors. | Against | For |

Walt Disney Co Voted — Country of Trade: United States — Annual Meeting Agenda 3/7/2019

| Proposal | Proposal Text | Mgmt Rec | Vote Cast |
|----------|--|----------|-----------|
| 1 | Elect Susan E. Arnold | For | For |
| 2 | Elect Mary T. Barra | For | For |
| 3 | Elect Safra A. Catz | For | For |
| 4 | Elect Francis deSouza | For | For |
| 5 | Elect Michael Froman | For | For |
| 6 | Elect Robert A. Iger | For | For |
| 7 | Elect Maria Elena Lagomasino | For | For |
| 8 | Elect Mark G. Parker | For | For |
| 9 | Elect Derica W. Rice | For | For |
| 10 | Ratification of Auditor | For | For |
| 11 | Advisory Vote on Executive Compensation | For | Against |
| | Vote Note: It is not clear that executive compensation sufficiently ties pay with performance in a manner that aligns executives with the long-term interests of the company. For example: • Threshold performance for the growth in shareholder value metric is 25 th percentile versus the S&P500 which may not be the appropriate peer group or be sufficiently challenging. • The total compensation of the CEO is quite high relative to the other named executive officers which may indicate there are problems with succession planning or effective structuring of pay. | | |
| 12 | Shareholder Proposal Regarding Lobbying Report Vote Note: Improved disclosure of lobbying expenditures and trade association spending and the company's related policies and practices could help with the evaluation of related risks and opportunities. | Against | For |
| 13 | Shareholder Proposal Regarding Linking Executive Pay to Cybersecurity Vote Note: The proposal asks that the Board "publish a report (at reasonable expense, within a reasonable time, and omitting confidential or propriety information) assessing the feasibility of integrating additional cyber security and data privacy metrics into the performance measures of senior executives under Disney's compensation incentive plans." We think this is a reasonable request and we think the exercise of determining how cybersecurity could be linked to executive pay will cause the company to review their risk management and governance of cybersercurity. | Against | For |

Wells Fargo & Co. Voted — Country of Trade: United States — Annual Meeting Agenda 4/23/2019

| Proposal | Proposal Text | Mgmt Rec | Vote Cast |
|----------|--|----------|-----------|
| 1 | Elect John D. Baker II | For | For |
| 2 | Elect Celeste A. Clark | For | For |
| 3 | Elect Theodore F. Craver, Jr. | For | For |
| 4 | Elect Elizabeth A. Duke | For | For |
| 5 | Elect Wayne M. Hewett | For | For |
| 6 | Elect Donald M. James | For | For |
| 7 | Elect Maria R. Morris | For | For |
| 8 | Elect Juan A. Pujadas | For | For |
| 9 | Elect James H. Quigley | For | For |
| 10 | Elect Ronald L. Sargent | For | For |
| 11 | Elect C. Allen Parker | For | For |
| 12 | Elect Suzanne M. Vautrinot | For | For |
| 13 | Advisory Vote on Executive Compensation | For | Against |
| | Vote Note: It is not clear that executive compensation sufficiently ties pay with performance in a manner that aligns executives with the long-term interests of the company. For example: | | |
| | Threshold performance for the growth in shareholder value metric is bottom quartile ranking versus peers which may not be sufficiently challenging. | | |
| | • The company's short-term incentive program uses metrics to determine the size of bonus pool, | | |
| | but the compensation committee determines individual cash bonuses on a discretionary basis. | | |
| 14 | Amendment to the Long-Term Incentive Compensation Plan | For | Against |
| | Vote Note: We oppose the use of stock options to compensate directors. | _ | _ |
| 15 | Ratification of Auditor | For | For |
| 16 | Shareholder Proposal Regarding Incentive Compensation Report | Against | Against |
| 17 | Shareholder Proposal Regarding Median Gender Pay Equity Report | Against | For |
| | Vote Note: Not only can inequitable compensation cause workplace dissatisfaction, lost productivity and high turnover, pay inequity can result in expensive and time-consuming lawsuits for the company. | | |
| | Moreover, issues related to gender pay equity can create significant competitive concerns, as those | | |
| | companies who are able to demonstrate and who have taken steps to narrow the gender pay gap are | | |
| | better situated to both retain and attract employees. | | |